Most academic accounts on radical politics in Britain tend to focus on fascism (e.g.
Copsey 1996) or the extreme right (e.g. Eatwell and Goodwin 2010), instead of populism (See Fella 2008 for an exception). The latter term has, nevertheless, regularly been used to refer to individual politicians. Two Conservative politicians in particular have been associated with populism: Enoch Powell and Margaret Thatcher (Fry 1998). In the case of Powell this often relates to the politician‟s infamous „rivers of blood‟ speech from 1968, in which he expressed concern with immigration and racial violence (see e.g. Canovan 1981). Thatcher‟s alleged populism is often associated with her appeal to the common „middle England‟ people, her emphasis on the decline of Britain and her crusade against socialism, Thatcher‟s main enemy „from within‟ (Fella 2008: 188). Whether these features are all undeniably „populist‟ is a moot point. In any case, as the central aim here is to identify populist parties instead of individual politicians, the question whether it is justifiable to label these political figures as populist is not directly relevant.
Until the general election of 2010, governments in post-Second World War Britain have always been formed by a single party; either by the centre-right Conservatives (the „Tories‟) or the centre-left Labour Party. The reason for the continuing dominance of these two parties is related to the disproportional Single Member Plurality (or „First Past the Post‟) electoral system, as will be discussed in
Section 6.3. Due to the dominance of two parties, it is seemingly easier to pin down which parties belong to the political „establishment‟ in the UK, than in countries more acquainted with coalition governments of varying compositions. In this sense, it has been quite straightforward for populist parties to identify the source of political evil. In the UK, however, all parties which have traditionally been part of the opposition – populist or not – have focused their critique on this political establishment. The
„majoritarian‟ character of British democracy can therefore be expected to make differentiating between populist and non-populist opposition parties a challenging task (see Lijphart 1999)2. Particularly the lack of coalition governments for most of the post-war era might have given British politics a distinctive adversarial character.
In an attempt to identify the British populist parties one can first turn to the various regionalist parties which managed to enter the House of Commons from the 1970s onwards. These are the regionalist parties in Scotland (the Scottish National Party) and Wales (Plaid Cymru) and several Northern Irish parties, which have either promoted British Unionism (Ulster Unionist Party and Democratic Unionist Party) or Irish Republicanism (Social Democratic and Labour Party and Sinn Féin). In their campaigns many of these regionalist parties have tended to apply anti-establishment rhetoric directed both at the Tories and Labour. According to the 2010 general election manifesto of the Welsh nationalists, for instance, “Labour has slavishly followed Tory policies for 13 years and [Conservative Party leader] Cameron has modelled himself and his politics on Tony Blair” (Plaid Cymru 2010: 4). The Scottish Nationalists applied a similar rhetoric: “The London parties are part of the same metropolitan political machine – a machine that leaves the ordinary men and women of our country on the outside” (SNP 2010: 7).
It is hard to deny that this latter passage is a populist statement. The main distinction between these regionalist parties and the parties that are considered to be populist parties in this study, however, is that the latter criticise the political establishment within their nation, whereas the regionalists attack a „foreign‟
establishment, in this case the „Westminster‟ political elite. The critique of the regionalist parties has been driven by an aversion against the central government which supposedly does not represent the interests of the people in their specific region, rather than the country as a whole. Another reason why the regionalist parties are different from the populist parties in this research is that their personality is, so to say, split between the national and the regional level. On the national level, they may have
2 A content analysis on the use of populism in the British print media hardly sheds light on the matter, as especially Conservative and Labour politicians are associated with populist statements or behaviour (Bale et al. 2011).
operated under the guise of anti-establishment parties, but all regionalist parties in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have taken part in their regional executives. In other words, on the regional level, these parties have very much been part of the political establishment3. In the regional elections of May 2011, the Scottish National Party even won an outright majority of the seats in the Scottish Parliament. All in all, while it is again apparent that lines between populist and non-populist parties are not always easy to draw, these regionalist parties will not be considered to be populist parties.
