La extensión del centro educativo al hogar Implicación del padre y la madre en una

The problem of establishing philosophy for itself leads to the necessity of questioning both factical life and the possibility of accessing it from within. Such philosophy is not to be found by turning towards the sciences. Rather, philosophy is origin-understanding – it aims at life as emerging from the origin and takes its point of departure from concrete forms of life. Its possibility lies in the self-world experience, the accentuation of which needs to be brought into prominence. In the end, philosophy is a mode of life. It can only be lived and brought to expression as such.

In the present lecture course, Heidegger brings out how origin-understanding concretely takes place and has taken place in factical life by focusing on intensifying- concentration of factical life upon the self-world [Die Zugespitztheit des faktischen Lebens auf die Selbstwelt]. I claim that (in the present lecture course), insofar as philosophy is origin-understanding in the previously described sense, intensifying-concentration of factical life upon the self-world refers to philosophical access in the living situation. Throughout the lecture course, Heidegger does not present the notion in an overly clear manner, but through the fragments the following picture will emerge.

Philosophy, which aims at life as emerging, needs to find a possibility of attaining the basic characters without de-vivifying life. This means, for example, that the character of meaningfulness is not simply actualized, but is co-experienced in the actualization. It means that the how-content of the experience comes forth in the experiencing and becomes intelligible.94 _{This is what is achieved in intensifying-concentration.}

[intensifying-concentration upon the self-world] can be found experientially within various life-worlds. Thus, factical life here presses, so to speak, a certain functional rhythm out of itself, which is not

94 _{Heidegger clearly insists that the basic characters become intelligible in intensifying-concentration by}

stating: “[t]he intensifying-concentration on the self-world [Die Zugespitztheit auf die Selbstwelt] is always there in factical life, in such a way that from out of here, the characters that we have so far found in factical life become more intelligible: the self-sufficiency of life in itself and its character of manifestation (likewise the particular groups of phenomena that we already have considered)” (46 [60]).

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bound to particular life-worlds. It presses out a how-content, in which factical life expresses itself and does so, indeed, with respect to its dynamic, its dynamic structure. (134 [175])

‘Not bound to particular life-worlds’ means that intensifying-concentration is not contextually dependent, not hinged on the what-content. Furthermore, by not being bound to a particular life-world, this mode of experiencing brings the various life-worlds together (an aspect with which the sciences were shown to have difficulties). In this respect, it is an attainment through which traditional philosophy can be brought to life “in an original and radical way” (2 [2]; see chapter 3.1). Heidegger suggests that in intensifying-concentration, factical life is reached in its temporality and liveliness. It expresses life’s dynamic structure and thus is not always too late (another aspect with which the sciences were shown to have problems). Life is not de-historicized and de-vivified, as in the case of the scientific approach.95 _{Rather, exactly the contrary is the case. According to Heidegger, the} methodological meaning of intensifying-concentration is to be a guide for understanding in a way that “phenomenologically the dissociation of life is undone” (151 [197]). In this respect, intensifying-concentration is an attainment.

Intensifying-concentration of factical life upon the self-world is a mode of experiencing in which accentuation of the self-world it is brought to prominence, it is attained. It is not only self-worldly experience, but rather life is lived in a self-worldly way. In this respect, Heidegger determines intensifying-concentration by saying that “[i]t is ‘seen,’ lived and living in a basic situation” (48 [62]). The question is: how is this concretely conceivable?

What does that mean: “Factical life is intensified, concentrated on the self-life”? The self-life always faces the “world” in a particular aspect. In the self we always have self-permeating situation in which the character of the world manifests itself. The context of expression in which the world gives itself is a function of the particular situational-context of the self-world. (156 [206])

What Heidegger suggests is that intensifying-concentration of factical life upon the self- world is a kind of positioning of factical life into the self-world. It is “[a] new and proper positioning of the self to its world” (48 [62]). As ‘new,’ intensifying-concentration is a shift in focus from one positioning to another (for example, from the environing-world to the self-world). It is proper with respect to the environing-world and with-world, insofar as in intensifying-concentration these life-worlds are encountered and lived from the situation of

95 _{Heidegger thus clearly brings out the opposition between science as described previously and intensifying-}

concentration as the mode of accessing that he is proposing. According to Heidegger, in intensifying- concentration the manifestation and the situation of the self-world are co-given (61 [76]). In the scientific context of expression this co-given relation is cut off. Rather, something from the unscientific life-world is at issue there. According to Heidegger, in the process of the steps involved in science there is a transformation of the situation of the self-world, whereby the personal relations are broken off (in order to be “objective”) (62 [77-78]).

