2. DEFINICIONES BÁSICAS
2.1 EVENTOS QUE AFECTAN LA CALIDAD DE LA ENERGÍA ELÉCTRICA
As in the contract of carriage for goods, the perfection of the contract of carriage of passengers does not necessarily coincide with the commencement of the duty of extraordinary diligence. It may occur at the same time or later.
Based on jurisprudence, the duty that the carrier of passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding the cars as well as those alighting therefrom [Del Prado
v. Manila Railroad (1929)].
This is also reflected in Art. 17, Warsaw
Convention, which applies to international
air carriage. It provides that the liability of a common carrier for injury to the passenger lasts from embarkation to disembarkation, including the period when the passenger is on board the aircraft.
In maritime commerce, Art. 698, Code of
Commerce relates to the period of the
voyage:
(1) In case a voyage already begun should be interrupted:
(a) The passengers shall be obliged to pay the fare in proportion to the distance covered; and
(b) If the interruption is due to a fortuitous event, without right to recover for losses and damages; if caused by the captain exclusively, with a right to indemnity.
(2) If the interruption should be caused by the disability of the vessel, and a passenger should agree to await the repairs:
(a) He may not be required to pay any increased price of passage; but (b) His living expenses during the stay
shall be for his own account.
(3) In case of delay in the departure of the vessel, the passengers have:
(a) The right to remain on board; (b) If the delay is not due to a fortuitous
event or force majeure, with the right to be furnished with food for the account of the vessel;
(c) If the delay should exceed ten days:
(i) Passengers requesting the same shall be entitled to the return of the fare; and
(ii) If it is due exclusively to the
fault of the captain or ship agent, they may also demand indemnity for losses and damages.
A vessel exclusively devoted to the transportation of passengers must take them directly to the port or ports of destination, no matter what the number of passengers may be, making all the stops indicated in its itinerary.
C.1. WAITING FOR CARRIER OR BOARDING OF CARRIER
As to the commencement of the duty of the common carrier, in Del Prado v. Manila
Railroad (1929), it was held that the duty
extends to persons boarding the cars as well as those alighting therefrom.
Thus, it is the duty of common carriers of passengers to stop their conveyances at a reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances while they are doing so
[Dangwa Transportation v. CA (1991)].
In this connection, however, a person boarding a moving car must be taken to assume the risk of injury from boarding the car under the conditions open to his view, but he cannot fairly be held to assume the risk that the motorman, having the situation in view, will increase the peril by accelerating the speed of the car before he is planted safely on the platform [Del Prado
v. Manila Railroad (1929)].
C.2. ARRIVAL AT DESTINATION
As to the termination of the duty of the common carrier, it has been held that the relation of carrier and passenger does not
cease at the moment the passenger alights
from the carrier’s vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises. What is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances:
(1) A person who, after alighting from a train, walks along the station platform is considered still a passenger;
(2) A passenger, who has alighted at his destination and is proceeding by the usual way to leave the company’s premises, but before actually doing so is halted by the report that his brother, a fellow passenger, has been shot, and he in good faith and without intent of engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve his brother, is deemed reasonably and necessarily delayed and thus continues to be a passenger entitled as such to the protection of the railroad and company and its agents [La
Mallorca v. CA (1966)].
The reasonableness of time should be made to depend on the attending circumstances of the case, such as the kind of common carrier, the nature of its business, the customs of the place, and so forth, and therefore precludes a consideration of the time element per se without taking into account such other factors. The primary
factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or near the petitioner’s vessel.
In the case of a shipper, the passengers of vessels are allotted a longer period of time to disembark from the ship than other common carriers such as a passenger bus, since such vessels are capable of accommodating a bigger volume of both passenger and baggage as compared to the capacity of a regular commuter bus. Consequently, a ship passenger will need at least an hour as is the usual practice, to disembark from the vessel and claim his baggage whereas a bus passenger can easily get off the bus and retrieve his luggage in a very short period of time
[Aboitiz Shipping v. CA (1989)].
The relation of carrier and passenger continues until the latter has been landed at the port of destination and has left the carrier’s premises. Hence, the carrier necessarily would still have to exercise extraordinary diligence in safeguarding the comfort, convenience and safety of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final destination [PAL v. CA
(1993)].
Note: Despite the Court’s pronouncement in PAL v. CA, note that common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the ‘safety’ of its passengers. The law does not mention the words ‘comfort’ and ‘convenience.’