Another regionalist and separatist party from Scotland, the Scottish Socialist Party, comes closer to being a genuine populist party. In the scholarly literature, the party has indeed been referred to as „social-populist‟ (March and Mudde 2005: 35-6) or „populist socialist‟ (March 2009: 127). The party proclaimed it “has a well-earned reputation as the party that stands up for ordinary people, whether it be offering solidarity to striking workers, campaigning against the injustice of the Council Tax or taking to the streets in opposition to Blair‟s illegal war on Iraq” (SSP 2005: 2). In its 2005 general election manifesto the party further argued that “the mainstream political parties offer no more choice than the competing burger fast food chains or pizza parlours” (SSP 2005: 2). Different from the Scottish National Party, the Scottish Socialist Party also targeted the political establishment in Scotland itself: “We reject the gravy trains of both Westminster and Holyrood” (SSP 2005: 12)4. Even though this party voiced a more explicit populist discourse, it still only appealed to the ordinary Scottish people, instead of the ordinary people across the whole of Britain. Moreover, the party has played a very marginal role in general elections; it only fielded candidates in ten constituencies in 2010, without any success. Since the focus in this dissertation is on the performance of populist parties on the nation-wide level, this chapter will not further consider the SSP.
Moving beyond the parties which strictly operate on a regional basis, the Green Party, in 2010 elected into parliament in the Brighton Pavilion constituency, had quite a damning analysis about the state of British politics as well. Its 2010 manifesto starts with: “Business as usual, brought to you by the main political parties, has given us a series of linked economic, environmental and social crises” (Green Party 2010: 2). The party did not refer to „ordinary people‟, however, and, although one of its aims was to
„bring government to the people‟ (Green Party 2010: 32), it never stated that politicians should categorically follow these people‟s opinions and wishes.
3 The Northern Ireland Executive is even comprised of all regionalist parties, due to a consociationalist power-sharing agreement.
4 „Holyrood‟ refers to the Scottish Parliament, which is located in the Holyrood area, Edinburgh.
The radical left-wing party Respect, on the other hand, can be classified as a populist party. In 2005 the party won a Lower House seat on the basis of an anti-Iraq war platform (which it would lose again in 2010). The party argued that Britain‟s
„huge‟ wealth “remains largely in the hands of a tiny elite (...) There is no longer any significant difference between the major parties on these issues. They all subscribe to the same basic economic model, of privatisation and the freedom of the market”
(Respect 2005: 18). Other than most populist parties in Western Europe, Respect has actually conveyed an „inclusive‟ vision of the ideal British society when immigration and multiculturalism are concerned. The party even argued that “Britain's diversity is its strength” (2010: 5). Respect did identify enemies „from within‟, however, as it argued that Britain‟s diversity “is under threat by those who would rather ordinary people turn against one another than come together to confront the real culprits – big business and the mainstream politicians who do its bidding” (Respect 2005: 13). Yet since Respect, like the Scottish Socialist Party, has only played a very marginal role in national-level British politics, it will be excluded from the analysis. The party‟s electoral potential in Westminster elections has inherently been limited due to its modest supply of candidates. The party only fielded eleven candidates in 2010.
As has been shown so far, at least one of the elements of populism, the anti-establishment critique, has been widely shared by the whole political opposition. What is more, the use of (populist) anti-establishment rhetoric has not been limited to smaller fringe parties. The Liberal Democrats, the junior partner of the Conservatives in the coalition government formed in 2010, also emphasised the unresponsiveness of the two main parties in their 2010 manifesto: “We‟ve had 65 years of Labour and the Conservatives: the same parties taking turns and making the same mistakes, letting you down” (Liberal Democrats 2010: 4). The party promised to “do things differently, because we believe that power should be in the hands of people, not politicians”
(Liberal Democrats 2010: 87). In the 2010 general election campaign even the Conservative Party criticised the established political system and stated that “our political system has betrayed the people” (Conservative Party 2010: iii) – a strong statement for a party which has so frequently dominated British government in the past few centuries. Peter Mair (2002), finally, discusses the rhetoric used by Tony Blair‟s (New) Labour Party and asserts that “populist language has now become acceptable within what has long been perceived as a decidedly non-populist political culture” (Mair 2002: 92)5.
