CHAPTER 1
Introducing participatory debates in late modernity
In recent years, ‘participation’ has become a common or ‘trendy’ concept that appears in debates involving several different fields, from political science to arts and media studies (Carpentier, 2011). Although some level of citizen participation is normally understood as something positive and necessary in democratic societies, discrepancy exists with regard to the level or intensity of this participation. Different disciplines are debating to what extent existing actors and institutions should allow more citizen participation, how these actors can take into consideration citizens’ needs and preferences in their decision-‐making processes, and which sectors of society are still unrepresented (Livingstone, 2013). Despite its centrality in present debates, some authors have claimed there is a lack of clarity in academia about the meaning and definition of this core concept (Carpentier & Dahlgren, 2011), that tends to be adapted according to the context or particular field in which is used (Dahlgren, 2013; Pateman, 1970).
In explaining this lack of clarity in definitions around participation, some authors point out the confusion between participatory practices and their conditions of possibility, due to too broad an understanding of the concept (Carpentier &
Dahlgren, 2011). As Livingstone (2013) argues , to participate is a verb that implies some action and taking part, or being actively involved, in something. Carpentier (2011) established a distinction between access (based on presence), interaction (based on a social-‐communicative human-‐human or human-‐object relationship) and participation, the former two being conditions of possibility of the latter one.
According to Carpentier (2011), for a practice to be truly participative it must
involve some level of power in decision-‐making related processes. Consequently, visiting a museum or gallery, or being politically engaged cannot be considered as true or full participation, as they do not involve any access to power or any control of the decisions that condition this concrete practice.
Theorizing about participation, Carpentier argues that rather than being an academic construct, the term is better defined as a part of a political-‐ideological struggle that takes place in many societal fields, between minimalist and maximalist discourses which try to limit or enhance the meanings of participation (Carpentier & De Cleen, 2008). The core issue involving these discourses about participation is then the notion of power, and how it is distributed within a particular societal field. Following a Foucauldian approach to the concept of power (understood as an element always present in social relations), Carpentier believes that these power struggles are never restricted to just one concrete field, being consequently similarly repeated in many different contexts. Accordingly, there are debates about the concept of participation that share important similarities in the art world, with participatory art (Bishop, 2012), or in the field of media and communications with new media and audience participation (Jenkins &
Carpentier, 2013), as well as the long-‐term debates in political theory between direct participation and political representation (Held, 2006). In all these societal fields, then, the same struggles between discourses related to different distributions of power and access to structures of participation and decision-‐
making processes are present and vividly active (Carpentier, 2011).
The next two parts of this section will be aimed at analysing the different approaches to the concept of participation in the two societal fields to which this research is related: democratic theory and media studies. It will be seen how in these two fields similar debates coexist about the nature and limits of participation, although each field also has some particularities which merit separate analysis. Furthermore, the next two parts will also introduce Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) ‘discourse theory’ and its basic concepts of power relations, hegemony and access to structures of participation or decision-‐making processes.
This social theory is also adopted in its basic premises by many relevant authors
quoted in this research, such as Carpentier (2011), Dahlgren, (2009 and 2013) or Press and Williams (2010), and is also an important theoretical referent for the construction and analysis of the focus groups that form the qualitative part of this investigation, as will be seen in the last chapter of part one, which will present the methodological issues. The aim of this first section is then to establish a general context for the next sections of this theoretical background chapter and the subsequent chapters that form this thesis.
1.1. Participation in democratic theory
It is perhaps in the field of democratic theory that it is easier to understand and analyse the components of power relations that compose the different approaches or theories related to participation. Following Carole Pateman’s classic definition, full participation, as a political-‐democratic theoretical concept, can be understood as all the existing actors in a decision-‐making process having a similar power position (Pateman, 1970), whereas partial participation comprises those processes in which several actors participate and influence each other but where just one of them holds the final power to decide. Different models of democracy have articulated these components of power relations in different ways. Accordingly, one of the main characteristics of David Held’s (2006) models of democracy is precisely the way in which these different models articulate citizen participation.
