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That China’s strategic posture seems now well- suited to the requirements of deterrence in the cross- strait contingency does not mean that it has been tailored solely for this purpose. As the guidance makes clear, China’s leaders expect nuclear deterrence to play a role in many high tech local wars under modern conditions—because of the possession of nuclear weapons by some of its neighbors, or their protection under a nuclear shield extended from elsewhere. As one PLA expert has argued: “What, then, are the targets of the nuclear deterrence of China? The targets

are countries with nuclear weapons.”65 _{And what}

countries other than the United States have nuclear

weapons that are also a source of potential conflict

China’s leaders voice optimism about strategic partnership with Russia and the long-term potential for cooperation to bring about a more multipolar world. But this has not prevented China from preparing a deterrent of possible utility against Russia. As noted above, deterrence of the Soviet Union was a key driver of the development of long-range Chinese nuclear strike systems, and of a theater force conceived as necessary for wearing down and ultimately reversing

a Soviet armored invasion of China. China’s first long-

range missile was designed to target Moscow. It is useful to recall that Moscow is protected by a nuclear- tipped missile defense system, and thus that China has been concerned with the problem of penetrating missile defenses for decades. With the end of the Cold War and the drawdown of Russian nuclear forces, there has been no apparent change in China’s nuclear posture vis-à-vis Russia—except its modernization. In the words of one PLA analyst, “Although Russia has

promised us not to be the first to use nuclear weapons

against China, we shall not let down our guard even for 1 day against the fact that the domestic political and economic situations of Russia are unstable and that a large number of nuclear weapons exist in that

country.”66 _{As noted earlier, China has deployed}

medium-range missiles capable of reaching the Russian Far East and longer-range missiles capable of reaching Moscow, and it is now modernizing those systems.

Although the specific mission assignments of China’s

medium-range forces are not known, the number of deployed land-based missiles with these ranges is

approximately between 80 and 100.67

Few in China’s expert community appear to see

the prospect of armed conflict with Russia as in any

“it would be too far-fetched to envision a military

conflict between China and Russia, let alone one

involving nuclear confrontation,” in part because “the strategic partnership formed between China and

Russia removed the prospect of a Russian nuclear first

strike.”68 _{China’s experts seem unworried that Russian}

military doctrine has reembraced first use of nuclear

weapons or by Russian threats to withdraw from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

It is useful to note that some Russian experts do not view the balance of strategic military power along the Sino-Russian border with the same equanimity. Those experts speak privately of the dangerous implications of what they see as China’s unilateral nuclear advantages in Asia. They argue that Russia lacks an intermediate-range system, cannot compensate with deployments of tactical weapons (given the absence of bases along the Chinese border), and cannot credibly counterbalance with long-range systems that are designed to counterbalance the United States. China’s modernization of its theater nuclear missile systems is a key factor in Russia’s case for withdrawal from the INF treaty. A deep underlying factor is the Russian expectation that China will grow stronger and more nationalistic over the coming decades and will seek to redress additional historic grievance against Russia by

exploiting an imbalance of strategic military power.69

Regarding strategic partnership with India, China’s leaders also voice optimism. Economic interactions are intensifying and political relations appear to be warm.

But here, too, China has fielded forces capable of

deterrence missions against India. No public disclosure of the number of such forces has been made by China. In the current situation, China’s nuclear forces can target all of India and can also project power into the

Indian Ocean, whereas India cannot target all of China

and hence is developing the Agni 3 and associated

light warhead to reach Beijing and other targets along China’s northeastern seaboard. There are also reports that China is modifying its most modern bombers to carry long-range cruise missiles, some of which can be

expected to carry nuclear warheads.70

Here too China’s expert community seems largely untroubled by the mutual deterrence relationship. To again cite Yao:

China formed with India a very credible mutual deterrent relationship the moment it went nuclear. Pakistan, a long time friend of China, has been locked into a mutual deterrent relationship with India as well. The pair of deterrent relationships brought about more earnest effort from both India and China for settling territorial disputes by political means.71

China, then, has a mutual deterrent relationship with India. China’s experts attest that China is assured by

India’s no first use commitment. But the modernization

of China’s medium- and intermediate-range missile

systems is improving the force it fields against India

and the recent increases in road-mobile deployment sites noted above raise a question about the size of the future force that China has deemed or might deem necessary to counter India’s rise. Of course, China has also helped build up a nuclear-armed Pakistan as a counterweight to India’s nuclear power and counterfocus of its nuclear planning.

Chinese perceptions of strategic stability in the Sino-Indian relationship apparently differ from Indian perceptions just in the way Chinese and Russian

perceptions differ. As one influential Indian analyst

The Chinese leadership comes from the Maoist tradition

which asserts that power flows from the barrel of a gun.

While calling nuclear weapons paper tigers, it went all out to get them at great cost to their people. It talked about joining the disarmament process if the U.S. and Soviet Union brought down their arsenals to half their original levels and has gone back on it. It talks about

no-first use but tests tactical nuclear weapons which are essentially first-use weapons.72

Some Indian experts are also concerned about the

potentially limited application of China’s no-first-use

principle.

Beijing, while insisting that its nuclear weapons are exclusively “defensive” in nature and focused only on deterring the possibility of nuclear coercion by other nuclear weapon states, has an added proviso that nuclear weapons have a role in preserving its sovereign territorial integrity, thereby extending their use in any military operation it may launch to wrest the territory it claims from India.73

Looking beyond Russia and India as potential foci of China’s strategic deterrent, it is important also to

consider those contingencies involving conflict between

the forces of China, the United States, and/or Japan that may unfold but not involve Taiwan. Whether such contingencies are plausible, or could plausibly lead to potential escalation to the strategic domain, is highly debatable. But they cannot be ruled out of this survey of possible roles of China’s strategic deterrent. The potential for such contingencies arises from China’s increased focus on challenges in its maritime security environment. It has a strategy to “gradually extend the

strategic depth for coastal defense.”74 _{As Taylor Fravel}