Experto:

9.1 Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to investigate how the Egyptian government, under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, dealt with militant religious groups, both jihadi and non- jihadi, since 2013. The investigation was conducted answering five different sub- questions that supported the analysis. Each sub-question contained the respective counterterrorism strategy grounded in the theoretical framework.

It was referred that states deal with terrorist religious groups, either by accommodating or by repressing them. In the Egyptian context, state and religion fluctuated between conciliation and repression. Since 2013, when president Sisi came to power, that repression has been the rule dictating the relation between both sides. In fact, the thesis revealed that the government is ordering policies and laws to eradicate militant Islamist groups. The Muslim Brotherhood has been the main target of this strategy, although the emergence of Salafi jihadist groups has also put them under the eye of state repression.

Considering this, the thesis showed the different facets of repression and they can be summarised as follows:

1. A new authoritarian doctrine is being institutionalized by the state, which is expressed in the empowerment of the military and other security services to control civil society with little or none supervision. This control has resulted in vast arrests and imprisonments, and also in police and military brutality spreading violence over dissenters.

2. The government has exerted a total control of the media. This control was firstly intended to use religious and nationalistic narratives to elevate the state as the nation’s saviour and protector. In parallel, it also hindered dissenters and critical media sources to reveal the violence perpetrated by the military and security forces.

3. Legal changes were made to allow the government to gain control of the public space. These changes were often characterized by vague, broad language, enabling the regime to arbitrarily outlaw and criminalize activities, to make accusations of terrorism, and to move civilians to military courts.

4. The state used religious institutions to fully exert control over religion. These institutions are Al-Ahzar University, the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Dar- al-Ifta. Despite the still independent Al-Ahzar, that doesn’t always align with the government’s policies, the other two institutions allowed the government to effectively control religion. This was observed in the standardization of the content of Friday sermons, by the Ministry of Religious Endowments, and by the drafting of fatwas (authoritative legal opinions regarding Islamic law) by Dar-al-Ifta.

5. To fully implement its repressive strategy, the state is counting with foreign support. In fact, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait are keen on diminishing the influence of the MB and other related religious groups within the region and thus are financially backing Sisi’s policies.

This research came to the conclusion that the Egyptian government, under the rule of Sisi, dealt with militant religious groups with repression and violence. The findings suggest that this repressive strategy is creating more religious violence. As observed, there’s an escalating Islamist insurgency, with the younger generations of the MB turning to violence (Ikhwani Jihadism) and with the Salafi jihadist groups seizing the opportunity to gain influence and to perpetuate terrorism.

9.2 Discussion and Recommendation

First of all, this thesis made a factual analysis of the events since 2013. Nonetheless, the findings of my study are quite recent, as the repressive crackdown of militant religious groups continues to be a reality. This resulted in a scarcity of sources, which sometimes were biased. Despite these limitations, the research tried to be as impartial as it could be.

In parallel, the analysis of government’s actions was limited to its effects on militant Islamic groups, leaving outside the scope of the study other religious groups, namely the Christians Copts or Catholics (religious minorities), as well as other sectors of society affected by repression.

With this said, the research achieved the purpose to inform and reveal a contemporary case study, which realities are still inconclusive and uncertain. Consequently it should continue to be analysed and studied, in order to develop new findings. In the same page, new studies should be carried about Egypt, so that the country can move towards progress and stability. The following recommendation leaves space for this to occur.

Recommendation

Considering that repression has been contributing to the emergence of more violence perpetrated by militant jihadist groups, both Salafi and non-Salafi, this research appears to support the argument for a change on how the Egyptian government deals with these groups.

As of this writing neither the government or the MB is taking actions that could effectively deescalate the violent insurgency. Consequently, this thesis suggests that in order to eradicate jihadism and move Egypt towards social and economical progress, a more constructive strategy should be adopted. It seems too premature to announce a political reconciliation between sides; nonetheless some steps can already be taken:

1. The government should deescalate the severest and indiscriminate security tactics, namely forced disappearances and alleged extrajudicial killings. In parallel, the security personnel that commit abuses should be held accountable.

2. This de-escalation of repression should be followed by a more targeted security response – chasing actual terrorists instead of labelling everyone against the regime as a threat to the nation.

3. A difference between young MB’s members that adhere to jihadism, and hardened Salafi jihadists should be made. The government should explore the differences between them, reaching the younger generations and providing them an alternative political path.

4. As the Islamic insurgency continues to escalate in North Sinai, the government should address the local population, namely the Bedouins, creating economic opportunities for Bedouin youth, so that they will not be drawn to jihadism. The government should be close to the population in order not to appear as its enemy. 5. The vagueness of the new laws, supposedly to fight terrorism, should be rescinded. For example, checks on assembly in the Protest law and restrictions on the media that don’t align with the state’s strategy, should be changed and move towards a more reliable, transparent and democratic rule of law.

6. Ideologically, the government’s strategy to rely on religious institutions to confront the terrorist message and to announce the “correct” interpretation of the Islamic law (fatwas and sermons over mosques) is insufficient. More work should be done rehabilitating terrorists, in order to promote a dialogue between them and young people about the dangers of radicalization.

To sum up, instead of the carte blanche given to the military and other security forces to repress militant religious groups that adhere to violence and terrorism, the government should adopt an appropriate use of force depending on the circumstances; at the same time it should generate a legislative reform that effectively target violent actors, and policies that respect constitutionally the rights and freedoms of the population.

Egypt is an extremely important country in a volatile region. A successful counterterrorism strategy would mean progress being brought to the country, helping its people to live in better conditions. The success of the strategy would also mean more stability to the region, which is currently fuelled by extremist movements.