Most of Held’s models can be divided into two broad groups: a) those that defend a certain notion of direct participation by citizens in the decision-‐making processes and b) those that try to control this direct democracy, or people’s self-‐government, limiting participation through the figure of political representation, which implies the transmission or delegation of power at different levels.
An example of the latter group is the ‘Competitive Elitist’ model of democracy, based on the theories of Max Weber (Weber, 1971, 1978) and Joseph Schumpeter (Schumpeter, 1952). According to Held, this model establishes a conception of political life in which there is “little scope for democratic participation and individual or collective development, and where whatever scope existed was
subject to the threat of constant erosion by powerful societal forces” (Held, 1996, p. 125). Participation is then reduced to the election of those individuals who will have the power to rule, and democracy to a method, by which citizens can change rulers and legitimate their decisions through periodic elections of competing political elites. On the other hand, an example of a model closer to the first group could be the ‘Participatory Democracy’ model, based on the theories of Carole Pateman (1970, 1985) and C.B. Macpherson (Macpherson, 1977). This model argues for democratization and a process of opening up political institutions, such as parliament and political parties, in order to make them more accountable and responsible. The model focuses strongly on the reformulation and reorganization of political parties, following the principles and procedures of direct democracy, and enhancing new forms of action at the local level, which is considered as a more suitable level to start a new political culture based on citizens’ direct participation and involvement in the regulation of society and state. The ‘Participatory Democracy’ model, however, does not support “the view that the institutions of direct democracy could be extended to all political, social and economic domains (…) and that complete political and social equality could be created through the self-‐management of all spheres” (Held, 1996, p. 213). Although the model argues for an extension of citizen participation in many societal fields (not just with regard to political institutions), some level of representation is still needed in all these fields, even if submitted to high levels of citizens’ control and accountability.
This balance between participation and representation is one of the dimensions that articulate the distinction between maximalist and minimalist models of democratic participation (Carpentier, 2011). Minimalist models are focused on representation and delegation of power, which implies an understanding of political participation as the election of representatives at the macro-‐level (state, city or region). Citizens’ involvement is then constricted to the realm of institutionalized politics, and the political sphere becomes the unique sphere that has power in decision-‐making processes. On the other hand, maximalist models of democratic participation try to balance representation and participation with a clear aim to maximize, or enhance, citizens’ direct involvement in decision-‐making processes. These models extend participation to other spheres of social and
everyday life, such as family, school, activism or local community, rather than focusing just on institutionalised politics. Political scientist Chantal Mouffe identifies these spheres of the social with the concept of the political, in a clear distinction with the notion of traditional politics. According to Mouffe (2001, 2005) the political refers to all the spheres of the social that include some conflict of interest, or collective antagonism, whether politics is identified with formalised institutional structures and actors or not
Since her publication together with Ernest Laclau of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985), Mouffe’s political and social theory, and her particular approach to discourse analysis (discourse theory), has become highly influential for many authors that have applied their theories not just to political science, but also to other disciplines such as media studies and participation (Carpentier & De Cleen, 2007; 2008). As Phillips and Jørgensen (2002) pointed out, inspired by Marxism and Structuralism, “the overall idea of discourse theory is that social phenomena are never finished or total. Meaning can never be ultimately fixed and this opens up the way for constant social struggles about definitions of society and identity, with resulting social effects” (2002, p. 24). According to discourse theory all societal phenomena and objects obtain meaning only through discourse, understanding this as a structure in which meaning is constantly negotiated and constructed in all the spheres of the social (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985).
However, Laclau and Mouffe break with previous discourse theories in using a broad definition of the text as creator of discourse, and focusing “on the meanings, representations, or ideologies embedded in the text, and not so much on the language of the text” (Carpentier & Spinoy, 2008). The aim of discourse theory then is not to uncover the objective reality, but to explore how different discourses create a particular hegemony through a contingent articulation of power relations (Mouffe, 2013). By doing so, “discourse analysis aims at the deconstruction of the structures that we take for granted; it tries to show that the given organization of the world is the result of political processes with social consequences” (Phillips and Jorgensen, 2002, p. 48).
