At a meeting, a staff member reports that Simon, a resident in his early twenties, has been caught smoking cannabis. In principle people like Simon, who repeatedly violate the rule of non-acceptance, should be thrown out, but reality is more blurred. The first reaction is: “Let’s take it nice and easy. What we should do is make it clear to Simon that he is not allowed to smoke cannabis on the premises”. Another staff member protests indignantly: “How long should Simon be allowed to cheat on us? He does exactly as he pleases; no matter what we say or do. Other residents have been thrown out for smok- ing cannabis. It’s not right that Simon is let off just because he’s charming!” A third opinion is expressed in a tone of conciliation: “We shouldn’t throw Simon out at the moment because we’re waiting for him to be properly examined by a psychologist”. The indignant person replies: “We’re subor- dinating ourselves to Simon. We aren’t helping him in this way.” At this point the social worker who introduced the subject in the first place suggests postponing the decision to a team meeting. This is where the subject rightly belongs. A fifth staff member thinks this is a good idea, but adds: “While we wait for the psychologist’s opinion, we shouldn’t refrain from taking action. For instance, we could tell Simon that there are certain kinds of behaviour we do not tolerate here.” The discussion is brought to a halt for now with the decision that the staff will await the result of the psychologist’s examina-
tion. A representative of the management will have a talk with Simon. The staff do not seem very convinced that the talk will make Simon change his behaviour. Rather, the aim is to reconfirm the allocation of roles: the staff are in charge, and the residents are subordinates.
There are at least two dilemmas embedded in this staff communication about Simon. First, there is the dilemma between general rules and indi- vidual treatment, reflected in the disagreement about whether the rule of non-acceptance of drugs and alcohol should apply to a young man whose psychological condition has not yet been clarified. According to Foucault, this search for a psychological explanation is an exercise in trying to gain knowledge about the insides of people’s minds and revealing their innermost secrets (Foucault 1983a: 214) in accordance with staff attempts to make resi- dents confess the ‘truth’ about their use of drugs and alcohol. With regard to Simon, staff want to know if he is ‘normal’ and therefore responsible for his own actions (and consequently unworthy of the hostel’s services); or if he is ‘sick’ and therefore ‘innocent’ (and consequently worthy of the hostel’s services). One aspect of this dilemma is also the two contrasting positions on equality and fairness; as when a social worker with the utterance “other residents have been thrown out for smoking cannabis” implies that rules should be the same for all independently of sympathies or antipathies. The opposite stance is that fairness and equality are achieved when each case is assessed individually.
The second dilemma is wrapped up in a remark from the staff member who says: “We’re subordinating ourselves”. This remark refers not only to the above-mentioned issue of reconfirming role allocations, but also to a general issue in social work of whether staff can and should trust residents. Trust is crucial to social workers because of the idea that the creation of confidence is important if their attempts to make clients develop or change are to succeed. The rationale is that if staff succeed in convincing residents of their good intentions, then a relationship of friendship-like trust can be established, and the client will be more likely to follow the instructions of staff.
Applying Sahlins’ model of reciprocity, the discussion among staff can also be seen as an attempt to categorise their relationship to residents in terms of the ‘spirit’ of exchange. Generalised reciprocity is exercised when the resident,
metaphorically speaking, is regarded as a friend or family member; somebody staff like, whose mistakes are easily forgiven. However, such a relationship is constantly challenged by the scepticism lurking in the attitude of the staff towards the residents; a scepticism that relates to a general conception of homeless drug users as people who are skilled in trickery and cheating, for which reason it would be naïve to fully trust them. Consequently, social work- ers cannot develop the generalised reciprocity relationship to its full extent. Rather, they switch between various kinds of reciprocity relationship, trying to strike a balance between creating confidence and not being fooled. In the case of Simon, though, it seems that generalised reciprocity is an appropriate category for the client-staff relationship because the staff decide to forgive Simon – at least for now.
Staff discussions about Simon also expose a hierarchy of arguments, start- ing off with: “Other residents have been thrown out for smoking cannabis [why not Simon?]”. Since this is not enough to convince his colleagues, the person plays a trump: “We aren’t helping [Simon] in this way”. This remark entails a certain moral reasoning of how best to help clients: it is better that they are met with demands and consistency, whereas it is poor service to let them stay despite a rule violation. Reflecting harm-reduction rationality, the opposite opinion is based on the same argument – but in inverse ratio: clients can be helped more if they are treated with compassion and flexibility, whereas throwing them out constitutes failure. According to Lipsky, it is not surprising that two conflicting opinions are based on this same argument because it is a typical characteristic of street-level bureaucracy that services and procedures, no matter what content they have, are presented as benign (1980: 119).
The final decision is postponed in Simon’s case. This is quite a common way to deal with the uncertainty which is part and parcel of any dilemma: let us not rush too much, maybe something will come up that changes the situation. Later it turns out that the psychologist’s opinion, as hoped for by some staff members, actually does solve the dilemma because she arrives at a diagnosis: Simon is probably suffering from ADHD (Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder). In Foucault’s line of thinking, the diagnosis tells the truth to staff about who Simon is, and consequently their dispute is settled all of a sudden: the moral argument that he is a cheat is silenced, and so is
the talk about his use of cannabis. This implies that a professional answer to a problem, due to its perceived unambiguousness, is easier for staff to handle than a moral one.
In Simon’s case, the diagnosis opens a field of new explanations for his behaviour and new solutions to problems: staff will start looking for an institution that specialises in treating young people with ADHD. Simon is still in the wrong place, but he is deemed worthy to stay until staff find the right place.
The next case of Martin, another resident, illustrates a different kind of solution to the conflict between individual client treatment and mass pro- cessing. In contrast to Simon, Martin is considered to be in the right place because he expresses his problems in ways that fit the models of solutions with which the hostel already operates.