5 More generally, Mair (2002) notes a shift from „party democracy‟ to „populist democracy‟. Mair uses the concept „populist democracy‟ to refer to a form of governing in which the people have
Populism may thus be a typical feature of contemporary British party politics in general. This is, as discussed before, arguably related to the majoritarian character of British democracy. Following the definition applied in this dissertation, however, it would be incorrect to claim that Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats are populist parties. The latter party has not conveyed an exclusivist vision of British society, which can for instance be illustrated by its generally pro-European stance, and has not identified clear non-political „enemies of the people‟. Particularly the two dominant parties in Britain are clearly not fundamentally opposed to the existing political establishment as it has developed throughout the decades. Labour and the Conservatives have actually embodied this very establishment. Apart from being associated with populism, Tony Blair‟s New Labour has, for instance, also been portrayed as “part of an out-of-touch cosmopolitan „politically correct‟ liberal Establishment” (Fella 2008: 191). Even if the parties have sporadically used populist statements, it can hardly be claimed that Labour and the Conservatives have populism at the core of their appeal. Anti-establishment, or even populist, rhetoric might be applied when in opposition, but it is not a central or constant feature of the two parties.
This is also shown in the content analysis performed by Matthijs Rooduijn and Teun Pauwels (2011). Whereas the authors find that the Conservative Manifesto of 2001 and the Liberal Democrat manifesto of 2005 contained relatively many populist statements compared to other European mainstream parties, the parties still clearly lagged behind two more usual suspects: the British National Party (BNP) and the UK Independence Party (UKIP)6. The results of the expert survey conducted for this case study also provides support for classifying only these two parties as „populist‟. Both the BNP and UKIP where considered to be populist parties by ten out of the fifteen respondents. Respect was mentioned four times, whereas none of the respondents included Labour, the Conservatives or the Liberal Democrats. Consequently, the remainder of this chapter will focus on the electoral performance of the BNP and UKIP.
The British National Party
The British National Party was founded in 1982 by the extreme right hardliner John Tyndall. Two years earlier Tyndall was ousted from the National Front (NF), a party which is normally defined as (neo) fascist (see e.g. Eatwell 1996; Copsey 1996). The
become undifferentiated and in which the role of political parties has decreased. This is quite disconnected from how the term „populism‟ is applied in this research.
6 In this content analysis, paragraphs in manifestos were coded as „populist‟ when statements including people-centrism and anti-elitism were made (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011)
NF was founded in 1967 and managed to build up some electoral support in the 1970s on the basis of its xenophobic appeal. In a 1973 West Bromwich (Birmingham) by-election, for instance, a NF candidate managed to win 16% of the vote. After disappointing results in the 1979 general election, however, the party suffered from internal dissent and never played a considerable electoral role anymore.
Under the leadership of Tyndall the course of the BNP was largely similar to that of the NF. The party still “clung rigidly to the core pillars of biological racism, radical xenophobia and anti-democratic appeals” (Goodwin 2011: 37). In the first decade of its existence the party was more concerned with participating in „rights for whites‟ marches than in fighting elections. The only electoral achievement of the BNP was to win a local borough council seat in East London in 1993, which the party lost again a year later. By this time, the party had begun to apply a new strategy which involved “sinking local community roots through „public-spirited‟ activity” (Copsey 1996: 130). The BNP sought to gain political legitimacy and to shrug off its extremist neo-Nazi image by focusing on the grievances of local white residents (Copsey 2008;
Goodwin 2011).
Real programmatic reforms were pushed through when Nick Griffin replaced John Tyndall after a leadership battle in 1999, even though Griffin himself had previously not been the main „moderniser‟ at all (Eatwell 2004; Copsey 2008: 74-5).
The party took inspiration from the more successful radical right-wing parties on mainland Europe, most notably the Front National in France (Goodwin 2011), and now explicitly rejected a political and economic system of fascist totalitarianism. The party also dropped its commitment to compulsory repatriation of immigrants. At the same time the party adopted a „differentialist‟ line on race (Eatwell 2004). The BNP now claimed that, although no race is superior to another, mixing people from different ethnic backgrounds threatens cultural identity and social cohesion. Especially since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the BNP emphasised the cultural threat of Islam in this regard (Copsey 2008). The BNP also continued to pursue its „local community‟ strategy (Goodwin 2007; 2008; Rhodes 2009). In order to further cultivate a „legitimate‟ image, the BNP moved away from a narrow focus on immigration and targeted more commonplace local issues “such as crime, antisocial behaviour, rubbish collection and pressures on social housing” (Goodwin 2008: 356).