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the self (48 [62]). Furthermore, according to Heidegger, in the intensifying-concentration of factical life upon the self-world’s situation “the turnedness [Zugekehrheit] of all life- encounters and their qualitative forms and contents toward the self-world” shows itself (49 [64-65]).96 _{It is a mode in which factical life manifests itself. And it manifests itself as a} (self-world) rhythm. This also means that the environing-world and with-world are never cut off in this mode of experiencing. As Scott M. Campbell (2012: 42) points out: “this twofold process of realizing that life-worlds are centered in the self-world and then drawing the life-worlds out of the self-world is not in any way linear.” It is not a back and forth movement with fixed results, but a rhythmic echoing (ibid.).97 _{It is attainment of the self-} world in the self-world experience.

All in all, intensifying-concentration of factical life upon the self-world is a mode of experiencing in which the self-world is attained – brought to life and lived as such. It is a proper positioning of the self into world – one does not objectify the world in this positioning, but actualizes it as worldly. What is significant about this mode is that it reaches the rhythm of life (lives as such and brings it to expression) and thus reaches that which phenomenology needs to point out in the living situation in order to stay with the vitality of life. According to Heidegger, intensifying-concentration of factical life upon the self-world refers to the question of the “new basic experience of life in and for itself and how a possible theory of life in and for itself prefigures itself out from itself” (171 [227]).

In his account of intensifying-concentration, Heidegger says on the one hand that it is always there in factical life and can be found in different life-worlds (46, 134 [60, 175]). And yet, on the other hand, he very clearly insists that it takes place and has taken place in rare cases, and the instances where Heidegger finds this kind of positioning become significant for him. Primarily he claims that this positioning can be found in the life of the primordial Christians:

The deepest historical paradigm for the peculiar process whereby the main focus of factical life and the life-world shifted into the self-world and the world of inner experiences gives itself to us in the emergence of Christianity. The self-world as such comes into life and is lived as such. What is there in the life of the primal Christian communities signals a radical rearrangement of the usual directions of life, whereby much thought is given to a denial of the world and to asceticism (the Kingdom-of-God- notions, Paul (compare, above all, Ritschl)). Here lie the motives for the cultivation of completely new

96 _{In this respect, it is important to note that according to Heidegger the origin is a form which I reach as a}

particular quality of form (114 [148]).

97 _{In his interpretation Campbell (2012: 43) stresses that the originality points to factical life’s incompleteness.}

It is incomplete insofar as each life-world is constantly pulled into another. Furthermore, it must be understood as incomplete since it expresses factical life’s temporality: “[t]o understand factical life as emerging from the origin means to understand it as temporal and, therefore, as constantly renewing itself” (ibid.).

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contexts of expression that life creates for itself, even up to the level of that which today we call

history. (47 [61])

Heidegger describes this shift as the “great revolution against ancient science” (ibid.). As the revolutionaries in this context he names medieval mysticism98 _{and above all Augustine} (47-48 [61-62]). Importantly for the present study, Kierkegaard is put forward by Heidegger as such a revolutionary. From Oskar Becker’s transcripts we can see that in appealing to the intensifying-concentration of factical life upon the self-world, Heidegger had Kierkegaard in mind:

This early Christian achievement was deformed and submerged by the infiltration of ancient science into Christianity. From time to time it asserts itself yet again in powerful eruptions (as in Augustine, in

Luther, in Kierkegaard). (155 [205])99

The early Christian achievement lies exactly in the attention to the self-world in its vitality, emphasizing factical life as self-worldly. The deforming of this by ancient science refers to the theoretical distortion of this pre-worldly experience. As Kisiel (1995: 77) points out in this context: “Augustine’s Confessions penetrates much more deeply into the self-world than Descartes, for example, who takes his starting point from modern science. […] His [Augustine’s] crede ut intelligas (Believe so that you may understand) means that the self must realize itself in the fullness of life before it can truly know.” Or as Otto Pöggeler (1990 [1963]: 25 [38]) states: “[t]he primordial Christian faith experiences life in its actuality.”100 _{This factical experience of life (this actualization), this achievement, will} prove to be of utmost significance to Heidegger, as I will show in chapter five. This also applies to Heidegger’s stance towards Kierkegaard.

From the way Kierkegaard is brought out here, there is no pressing reason to draw Kierkegaard into any specific aspect of Heidegger’s unfolding of phenomenology as origin-

98 _{More concretely, in this list Heidegger names Bernard of Clairvaux, Bonaventure, Eckhart, Tauler, and}

Luther (47-48 [62]).

99 _{“Diese altchristliche Errungenschaft wurde durch das Eindringen der antiken Wissenschaft in das}

Christentum verbildet und verschüttet. Von Zeit zu Zeit setzt sie sich in gewaltigen Eruptionen wieder durch (wie in Augustinus, in Luther, in Kierkegaard). Die mittelalterliche Mystik ist allein von hier auf zu verstehen” (GA 58: 205; Anhang B; I. Ergänzungen zur ausgearbeiteten Vorlesung aus der Nachschrift von Oskar Becker; Ergänzungen 4.).

