Evoluciones con Ruido y Distribuciones de Probabilidad

beginning in October 2009.62 In addition, most companies were allowed to “roll over” volumes not taken below minimum take or pay levels to future years. Although Gazprom sold nearly 9 Bcm more gas to its European customers in contract year 2009/10 compared with 2008/09 (Table 2), Gazprom‟s customers incurred take or pay liabilities, of 5 Bcm in 2008/09 and around 10 Bcm in 2009/10. However the reasons appear to be different: in 2009 the take or pay shortfall was spread across a number of companies; while in 2009/10 the shortfall was concentrated on two countries – Italy (ENI and Edison) and Turkey (Botas) while all others appeared to have taken their minimum quantities (see Table 2).

Increasing consensus of buyers and continuing opposition of Gazprom

Starting in August 2010, E.ON Ruhrgas began to openly call for a move to hub-based gas pricing and “re-engineering” of existing long term contracts.63 E.ON made it clear that this was not just about obtaining lower prices but about changing “fundamental elements” of the contracts.64 Later in the year it was reported that, “Both the CEO of E.ON Ruhrgas and the president of GDF Suez said that the days of oil indexation were over, as far as they were concerned, and gas to gas competition was here to stay.”65

A study by Morten Frisch came to a similar conclusion:66 “The two-tier price system that has developed for gas in Continental

Europe has unleashed market forces that must be dealt with. The big challenge in solving the price problem that has arisen will be to find reliable alternatives to the oil price indexation elements currently used in price formulae.”

In addition, there appears to have been a significant change of sentiment among the European gas community as expressed by (relatively unscientific) polls taken at European gas conferences. Annual polls taken at the FLAME Conference during the period 2004-09 found that around three quarters of participants did not expect the basis of gas pricing to change before 2015 or ever; the March 2010 poll showed similar results.67 By November 2010, a poll taken at the European Autumn Gas Conference showed 50% agreeing that volumes in long term contracts would be renegotiated and 29% believing that contracts would move to hub pricing. Only 16% agreed to the proposition that recent pricing and contractual changes were temporary and would not last more than a few years after which the traditional framework would be reinstated.68

62

Gazprom agrees to sell a portion of gas delivery to Ruhrgas at spot prices, Interfax Russia and CIS Oil and Gas Weekly, February 18-24, 2010, p.20; Anton Doroshev, Gazprom adjusts gas pricing to defend market share, Reuters, February 19, 2010,

http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLDE61I1M320100219?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=11700&sp=tru e;

63 _{See the presentation by the CEO of EON Ruhrgas to the Offshore Northern Seas Conference in Stavanger in}

August 2010, http://www.ons.no/index.cfm?event=downloadfile&famid=129806; the video of his

presentation gives an expanded version of his view on the need to move away from oil indexation. http://conventor.easymeeting.net/mediasite/Viewer/?peid=583efe3d8e474162b41d3a786a5ea584

64 _{Gas merchants’ chickens come home to roost, International Gas Report, August 16, 2010, pp.12-13.}

65

IEA sees long term gas glut, International Gas Report, November 22, 2010, pp.9-11.

66 _{Frisch 2010 p.1.}

67 _{Stern 2009, Table 1.}

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What we are observing here is a fundamental mindset change on the part of the traditional buyers from one which was appropriate for those in a dominant position with a relatively captive market, to one which increasingly reflects the competitive environment of access to liquid gas hubs and the trading culture of European utilities. To the traditional utility mindset, a long term oil-indexed contract represented a secure source of supply at prices which could be force-fed to captive end-user customers. If prices were higher than those at the nascent hubs, this could be partially justified by the accompanying volume flexibility embedded within such contracts (see Box).

To the modern utility mindset, a long-term oil-indexed contract represents an unbounded future potential exposure relative to the all important „market price‟ at the hubs, and the requirement of the financial community that contracts must be “marked to market”. The pressure to resolve this increasing polarity between buyers‟ and sellers‟ interests and motivations is unlikely to dissipate. Even if market fundamentals reduce the spread between oil-indexed prices and hub prices, the threat of future exposure in an increasingly uncertain LNG-connected global gas system is incompatible with the modern utility mindset.

This change in sentiment has encountered strong resistance from Gazprom which remained insistent that there is no acceptable alternative to oil-linked pricing and that the gap between long term contract and spot prices would close by 2012.69 Thus Gazprom believes that the gap between spot and oil-linked prices is a temporary phenomenon which will disappear within three years when supply and demand will once again be in balance. The company‟s view has been endorsed by Russian prime minister Putin and also by the Gas Exporting Countries Forum.70

69

Gazprom’s Miller sees demand for gas slackening in Europe, Interfax, June 10-16, 2010, p.4-7.

70 _{Third Energy Package will threaten Europe with energy-resource price growth – Putin, Interfax, November}

11-17, 2010, p. 28; Russia, China sign six energy deals in Petersburg, Interfax, November 18-24, p. 5; See the interview with the Secretary General of the GECF in Interfax, February 3-9, 2011, pp. 17-20

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Valuing flexibility in long term contracts

A long term gas contract should be regarded as a bundled product of commodity and flexibility with the latter defined by the ability of the buyer to vary offtake between (for instance) 85% and 120% of annual contract quantity (as well as monthly and daily offtake provisions). This flexibility allows buyers to modulate their offtake depending on the demand from their customer base, and their ability to utilise other forms of flexibility, particularly gas in storage. The changes suggested in this paper mean the likely disappearance of offtake flexibility in long term contracts. In such a situation, the question arises as to how buyers would meet their flexibility requirements if in future they will buy gas on a “flat” profile. The answer to this question is probably two-fold. First flexibility can be (and to some extent is already being) provided by storage facilities. In 2010, Gas Storage Europe data showed that there were facilities under construction in Continental Europe with working gas capacity totalling 22.6 Bcm.71 This is a veritable “explosion of flexibility” when compared with the existing European working gas volume of 80 Bcm, only half of which is typically used during a gas year. The second way of obtaining flexibility is through trading, buying gas from hubs when it is needed and selling when it is not. Buyers with access to additional LNG supplies may find this a particularly useful way of obtaining short term supply. This is the reason why new LNG terminals, and interconnection with other national networks – which may have been built principally for reasons of security of supply – may serve commercial purposes. As gas trading becomes a normal commercial activity, take or pay and contractual flexibility becomes (at the very least) less relevant because buyers can buy and sell short term gas to balance their requirements.

This suggests that the elimination of contract flexibility which may accompany the changes in long term contracts, may not be problematic for those buyers which are well on the way to making alternative arrangements. It also suggests that the value of contractual flexibility is not sufficient to outweigh the pricing problems with long term contracts.