EXPO MOQUEGUA 165

NORTHERN IRELAND 1969-1984. London: Methuen, 1986, 5. 10 Desmond Hamill, (1986), 7.

11 Sean MacStiofain. MEMOIRS OF A REVOLUTIONARY. Edinburgh: Gordon Cremonesi, 1975, 135-137.

reforms, which Northern Ireland’s Prime Minister, Captain Terrence O ’Neill had introduced, could dampen Catholic anger at the Protestants, although O ’Neill lost his

position in April 1969 and was replaced by the genial but ineffective conservative James Chichester-Clark.

The split took take place in the autumn of 1969 after events in August which had discredited the IRA as an effective protector of the Catholic community because of an inability to defend the gheto’s. This led to a dissatisfaction with the idealism of Gouldings neo- Marxist theorising, amongst the Northerners who needed protection from the Protestants. The split, largely

confined to Belfast, was to be confirmed when in October the IRA’s ruleing Army Council voted by twelve votes to eight to abandon abstentionism (the takeing of seats in legislatures). This meant that by December many

traditionalists (especially those from Belfast Brigade) chose to ignore an Army Convention called to approve the issue. When the convention approved the policy change the traditionalists established a new Army Convention which supported abstentionism and elected a new Executive with provisional status which then elected a new Army Council.

This was to stay provisional for only ten months until

September 1970, but by that time the status was to have given the new movement its name (with its intentional

echo of the Provisional government declared in 1 9 1 6).

This split at times threatened to become an internecine feud, but with a few exceptions, while there was no love 12 Patrick Bishop & Eamoun Mallie, THE PROVISIONAL IRA. London: Corgie, 1989, 132-137.

lost between the two factions, there was relatively

little violence between them. Although they still remain hostile to one another twenty-three years later.

When the cease fire was established in 1972 the

Official Irish Republican Army (DIRA or Officials) ceased violent activity, as did PIRA. However, once the cease­ fire collapsed, PIRA chose to escalate the level of attacks, regularly killing policemen and solders while the Officials chose to give up the gun.is Subsequently, the residue of the OIRA split again, with the remaining physical force supporters leaving to form the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP) and its para-military wing the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA).i4 Later, the INLA was to split in the most violent of all the para-military separations in 1986/87, when its Belfast Brigade formed the Irish Peoples Liberation Organisation

(IPLO).

The remains of the OIRA now rest in the Workers Party (also known as the Republican Clubs during the early 1980's) in Ulster and Sinn Fein-the Workers Party in the Republic (now the United Left in the South after another split in 1992). In the South the Workers Party has retained much of the old IRA's support while in the North this support has largely gone to the Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF) the political arm of PIRA.

Thus, in the North a new organization which had not existed in 1968 had developed out of the citizens defence groups. This became known as the Provisional IRA. It

13 Coogan, (1988), 570. 14 TIMES, 19 March 1980.

inherited the physical force tradition of Irish nationalism and set out to force the British out of

Ireland in the belief that one big push was all that was needed. It became properly active in 1971 both militarily and politically with PSF and set out on its lethal war with the security forces.

It was at this stage of the conflict when the casualty rate was at the very highest in the present

conflict in the N o r t h . is This was also when the machinery

of the security forces was being developed. The most important long term judicial effect of this period was the introduction of one judge juryless courts for

scheduled (paramilitary) offences. This was because of the fear of the probable intimidation of juries by paramilitaries.i®

This special treatment for paramilitaries was not the only change from the judicial norm, as in August 1971 the government at Stormont announced that it had

introduced the internment without trial of suspected

members of paramilitary organisations.i? As it turned out this became arguably the biggest mistake made in the

’’troubles” by the authorities. The lists which the army and police used were frequently out of date and many people were unjustly imprisoned because of this mixture of incompetence and stupidity. Internment was abandoned by the Labour Party when they resumed power as it had 15 See Appendix II.

16 Lord Diplock, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO CONSIDER LEGAL PROCEDURES TO DEAL WITH TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND. London: H.M.S.O, December 1972 , 17-19.

17 Robert Bell, Robert Johnstone & Robin Wilson. TROUBLED TIMES, FORTNIGHT MAGAZINE AND THE TROUBLES IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1970-91. Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1991, 152.

patently failed and did more damage than it was worth, by gaining sympathy for the republicans. Further, because of Stormont's (the Northern Irish Parliament) impatience to use internment, not enough time was given to accumulate accurate information. Finally, despite the activity of the Protestant supremacist Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) all the people interned were republicans until direct rule (when Stormont was suspended in 1972 allowing Westminster to take over). This helped discredit the already unpopular British Army in the eyes of the

nationalist population. Its failure has also discredited internment, probably for good, when it could have had a vital role to play in destroying the Provisionals.

Linked to the introduction of internment was the use of torture by the security forces in Northern Ireland upon internees during interrogation. The allegations concerning the torture of at least 250 people at

Hollywood and Girdwood Barracks, which included beatings, sensory deprivation, electric shocks and sleep

deprivation were compiled by two Catholic priests Fathers Denis Faul and Raymond M u r r a y . T h i s led to the

government of the Irish Republic deciding that it should take these complaints to the European Court of Human Rights and led to the Court's criticism of the '^inhuman and degrading treatment" given to eight internees by the

A r m y . 2 0 Thus, the British had by 1975 lost all support

18 Chris Ryder, THE RUC, A FORCE UNDER FIRE. London: Madrarin, 1989, 122-123.

19 John McGuffin, THE GUINEAPIGS. London: Penguin Books, 1974, 133-135.

20 Paul Foot, WHO FRAMED COLLIN WALLACE?. London: Pan