100 _{The meaning of this Christian achievement is clarified by Pöggeler as follows: “[s]ince according to the}

view of the early Heidegger, primordial Christian religion is factical life-experience, it needs only to be ‘explicated.’ In later history, however, this life-experience is no longer kept up in its purity. To be sure, thinkers such as Augustine, the medieval mystics, Luther, and Kierkegaard recover this experience in spite of all the distortions; nevertheless, it is permeated by a metaphysical conceptualization which ultimately remains inadequate to the experience. In the case of Augustine the factical experience of life is distorted by Neoplatonic concepts. Therefore, Augustine may not only be explicated; he must also be destroyed. The interpretation must grasp through the concepts at the experience which is truly at the core in order to free this experience from the inadequate concepts by which it is expressed.” (Pöggeler 1990 [1963]: 26 [38]) With this insight of Pöggeler’s that the factical experience of life of primordial Christians must, according to Heidegger, be both destructed and explicated, I fully agree. This fact comes to the fore most clearly in chapter five of this thesis, where I show how Heidegger explicates Book X of Augustine’s Confessions.

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understanding in this lecture course. However, what can be claimed is that Heidegger clearly places Kierkegaard among those whom he regards as having attained the self-world: that Kierkegaard has lived and expressed the origin-understanding. This is significant, because it means that for Heidegger Kierkegaard has actualized, lived in this way and expressed the origin-understanding. To what extent Heidegger appreciates Kierkegaard in this respect is the theme for the second part of this thesis.

3.6. Conclusion

In this chapter I concentrated on Heidegger’s lecture course Basic Problems of Phenomenology. I claimed that in this lecture course Heidegger follows one of the two directions he proposed as a task for philosophy in his KNS lecture course, namely the task to establish philosophy within the pre-theoretical sphere. I aimed to show that in this lecture course Heidegger articulates philosophy as origin-understanding and states that this lies in intensifying-concentration of factical life upon the self-world. Furthermore, I sought to prove that Heidegger refers to Kierkegaard as one who has lived and expressed an origin- understanding. With this, I paved the way for the claim that in Heidegger’s first Freiburg period lecture courses Kierkegaard is given a significant place with respect to accessing the pre-worldly within the pre-theoretical sphere. That is, in Kierkegaard Heidegger sees somebody who has actualized philosophy proper as far as the pre-theoretical sphere is considered.

As I have shown so far, Heidegger brings out the problem of philosophical access first of all as a problem of the possibility of pointing ahead to the basic characters of factical life from out of the fullness of life in itself. That is, access to (the basic characters of) factical life must be such that the living flow of life is sustained and it must be reached as motivated out of itself. Thus, philosophy must keep away from objectification and turn to the rhythmic echoing of the self-world – to the factical manner of how life lives in the world and becomes understandable for itself. The fact that life is always already in the world and lives in the context of meaningfulness allows Heidegger to claim that one always already has oneself, is familiar with the world and oneself. This also means that the characters to which the access is searched for are immediately experienced. And yet, the access is searched for. For Heidegger, having oneself is not the same as origin- understanding – ‘having oneself’ does not simply give factical life from out of itself. Rather, there are different modes of experiencing. Origin-understanding refers to the mode

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of experience in which the accentuation of the self-world is brought into prominence. That is, the experience is not simply lived through in the familiarity, but actualized in the way that the characters are co-experienced. The self-world is lived according to itself. In this mode of experiencing, factical life manifests itself and thus should be considered philosophy proper. In the present lecture course, Heidegger names this mode of experiencing intensifying-concentration of factical life upon the self-world. By this expression he refers to a proper positioning of oneself into the world, in which factical life pushes a functional rhythm out of itself. Intensifying-concentration, in which one turns towards the how-content and aims at the rhythm of life whereby the basic characters can be attained is a mode of accessing which has been put forward as origin-understanding. It is an actualization in which life as factical is lived and brought to expression according to itself.

For the present thesis it is decisive that Kierkegaard is named as one of the few who have lived and expressed (actualized) factical life in the manner which Heidegger calls ‘intensifying-concentration of factical life upon the self-world.’ This justifies the claim that Kierkegaard according to Heidegger has reached the origin-understanding, or to put it differently: Kierkegaard has accessed and expressed factical life within the pre-theoretical sphere.

As I aim to show in the next chapter, philosophy as origin-understanding is not Heidegger’s final account in addressing the question of accessing and expressing factical life. He further aims to articulate a concrete philosophical methodology for accessing and expressing factical life. He provides a procedure for philosophical investigation. In what is to come Heidegger will no longer talk about philosophy using the term intensifying- concentration. However, this manner of actualizing factical life remains central for Heidegger. Thus, in the second part of this thesis I will argue that Heidegger starts to unfold what Kierkegaard has to offer (his actualization of intensification) through the phenomenological method and how he does this.

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4.

Phenomenology as a method: the three methodological moments

4.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I showed how in the lecture course Basic Problems of Phenomenology Heidegger unfolds philosophy as origin-understanding. With the question of finding an access to life in its originality, Heidegger’s deliberations led to the phenomenon of intensifying-concentration upon the self-world. It is a mode of experiencing