‘Hegemony’ is then a key concept in Laclau and Mouffe’s theory. It can be found in many spheres of the social struggles that take place between two or more discourses that are trying to become hegemonic: trying to construct the social order in a determined way, excluding all the other possibilities. Discourses are then promoted by different actors that are trying to establish different ways of organizing society, on the basis of different configurations of power relations. The main objective of a discourse that is in this position is to become ‘hegemonic’, and to be understood in society as something beyond dispute, as the natural order of things. However, as Mouffe points out: “Things could always be otherwise. Every order is predicated on the exclusion of other possibilities” (Mouffe, 2013, p. 131). It is precisely in the political where this struggle to ascribe meaning to discourses and organise society take place (Mouffe 2001; 2005).
From a discursive approach, then, debates around the concept of ‘participation’
acquire a strong political connotation. Drawing from discourse theory, Carpentier understands participation as a ‘floating signifier’ that takes different meanings in different discursive contexts, being in democratic theory the objective of a societal struggle between different discourses about democratic participation (Carpentier
& De Cleen, 2007). Each of these discourses attempts to ascribe a particular meaning to ‘participation’: while maximalist discourses are pushing towards a broad understanding of the term, minimalist discourses are trying to narrow the meanings of ‘participation’, and therefore limiting participatory opportunities.
Consequently, the meanings attributed to ‘participation’ “are neither neutral nor accidents of history” (Carpentier & De Cleen, 2008, p. 1), being those ideological processes that define the ways in which citizens practice and understand participation and, more generally, life in democracy.
In fact, Carpentier introduces a normative-‐critical dimension to the concept of participation, considering it as part of the democratic project proposed by Laclau and Mouffe, and consequently, as the object of one of the many political-‐ideological struggles between actors in society5. Participatory debates become, then, a latent
5 However, even if Carpentier positions himself as an advocate of enhancing participation in many different societal fields, he also recognises the fact that ‘full participation’, understood as equal
conflict about “who can become involved in societal decision-‐making processes, in the definition and resolution of societal problems, in deciding which procedures should be followed, and in the societal debates about these definitions, procedures and resolutions” (Carpentier, 2011: 128). Furthermore, Carpentier argues that part of the actual lack of clarity of the term is due to the fact that minimalist discourses are trying to empty the meaning of participatory practices, labelling as
‘participation’ practices that are in reality mere forms of pseudo-‐participation.
Here we have the examples of the ‘participatory’ museum or gallery, in which the audience can just push a button in order to slightly modify the artwork or make it move in a predetermined way; or a ‘participatory’ process of modifying a neighbourhood in a city, by inviting citizens to an exhibition where the project is on view, although all the details have been already approved and decided. Here,
‘participation’ is understood as ‘seeing’ or ‘receiving information’ about the future project. Carpentier’s aim is, then, to establish a definition between what can be considered as ‘participation’ and what are other practices labelled as
‘participatory’ but that in reality are not sharing power equally among the different actors.
Even if Carpentier argues in favour of a maximalist approach to participation, opening up decision-‐making processes not only in the political sphere, but also in many other societal spheres, such as the economy, culture or media (Carpentier and De Cleen, 2008), his can be considered a ‘reductive’ approach to the concept of participation, as for a practice to be understood as ‘participatory’ “we need to look at what decision-‐making processes there are and what kind of power positions people hold” (Jenkins & Carpentier, 2013, p. 274), even if these decision-‐making processes can be understood as formal or informal. Consequently, the absence of power in one actor, or a too unbalanced power relation, implies that a concrete
power positions of all the actors, is a democratic utopia. As Mouffe pointed out, struggles for power and agonistic positions are conditions of existence for democracy: “(…) a pluralist democracy contains a paradox, since the very moment of its realization would see its disintegration. It should be conceived as a good that only exists as good as long it cannot be reached. Such a democracy will therefore always be a democracy ‘to come’, as conflict and antagonism are at the same time its conditions of possibility and the condition of impossibility of its full realization” (Mouffe, 1997, p.
8).
practice cannot be considered as ‘participation’, entering then in other categories.
In the previous examples, the chance to activate the movement of the artwork is understood by Carpentier as ‘interaction’ (based on social-‐communicative human-‐
human or human-‐object relationships), and the possibility for citizens to go to the exhibition that shows the new neighbourhood project as simply ‘access’ (based on presence) to the information6.
