Besides setting out a clear line for resistance work among the overseas Vietnamese in northeast Thailand, Hoäng Vän Hoan was also worried by the failure of a number of cadres in northeast Thailand to support the work of the DRV delegation in Bangkok. Cooperation between the leaders of the overseas Vietnamese in northeast Thailand and the delegation in Bangkok was marred by mistrust on both sides. Vietnamese cadres working in the austere northeast were upset by the relatively posh lifestyle enjoyed by their counterparts in Bangkok. Hoan says in his memoir that he had to dedicate a great deal of time to convincing leaders in the northeast that despite the better living conditions
4 4 Interviews with Nguyen D£rc Quy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City and Tran Vän Giäu, 3 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City.
4 5 Hoang Van Hoan, op. c it, pp. 289-91 and Interview with Hoang Nhat Tan, 5 May 1989, Hanoi.
4 6 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 294 and also Interview with Nguyen DCrc Quy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh
at the delegation, these diplomats served a very important function for the nation. Without providing any details, Hoan only says that after discussions with northeastern cadres concerning this problem, relations improved between the two sides.47
While more research remains to be done before we can say anything more definitive about this matter, there must have been other, more serious reasons for the lack of cooperation between the two sides. After all this was one of the main reasons that led to the high-level dispatch of Hoan to Thailand. It is worth considering the possibility that there were two different directions informing Vietnamese resistance activities in Thailand that came to a head by 1948. One was run by activists in the northeast concerned with events in northern Vietnam, while the other was administered by cadres working from Bangkok, the majority of whom were probably more concerned with the course of events in southern Vietnam. As we know from chapter 1, the Vietnamese leadership in the northeast was dominated by cadres from Nghe-Tinh. They had worked and lived in spartan conditions in northeast Thailand since the late 1920s and 1930s and were in firm control of Vietnamese organisations in the area. Because their resistance activities had historically been orientated toward northern Vietnam and southern China (and not toward southern Vietnam or Vietnamese communities in Cambodia), these cadres were probably ill-informed about the activities of their southern counterparts after WWII. Secondly, ranking southern communists were unable to attend the Tan Trao congress, and were thus probably unaware of the guide-lines directing the work of Viet Minh adherents in Laos and northeast Thailand after WWII. Moreover, they had their own agenda, quite different from their northern counterparts. Because war broke out in Nam Bo in September 1945—over a year before it did in northern Vietnam—southern leaders in Thailand were much more interested in assisting the war effort in the south, and in so doing effectively altered the direction of resistance activities in Thailand away from its previous northern Vietnamese orientation. As we know, throughout 1946 a number of high-ranking southern officials were working in Thailand, in charge of arms shipments, contacts with the Thai government and military, the outfitting of combat units, and cooperation with the Cambodian resistance movement. In many respects, by mid-1946 southerners had already established a western corridor linking eastern Thailand to Nam Bo through routes crossing Cambodia and by sea.48 In this context, it is possible that following the outbreak of war in all of Vietnam in December 1946, the ICP did not give any clear directions to cadres in Thailand concerning the administration of these two different components of Vietnamese resistance activities in Thailand. Both sides may have been competing for limited resources. This might explain why some cadres, almost certainly those in the northeast, finally had to ask Hoan (a northerner and veteran communist who
4 7 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, pp. 294-95. Unfortunately, we have no other sources against which to compare Hoan's account.
48 It will be recalled that ICP bases in northeastern Thailand up to this time had been concentrated in bases along the Thai-Lao border and not the Thai-Cambodian one.
had worked in Thailand in the late 1920s and 1930s) to come there to reorganise resistance activities.49
Whatever the case, Hoan arrived in Bangkok sometime during the latter half of 1948 and says he set about re-organising the work of the delegation. Upset by what he saw as haphazard and casual administration, Hoan argued that, as a diplomatic office, the delegation had to maintain a dignified and professional appearance.50 He also felt that members of the delegation had fallen out of touch with activities in the northeast because of "careless" operation. Hoan discussed these problems with Qüy and members of the Overseas Vietnamese Special Committee. Thereafter, Hoan says he asked permission from the ICP Central Committee to establish a new body, separate from the delegation, called the Central Committee Working Overseas Office (Ban Can Sir Trung Ucrng cr
Hai Ngoai). This committee took over the leadership "of all work which had to be
implemented in Thailand." These tasks included: 1) the organisation and mobilisation of the overseas Vietnamese in Thailand in order to increase their patriotic unity, support for the resistance, and to guard the Thai "gateway" to the international community; 2) the reorganisation of assistance to the Lao and Cambodian resistance movements from the west; 3) the organisation and administration of supply matters; 4) the administration of foreign affairs, consisting of international propaganda efforts and the activities of government representatives in Thailand and Burma; and 5) strengthening cooperation with officials in France and Czechoslovakia.51
Hoan became the secretary of the Overseas Office, while Qüy took over as the deputy secretary.52 A certain Hong and Song Tung were members of the Office who also served in the Overseas Vietnamese Special Committee. Joining them from the Western Front General Staff were a Khanh and Bmh (almost certainly Vü Hihi Binh), while Cao Hong Linh (Lanh) and Dung Vän Phuc represented the Vietnamese supply and procurement section in Thailand on this Commission.53 Almost all of these individuals were ICP members.
