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A Evaluation of the b¯b background

In document 2 Heavy neutrino interactions (página 27-31)

The shipping industry had been self-regulating for a long time. By tradition, ships were subject to the laws, rules and regulations of their own flag states and in the countries where they sailed in the past. There was a lack of multilateral harmonisation and uniform standards. The regulation of the maritime world was very late (Perrow, 1999). Although the IMO adopted a considerable number of legal instruments intended to improve maritime safety, the major focus lay on the technical issues rather than human factors.

It was widely acknowledged that the Herald of Free Enterprise accident catalysed the move towards a systematic OHSM strategy in the international shipping industry. In 1987, the capsizing of a UK registered passenger ferry in the English Channel, the Herald of Free Enterprise, ironically caused a loss of almost two hundred lives. Although the immediate causes of the accident were errors on the part of ship’s officers and crew, the in-depth

inquiry showed that the cardinal faults lay in the shore management of the company (see Reason, 2005, p.58). The accident investigation team examined the shore-ship communication process and found that one of the major problems pointed to serious lapses by the shore-based management (HMSO, 1987). Based on that analysis, Goulielmos and Goulielmos (2005, p.490) concluded that ‘long established mis-communication patterns and problematic misconceived dialogues between management and ship officers did not allow for an adaptation to changing parameters’. This was seen as a major characteristic of

‘organisational decline’ and ‘closed systems’ (ibid). These studies highlighted the unique role of shore-ship communication in OHSM in the shipping context.

The sinking of the ship and follow-up investigation result raised noticeable concerns in the international maritime community following the accident. It directly led to the introduction of the ISM Code in 1998 and marked a ‘turning point’ for the industry. Before the introduction of the Code, there had been some positive developments on regulating OHSM through a system based approach in the shipping industry from developed countries such as UK as well as from international industrial bodies such as the International Chamber of Shipping/International Shipping Federation (ICS/ISF); however, they were not well organised lacking an international influence.

The introduction of the Code marked a ‘turning point’ for the industry. It brought about a fundamental change to the way in which OHSM was previously conducted (Anderson, 2003). The IMO, a specialised agency of the United Nations (UN), required every contracting member to implement the Code by enacting corresponding mandatory standards to regulate OHSM in its shipping industry (IMO, 20007). The philosophy underpinning the Code is to require shipping managers and seafarers to transform their traditional operational practice into a regulated system-based approach in order to better manage OHS issues and reduce harm to persons, ships and the environment (Anderson, 2003; Bailey, 2006). All shipping companies around the world subject to the Code were required to establish mandated forms of safety management systems. According to the Code, an OHSMS should consist of some essential elements contained in the Code. The overall functional requirements of the system are:

‘a safety and environmental protection policy, instructions and procedures to ensure safe operation of ships and protection of the environment in compliance with relevant international and flag state legislation, defined levels of authority and lines of communication between, and amongst, shore and shipboard personnel, procedures for reporting accidents and non conformities with the provisions of this

Code, procedures to prepare for and respond to emergency situations; and procedures for internal audits and management reviews’ (IMO, 2007, p.4).

On the one hand, these requirements imply the importance of lines of communication between different hierarchies in a shipping organisation for OHSM practice. In section 2.5, I addressed the role of management-employee communication in OHSM. In the context of shipping shore-ship communication plays an essential role in the operation of a management system. These requirements suggest the importance of establishing a sound OHSMS. Although a good management system is said to be a competitive advantage, the real effect can be complex in terms of the nature of this multinational and multifaceted industry employing a globalised labour force (Anderson, 2003). After the implementation of the Code, some authors have claimed its positive role in improving OHSM in the international shipping industry (IMO, 2005; Celik, 2009), but there is a lack of firm evidence from empirical studies to support their views. Given the very limited sources available in the maritime literature (as stated in Chapter 1) previous studies on the safety management in the maritime industry were mainly conducted in questionnaire-based surveys (Anderson, 2003; IMO, 2005). They ‘failed to expose the underlying concerns’ and

‘reach any firm conclusion’, and ‘further in-depth qualitative research’ was recommended (Bhattacharya, 2009, p.4).

As a contracting member of the IMO, China was obliged to implement the mandated international standards enacted by the IMO. The Ministry of Communications and the China Maritime Safety Administration (MSA), its affiliated official department dedicated to maritime affairs in China, are responsible for ensuring the adequate implementation of the Code. Circular 96 (465) was the first official document requiring maritime organisations involved to fully comply with the Code. Following the implementation of the ISM Code, the National Safety Management (NSM) Code was enacted by the Ministry of Communications in 2001. Since then, fundamental changes have been made in the Chinese shipping industry. As stated, one of the most significant impacts on a shipping company is the establishment of a safety management system. The search of two major Chinese databases, the CNKI and CQVIP, showed that the articles available about the implementation of the ISM Code mainly addressed theoretical or technical issues integrated with personal views and suggestions. The lack of empirical studies is evident in terms of operationalisation of OHSMSs in the Chinese context. Thus, few previous empirical studies along with the different national situation also suggest the need for ongoing studies in this

industry.

In document 2 Heavy neutrino interactions (página 27-31)

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