Explicaciones en torno al tipo de estudio y de diseño de la investigación

34-8-50. They were agreed to by the Lords on 10

September 164-2. The declarations we re delivered to the Lord Maitland at 5*00 P«m. the same day, before he set out for Scotland the following morning.

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recognition by both parties of their mutual interest in co-operating to defeat certain forces. These forces were said to be threatening reforms established in Scotland and being established in England. Furthermore, the

parliamentarians said that the Scots were bound to assist England in this work according to the treaty of pacification.

This policy was not without its opponents. There were men (like Sir John Hotham, Lord Falkland and Sir John Culpepper) who did not see that England needed to establish a modus vivendi with the Scots. Even if there was some enemy threatening the reform or the peace of England or her

dominions, they did not see that it was necessary to have the support of the Scots. It was dishonourable for England to seek the support of a nation which had humiliated her. This resistance persisted longer in the Lords, but eventually it, too, was forced to yield. The Peers feared to be blamed for neglecting the colonists of Ireland.

As the crisis deepened and parliamentary reform was threatened in England by the growing military power of the King, Scotland became more important. The enemies who were said to be threatening the peace of both Kingdoms now openly had drawn the sword in England. Parliament strove to counter the royal threat not only by military preparations but also by arguments designed to persuade the Scots that Parliament had been wronged. Parliament did not seek an alliance with the Scots. They only sought that the Scots should understand the 'real* position in England so that

they would not be deceived by the K i n g ’s arguments. Parliament thus decided to abolish episcopacy partly in order to convince the Scots that Parliament’s cause was genuine. However, Parliament was not prepared to let the Scots dictate the model of church reform in return for their support. The parliamentarians were determined that they and they alone would decide the nature of religious reform. By promising to abolish episcopacy the Parliament intended to offer the Scots a hope of Presbyterian

reformation sufficient at least to secure their benevolent neutrality and to l:eep them out of the K i n g ’s camp.

As the crisis of 164-2 developed there was not, until November, renewed opposition to closer ties with the Scots. This is not surprising. As members drifted away from Parliament, betaking themselves to a country seat or to the royal camp, the most outspoken opponents of the Scots would have been leached from Parliament. Guided by the example of the Commons, where a man's hostility to the Scots was

usually indicative of his royalist inclinations, we can conclude that it was likely that, as royalists gathered around Charles at York, both Houses were emptied of the more resolute opponents to friendship with the Scots. Thus it was that those who remained supported the policy of

attempting to prevent Charles from turning Scotland against Parliament.

However, the temporary unity within Parliament on this particular issue did not survive the shock of Edgehill.

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Kany who remained at Westminster were amazed when the

conflict between King and Parliament developed into a full- scale war. They were completely surprised, too, by the

strength of the royal forces. In this moment of extreme danger something more was needed of the Scots than their goodwill and understanding. The obvious conclusion, for the more stalwart rebels, was a military alliance.

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The battle of Edgehill transformed the parliamentary attitude to the Scots. Whereas before

Parliament had been united in its attempt to keep the Scots well-disposed towards it, now the reality of war began to weaken that unity. Now the attitudes taken toward the

Scots began to differ between parties according to whether they were more or less fierce in prosecuting Parliament’s cause. It was one thing to convince the Scots of the

rectitude of the cause and to keep them from the clutches of the King; it was another to invite them into England as allies. In this chapter I will argue that, whereas the Middle and War Parties (for convenience I will refer to them as the

1

Military Party ) tried to establish a military alliance with the Scots from the very first days of the civil war, the Peace Party resolutely resisted the plan, even after

commissioners had been dispatched to negotiate the alliance in 164-3; so that Parliament engaged itself to the Scots despite the unwillingness and reservations of nearly half the parliamentary party.

Not long after Edgehill Parliament quickly

divided between those who sought to resolve the conflict by peaceful negotiation, and those who believed that only the defeat of the royal forces would induce the King to come to terms with Parliament. Those who supported negotiation saw

U I have adopted the new term as both these groups

supported an alliance with the Scots. It was probably proposed by Pym, the leader of the Middle Party: see

J. H. Hexter, The Reign of King P y m , London, 194-1 , 29-30.