Exportaciones de Palta Hass

NATURE

Appeal from the Manila CFI decision

FACTS

- Maria Mortera Vda de Aguirre on May 17, 1951 executed a will written in Spanish making many legacies and devises including Pesos 20,000 to Rene Teotico who was married to testatrix’s niece, Josefina Mortera. Josefina was instituted as the sole and universal heir to all the remainder of the properties not otherwise disposed of in the will. The testatrix died on July 14, 1955 and a petition for the probate was file before the Manila CFI on July 17, 1955.

- Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, and an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed an opposition to the probate alleging that the will was not executed as required by law, that the testatrix was physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution, and that the will was executed under duress, threat or influence of fear. The lower court allowed Ana del Val Chan’s opposition despite a motion to have said opposition dismissed on the ground that Ana had no legal personality to intervene.

- Ana amended her opposition by alleging that the will is inoperative with regard the share of Rene Teotico because he was the physician who took care of the testatrix during her last illness.

- After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision on November 10, 1960 admitting the will to probate but declaring the

disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession.

- Hence this appeal ISSUE/S

1. WON Ana Del Val Chan has the right to intervene 2. WON the will has been duly admitted to probate

3. WON probate court committed an error on passing on the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will

HELD

1. No. Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof, and while she previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta., she had already disposed of it long before the execution of the will.

In the supposition that the will is denied probate, would the oppositor acquire any interest in any portion of the estate left by the testatrix? She would acquire such right only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. It is true that oppositor claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the deceased, and also an adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot give her any comfort for, even if it be true, the law does not give her any right to succeed to the

estate of the deceased sister of both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is so because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father. Thus, Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother.”

2 The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of he adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.

2. Yes. The claim of the oppositor that the testatrix was of unsound mind when she executed the will was belied by the testimonies of the three people who witnessed the signing of the will. The claim that Teotico exerted improper pressure and undue influence over the testatrix to overpower and subjugate her mind to destroy her free agency and make her express the will of another rather than her own was not proved. 3. Yes. "Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the

will cannot be entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law."

"To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The

judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one valid."

XIX. LEGACIES AND DEVISEES

FERNANDEZ v DIMAIGBA

G.R. No. L-23638

REYES; October 12, 1967

NATURE

Petition for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals

FACTS

- Ismaela Dimagiba submitted to the CFI a petition for the probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes. The will instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased.

- The petition was set for hearing, and in due time, Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and Luisa Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate asked. Grounds advanced for the opposition were forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by the testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944, but which conveyances were finally set aside by this Supreme Court.

- CFI found that the will was genuine and properly executed; but deferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and revocation.

- Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration, and/or new trial, insisting that the issues of estoppel and revocation be considered and resolved; the Court overruled the claim that proponent was in estoppel to ask for the probate of the will, but "reserving unto the parties the right to raise the issue of implied revocation at the opportune time."

- CFI appointed Ricardo Cruz as administrator for the sole purpose of submitting an inventory of the estate.

- TC resolved against the oppositors and held the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale." The oppositors elevated the case to the CA.

- CA held that the decree admitting the will to probate, had become final for lack of opportune appeal; that the same was appealable independently of the issue of implied revocation; that there had been no legal revocation by the execution of the 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale.

ISSUES

1. WON the decree of the CFI allowing the will to probate had become final for lack of appeal

2. WON the order of the CFI overruling the estoppel invoked by oppositors-appellants had likewise become final

3. WON the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been impliedly revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the proponent .

HELD

1. YES. A probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise.

- There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was not appealed on time, the same had become final and conclusive. Hence, the appellate courts may no longer revoke said decree nor review the evidence upon which it is

made to rest. Thus, the appeal belatedly lodged against the decree was correctly dismissed.

2. NO. The presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being primarily designed to protect the testator's, expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedent's ownership and right of disposition within legal limits.

- Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a will to deliver the same to the Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation (Revised Rule 75). It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. Whether or not the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still appealable or not, the defense is patently unmeritorious and the Court of Appeals correctly so ruled. 3. NO. The existence of any such change or departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba.

- But even if Art 957 were applicable, the annulment of the conveyances would not necessarily result in the revocation of the legacies, if we bear in mind that the findings made in the decision decreeing the annulment of the subsequent 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale were also that it was the moral influence, originating from their confidential relationship, which was the only cause for the execution

BELEN v BPI

G.R. No. L-14474

REYES; October 31, 1960

NATURE

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila denying appellant's petition

FACTS

- Benigno Diaz (DIAZ) executed a codicil on September 29, 1944. On

November 7, 1944, he died and the aforesaid codicil, together with the will, was admitted to probate in Special Proceedings No. 894 of the same Court of First Instance of Manila.

- The proceedings for the administration of the estate of DIAZ were closed in 1950 and the estate was thereafter put under the administration of BPI, as trustee for the benefit of the legatees.

- Filomena Diaz (FILOMENA) then died in 1954, leaving two legitimate

children, MILAGROS, married, with 7 legitimate children, and ONESIMA, single.

- On March 19, 1958, ONESIMA filed a petition in Special Proceedings No.

9226, contending that the amount that would have appertained to FILOMENA under the codicil should now be divided equally between herself and MILAGROS, as the surviving children, to the exclusion of the 7 legitimate children of MILAGROS.

- The court denied this petition. It said that after due consideration of the

petition filed by ONESIMA. The share of FILOMENA from the codicil does not and should not form part of her estate. The aforesaid share of should be distributed not only between her children but also among her other

legitimate descendants which also includes her grandchildren, etc., and in this connection. it is not amiss to observe that one may be a descendant and not yet not be an heir, and vice versa, one may be an heir and yet not be a descendant.

- From this order ONESIMA appealed to this Court. She contends that the

term "sus descendeintes legitimos," as used in the codicil, should be interpreted to mean descendants nearest in the degree to the original legatee FILOMENA, which are the two daughters.

ISSUE

WON the words "sus descendientes legitimos" refer conjointly to all the living descendant (children and grandchildren) of the legatee as a class or only to the descendants nearest in degree

HELD

NO

- In her argument, FILOMENA invokes Art. 959 of the CC, which says: A

distribution made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in degree. However, the

argument fails to note that this article is specifically limited in its application in cases where the beneficiaries are relatives of the testator, not those of the legatee. In such an event, the law assumes that the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, in order to benefit the relatives closest to him based on the ratio legis that among a testator's relative the closest are dearest.

- Obviously, this does not apply where the beneficiaries are relatives of

another person (the legatee) and not of the testator . There is no logical

reason in this case to presume that the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, for he precisely made a testament and provided substitutes for each legatee; nor can it be said that his affections would prefer the nearest relatives of the legatee to those more distant, since he envisages all of them in a group, and only as mere substitutes for a preferred beneficiary.

- The result of applying the "nearest relatives" rule of Article 959 is that the inheritance would be limited to her children excluding the grandchildren altogether. This could hardly be the intention of the testator who in the same clause 10 of his codicil speaks of his grandchildren indicating clearly that he understood well that hijos and descendientes are not synonymous terms.

- We conclude that in the absence of other indications of contrary intent, the proper rule to apply in the instant case is that the testator, by designating a class or group of legatees, intended all members thereof to succeed per

capita. So that the original legacy to FILOMENA should be equally divided

among her surviving children and grandchidren.

Disposition The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs to the

XX. GENERAL PROVISION OF INTESTATE