It can be debated how much the BNP has truly changed. According to Nigel Copsey (2007: 61), “ideological renewal under Griffin constitutes a recalibration of fascism rather than a fundamental break in ideological continuity”, meaning that the BNP‟s long term objective still is “a post-liberal, regenerated national community”
(Copsey 2007: 79). Copsey still perceives the BNP to be neo-fascist, rather than
„national-populist‟, as the party does not truly commit to liberal democracy. The ideological modernisation can, according to Copsey (2008: 164-5), better be perceived as an opportune „change of clothing‟ instead of a real break with the past. In this study the BNP is, nonetheless, considered to be a populist party. Many BNP insiders may indeed still be driven by fascist and biological racist convictions (Goodwin 2010:
179), but the BNP is here classified based on how it portrays itself to the wider electorate. In recent years, the BNP explicitly aimed to present itself as a democratic party. The manifesto for the 2005 general election – titled „Rebuilding British Democracy‟ – actually warns against too much power in the hand of the central state.
This has, as argued, previously led to the “excesses and horrors of totalitarianism on mainland Europe throughout the 20th century” (BNP 2005: 9). In the party‟s 2010 general election manifesto, named „Democracy, Freedom, Culture and Identity‟, Griffin even stated that “The word „democracy‟ appears in the title of our manifesto for good reason. It represents our desire to preserve this great institution” (BNP 2010a: 12).
It furthermore seems appropriate to apply the label populism to the present-day BNP, as the party has combined a strong anti-establishment rhetoric with an explicit appeal to “ordinary British folk” (BNP 2005: 53; see also Fella 2008). The party, for instance, claimed that
It is the „average‟ man and woman who suffers from the failings of our politicians to grasp the issue and restore genuine democracy (...) The British National Party exists to put an end to this injustice. We will return power to the men and women of Britain, the taxpayers, pensioners, mums and dads and workers” (BNP 2005: 3).
On the BNP‟s website, Nick Griffin voiced some further populist anti-establishment rhetoric: “While we struggle to pay the bills and live in fear of losing our jobs, the crooked politicians are fiddling their expenses and stealing taxpayers' money” (BNP 2010b). The established parties, moreover, have allegedly neglected the national British interest: “The Lab/Lib/Con alliance long ago abandoned any attempt to run the British economy for the benefit of the nation and have surrendered it to the dead hand of EU regulation and a rootless, amorphous globalist philosophy” (BNP 2010a: 69). In contrast, “The BNP is a patriotic, democratic alternative to the old parties that have wrecked our great country” (BNP 2010b).
The more „moderate‟ and populist course of the BNP has lead to some limited electoral success, most notably on the local level in areas with a relatively large ethnic minority populations. In 2002 the party managed to win three local council seats and this number steadily grew to 55 in May 2009 (Tetteh 2009: 5). To put things in perspective, however, there are in total more than 20,000 principal local authority seats
(Webb 2005: 772). After 2009 the party lost a fair share of its council seats. In European Parliament elections, the BNP also made a modest impact. In 1999, when the European elections were held under a Proportional Representation electoral system for the first time, the party still received no more than 1.1% of the vote. In 2004 the BNP‟s vote share increased to 4.9%, but the party won no seats. In 2009, the BNP did succeed in winning two seats – Griffin taking up one of them – with a vote share of 6.2%.
The BNP never managed to win a seat in the House of Commons. In the general election of 2001, the 33 BNP candidates received 3.9% of the vote on average in the constituencies where the party stood. In Oldham West & Royton (Greater Manchester) the BNP candidate managed to win 16.4% of the vote. In 2005 the party fielded 119 candidates and polled just under 193,000 votes. This was an average vote share of 4.3% in the contested constituencies and 0.7% of the total national vote. This time the Barking (London) candidate managed to secure the best BNP result with 17%
of the vote. In 2010 the party again extended its number of candidates significantly.
The 339 BNP candidates received about 564,000 votes, 1.9% of the total vote. The best result was recorded in Barking once more. Party Leader Griffin won 14.6% of the vote in this constituency and finished third. Even though the BNP vote has thus significantly increased throughout the years, the party has failed to come even close to winning in key battle grounds. The party met the 2010 general election results with
The 339 BNP candidates received about 564,000 votes, 1.9% of the total vote. The best result was recorded in Barking once more. Party Leader Griffin won 14.6% of the vote in this constituency and finished third. Even though the BNP vote has thus significantly increased throughout the years, the party has failed to come even close to winning in key battle grounds. The party met the 2010 general election results with