Expte: PI 4782/22 RGEP 11166

The international community undertook many diplomatic initiatives in a bid to broker a peace in the DRC. A number of agreements were signed by the parties involved and approximately 23 initiatives, aimed at ending the hostilities and addressing the concerns of neighbouring countries, mainly Rwanda and Uganda, as the conflict in the DRC has regional dimensions (Dindelo, 2006:47). The first, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, was negotiated within the framework of the South African Development Community (SADC) and signed by the Heads of State of the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe and Angola‟s Minister of Defence on 10 July 1999.

The 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement resulted in agreements over two primary initiatives, namely the United Nations Organisation Mission to the Congo or Mission de la Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo (MONUC) and the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (Malan and Porto, 2004:v). The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement primarily dealt with the ceasefire, the date of its entry into force, its meaning and implications for the parties to the Agreement and the security concerns for the DRC and its

neighbouring countries (Mangu, 2004:32). Mangu (2004:32) also emphasises the fact that the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement addressed much more than the ceasefire itself, and that it included many aspects regarding post-conflict peacebuilding aspects as well. The significance of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement can be found in the fact that regional states themselves, for the first time, agreed upon a framework for the region‟s political reconstruction in Sub-Saharan Africa (Wolpe, 2000:27). However, despite the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the Congolese failed to implement it. President Laurent Kabila was assassinated by his own bodyguard in 2001, and as was the case with the Belgian and Mobutu governments before him (Kabemba, 2006:158).

During a meeting that took place in Gaborone, Botswana in August 2001, the Congolese parties agreed that Inter-Congolese Dialogue was set to take place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in October 2001. It finally took place at Sun City in South Africa, from February to April 2002 and in April 2003 (Mangu, 2004:33). The purpose of the Dialogue was to establish an agreement on a power-sharing formula.

The negotiations were to be all inclusive and under the supervision of Sir Ketumile Masire, the SADC-appointed mediator, but from 9 April 2002 they were partly taken over by former South African President, Thabo Mbeki. The first phase of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue finished on 18 April 2002, with a partial agreement signed by one of two major rebel movements, the MLC, and the Kabila government. Despite the late intervention by President Mbeki, the Rwanda-backed Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie-Goma (RCD-Goma) and a coalition of civil society groups refused to sign this agreement, partly as a result of heavy pressure from the Kabila government, but also because of disagreements over the arrangements for power-sharing during the transitional phase (Mandrup-Jorgensen, 2007:49).

The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 1999 was followed by the Pretoria Agreement that was agreed upon in July 2002. In accordance with this agreement, a programme and timetable for implementation was agreed upon and Rwandan delegates agreed to withdraw their troops from the DRC (Dindelo, 2006:47). The Pretoria Agreement was followed by the Luanda Agreement, which was signed in September 2002 between the DRC and Uganda. This agreement addressed the security concerns of neighbouring countries referred to in the Preamble and Article 2 of the 1999 Lusaka Agreement. It stipulated the arrangements for the withdrawal of Ugandan forces from the DRC, establishing the Joint Pacification Committee on Ituri to govern the district with the assistance of MONUC and the acceptance by the DRC for Uganda to remain on the slopes of Mount Ruwenzori until the parties put in place security mechanisms guaranteeing Uganda‟s security. The general situation in the DRC improved in 2002 when a large part of the foreign intervention ended when Rwanda,

Uganda and Angola withdrew their forces from the country. The situation became politically more manageable for the UN, despite that fact that foreign influence, especially Rwandan, continued to be exercised through local factions (Macqueen, 2002:232).

According to Kabemba (2006:158), little attention has been paid to the issue of justice in the DRC and this has exacerbated much of the violence that continued to flare up in parts of the DRC. The mainstream justice system remained weak and corrupt and the establishment of a TRC was supposed to be the conduit for the development and implementation of effective transitional justice policies in the DRC, but this commission did not become operational. The same can be said of the Anti-Corruption Commission and Human Rights Commission. These problems and setbacks limited the transitional government‟s ability to deal with past and increasing new human rights abuses (Kabemba, 2006:158).

In addition to the above, the human security situation in the DRC posed huge challenges of its own. In August 2003, after months of clashes in the Ituri district in the Kivu and Maniema provinces, over 3,4 million persons were estimate to be displaced. North Kivu and Ituri alone represented 2 million displaced people, whilst over 350 000 Congolese refugees fled to Congo-Brazzaville, Zambia or Tanzania and approximately 250 000 foreigners from six neighbouring countries had sought asylum in the DRC. The transitional government and the international community had to find practical solutions to address the issues effectively (Malan and Porto, 2004:6).