Unfortunately, we have very little information about how this Overseas Office worked. However, we do know that one of the delegation's problems in relation to the
49
5 0 51
5 2 53
Commenting on the leadership o f Vietnamese resistance activities in Thailand after WWÜ, Tran Van Dlnh said in a June 1990 interview that Tran Van Giau realised in Thailand the ramifications for his work there o f not having attended Tän Träo. Dlnh, who was working from Bangkok during this period and was not a communist, claims that Giau was not an insider o f the communist leadership in Thailand. Interview with Tran Van Dlnh, 20 June 1990, Washington, D.C. I have been unable to confirm this. The timing o f this matter coincided with stepped up efforts by the French to win over international and regional recognition of Bao Dai.
Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 296; Interviews with Nguyen Dtirc Qiiy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City
and Interview with Tran Van Giau, 3 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City. Both Quy and Gihu agreed that these five points were introduced.
Interview with Nguyen Dtirc Qiiy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City and Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 297.
overseas Vietnamese during this period was enlisting young men to serve in the resistance in Vietnam. While many Vietnamese in Thailand joined combat units set up in Thailand since late 1945 (see chapters 3 and 4), recruitment was by no means a popular policy ' among all the Vietnamese in northeast Thailand. Those officials in charge of enlisting young Vietnamese nationals, such as Trän Van Giäu, often encountered hostility during recruiting trips to northeast Thailand. Giäu explained in an interview that he was far from popular among some Vietnamese families, especially among women in the northeast who were not keen on losing their loved ones on faraway battlefields in Vietnam.54 In a statement in support of the French-backed Bao Dai government in 1951, the wife of Pham Vän Bach mentioned this matter specifically in a scathing attack on Vietnamese activities in Thailand. She opposed what she saw as the forced, communist recruitment of young overseas Vietnamese men and their dispatch to Vietnam in overseas fighting units. Madame Bach said that those who refused to join could be charged with treason and killed by the Vietnamese communist organisation in Thailand, citing the murders of a Ly Hoa Vinh and Le Bien.55 Not surprisingly, published communist Vietnamese sources make no mention of such matters, and interviewees are less than forthcoming, so it has thus been impossible to confirm this allegation.
Another problem was the existence in Bangkok of the International Liaison Centre of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (see chapter 4). As we have noted earlier, this was another information service (possibly an appendage of the VNS) used to disseminate information on the DRV to the international community. To western journalists, however, this centre was suspected of being a communist front and was often referred to as the Comintern’s office in Southeast Asia. Hoan claims he advised that this centre be dismantled immediately in order to transfer much needed manpower to foreign affairs duties and to avoid attracting the attention of the Phibun government.56
Concerning the need to improve the delegation's appearance and effectiveness, Hoan and others rented a villa to separate the delegation from the VNS. This villa could house
Interview with Tran Van G iki, 3 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City.
T he Broadcast Statement o f the wife o f Mr. Pham Van Bach,' Vietnam N ew s Bureau, 2 June 1951. While this statement must be used with care, Madame Bach, who worked in Thailand for at least four years (1946-1950), singles out her disagreement with Vietnamese communist activities in Thailand as one of the reasons leading her to switch over to supporting Bao Dai. There is evidence from other DRV officials who worked in Thailand during this time indicating that violent breaks did occur among the Vietnamese leadership in Thailand in the late 1940s. One former Vietnamese official who wishes to remain anonymous told the author in an interview that there were severe conflicts among the Vietnamese leadership in Thailand during the late 1940s and there was even talk o f assassination plots. Another former ranking DRV official in Thailand during this period told the author that concerning Vietnamese affairs in Thailand in the late 1940s, there are "many stories which still remain secret and should not be discussed."
Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 299. I have been unable to determine whether this was a communist organisation.
ten to thirty cadres and was a more appropriate site for a diplomatic office. It was located on Sathom road, ironically positioned between the Soviet and American Embassies.57
Sometim e at the end of 1948 or the beginning of 1949, the Central Committee Working Overseas Office convened a meeting in Bangkok for cadres conducting foreign affairs work abroad. When addressing the meeting, Hoan stressed the importance of supporting the D RV's policies and the need to avoid "free m anifestations o f individualism" and "diversions from the DRV's line and policies."58 Once again, Hoan emphasised the importance of maintaining a high standard of protocol. While he does not say it, it seems clear that Hoan and others must have had political changes in the region in mind— most probably attempts by the French, and increasingly the Americans, to win over regional support for the Bao Dai regime.59