This approach, by emphasizing the component of power and the actor’s capacity to influence decision-‐making processes, seems to equal participation with an expression of political agency. Despite the fact that it successfully theorises participation and connects the concept with societal struggles and democratic theory, expanding it to ‘the political’ and avoiding the limitations of the traditional connection between participation and traditional politics, the result is a theory of participation that reduces the concept to practices directly aimed to influence, whether formally or informally, decision-‐making processes. Consequently, practices more embedded in everyday life contexts, such as public talk (connected with Habermas’ (Habermas, 1989) notion of the public sphere), remain out of the conceptualization of participation. Although Carpentier does not seek to diminish the importance of such practices in democratic life, he prefers to label them as
‘interaction’, or as constitutive of engagement (a prerequisite for participation).
However, some other authors disagree, arguing for recognizing public talk as one of the key elements of citizens’ politically meaningful participation: “Political talk (that actually engages with the political) such as in a face-‐to-‐face discussion, or in an online forum or on Facebook, would be seen as participation; it is the enhancement of the public sphere, where opinion can take shape” (Dahlgren, 2013:19). Moreover, Henry Jenkins, in an interesting discussion with Nico Carpentier, points out the social and cultural dimensions of participation (Jenkins
& Carpentier, 2013). Jenkins acknowledges the importance of some participatory practices non-‐established in decision-‐making processes or power relations contexts, but nevertheless ‘political’ in their aims (or with the potential to be so), such as talking about public issues, inviting someone to a political or civic
6 Carpentier’s typology of Access – Interaction – Participation will be more extensively analysed in the next section, when I will focus on issues about media and participation.
association gathering, or even practices such as dissemination or curation of cultural and political content (Jenkins, Ford, & Green, 2013).
Rosanvallon (2008) follows this broad understanding of democratic participation in his definition of the concept as a complex process that involves three different dimensions between the people and the political sphere: A) Expression: citizens’
ability to articulate their voices and discuss the actions of their representatives, implying for example all the range of practices linked with debate and public talk, even if this is face-‐to-‐face or online. B) Involvement: the whole range of practices that implies citizens gathering and agreeing collective action to achieve common goals, like the recent assemblies conducted by new social movements, but also more traditional forms of meeting like neighbours’ associations or other civically aimed formal or informal groups of citizens. C) Intervention: practices that imply action aimed at influencing or producing a desired result, like for example demonstrations, or other activities such as signing law petitions or campaigning.
Rosanvallon points out how some forms of participation included in these dimensions have increased their importance in recent years, at the same time as more traditional forms of political participation (like voting or joining a party) have been losing their central position in democratic life. These new forms of participation can be linked with protest politics or new social movements, aimed not at affecting already existing decision-‐making processes but at changing the political and economic structures (Stiegler, 2012; Žižek, 2012). At another and less radical level, new forms of participation in ‘the political’ also emerged in the context of new –isms (such as feminism or ecologism) that appeared in the post-‐
modern phase of development in advanced industrial societies, characterized also by a declining respect for authority and a growing support for democratic and participative values (Inglehart, 1997). These new forms of engagement imply bringing to the public sphere a new set of practices (signing petitions, boycotting, performance actions, pacific resistance, and so on…) that are also linked with lifestyle or new personal identifications that break the previously more political and fixed distinctions of centre-‐periphery or right-‐left cleavage (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967).
Recent literature in late modernity (Bauman, 2000, 2005; Beck & Beck-‐Gernsheim, 2002; Giddens, 1991), is summarised by Dahlgren (2009), by pointing out some trends that may affect citizens’ engagement and the ways in which they prefer to participate in ‘the political’. Dahlgren argues that society is becoming more
Recent literature in late modernity (Bauman, 2000, 2005; Beck & Beck-‐Gernsheim, 2002; Giddens, 1991), is summarised by Dahlgren (2009), by pointing out some trends that may affect citizens’ engagement and the ways in which they prefer to participate in ‘the political’. Dahlgren argues that society is becoming more