The transitional government was a crucial tool to bridge the violent divide that has plagued the DRC, but its functioning was severely impeded by elements that have shown continued reluctance to give up power. Rwanda and the DRC have often been antagonists (Swart, 2005:15). There seemed to be a clear need for greater UN peacekeeping presence and greater commitment to disarm the Interahamwe militia, a Hutu paramilitary organisation that settled in the eastern DRC after the Rwandan genocide in 1994. It was thus essential to diffuse the tensions between the Rwandan and DRC governments. According to Bischoff (2005:10), the resources required to disarm the rebels would have had to come from outside Africa and the only way in which this could be attained, was to use the UN and the AU to maintain the international community‟s focus on the Great Lakes region as a whole, as well as on the geo-economic situation of the DRC in particular.

According to Mandrup-Jorgensen (2007:50), the DDR process in the DRC was identified by most of the parties as central to getting the DRC on the road to peace

and stability. In a report by the UNSG (Annan, 2001:16), it was stated that DDR and the resettlement of armed groups would be key to moving towards lasting peace in the DRC. The report stated that the main problems would be to remove any need for foreign troops to remain in the east of the country, immeasurably improve the security and quality of economic life for the area‟s inhabitants, and neutralise a dangerous source of conflict and instability in the region (Annan, 2001:16). The DDR process in the DRC is very complex and it was estimated that it would involve 300 000 combatants. Progress with the DDR process was slower than initially anticipated and the fact that there has been continued instability in especially the eastern DRC has meant that the combatants have been reluctant to hand in their weapons (Mandrup-Jorgensen, 2007:51).

Despite the signing of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement that was aimed at finally bringing peace to the DRC, the security situation deteriorated into an almost never-ending saga of delays in the implementation of crucial agreements, vicious incidents of conflict that borders on another outbreak of war, as well as continued tensions among key role-players who were supposed to lead the region into a new era of peace and prosperity (Mangu, 2004:36). During 2004, two successive coups attempts occurred in the capital, Kinshasa, and the fall of Bukavu to renegade troops left most Congolese convinced that the transition process in the DRC was rapidly deteriorating. Accusations that the transitional government had not managed to consolidate itself proved to be true (Swart, 2005:15).

Despite these impediments, progress was eventually made towards establishing a representative and democratically elected government for the DRC. In December 2005, the process of registering 25 million out of an eligible 28 million voters was completed. A new constitution was also adopted after a national referendum. In two rounds of elections that took place in July and October 2006, Congolese voters chose their leadership for the first time since independence in 1960. The election was declared free and fair by all international electoral observer missions, including those from the USA, Europe and South Africa (Swing, 2007:2).

The election process was a very important milestone for the peace process in the DRC. However, it is essential to bear in mind that that the election process was merely the start of a long-term process on the road to societal transformation.

According to Kabemba (2006:153), many describe the current government in the DRC as „juridical fiction‟. This is because the government had not extended its power base much further than beyond the borders of the capital, Kinshasa. The question remains how to restore the DRC as a functioning state, given the extent of state destruction that has taken place, and the continued presence of opposing forces

both inside and outside the DRC. Kabemba (2006:153) points to the possibility that the government could fail in its attempts to establish an effective state (from the highest to the lowest levels), if it should perpetuate the kleptocratic patterns of the past. This state of affairs could enable a governing elite to engage in the consumption of resources through illegal and corrupt means without accountability, without regard for social and human security issues, and without respect for human rights. As a result, one of the greatest internal challenges in terms of the creation of an environment that would be conducive to societal transformation, is the legitimisation of institutions from the highest to the lowest („grassroots‟) governmental levels.

Societal transformation will only be achieved in the DRC by inculcating respect for state institutions and the rule of law amongst the people of the DRC, as well as by effectively addressing human rights issues. Transition and state building in the DRC should firstly be about people, and presupposes a move away from one period to a new one that is vastly different from the past. A transition enables a society to proceed in a different way from the past, because of the injection of new ideas and appearance of new leadership with sound values. While much of the negotiation processes regarding the DRC was indeed focused on introducing new ideas of negotiation and inclusiveness, it failed to effectively address accountability and to provide for the emplacement of a new political class that would be able to respond to the challenges of state building (Kabemba, 2006:156). It concentrated on the requirements of the main belligerents, whose aim it was to protect their own individual interests by ensuring access to resources, rather than emphasising the requirements for the building of a new state. The problem in the DRC since independence is not an argument about political ends, but rather a confusion as to the means to reach those ends. In other words, even though belligerents, non-armed opposition and civil society have all taken part in the negotiations, it is still not clear how they intend to create a climate within which their efforts toward democracy will be sustained in the long term (Kabemba, 2006:159). This supports the notion that, although it was essential to include the belligerents in finding lasting solutions to the conflict in the DRC, their inclusion should not have been the focus of the negotiation processes – too little emphasis was placed on the important issues of state-building.