EXTRACCIÓN DE ORO EN MINERALES REFRACTARIOS

There are a number of measures of government durability: a change in Prime Minister, a change in the party composition of Cabinet; a change from majority to minority support; an election; a reconstruction of the same government mid-term. It does appear that

government durability has declined under MMP under most measures. However, this is offset by strong continuities: the Prime Minister remained the same for nine years from 1999; most ministers served for two or more parliamentary terms; and there were only two changes in the ideological orientation of the government over the entire period (in 1999 and 2008).187

There are a number of ways in which governments can end in NZ: by scheduled election; by early dissolution; or by a loss of confidence. In NZ, no minority government has lost the confidence of the House; the most common way for a minority government to end is by scheduled election. There has, however, been one early dissolution since 1996.

The 1996 National-NZ First coalition ended with a breakup in mid-term. After a major disagreement, the NZ First Ministers walked out of Cabinet. Prime Minister Shipley then advised the Governor General that she was dismissing Peters, the NZ First leader, from his posts. The coalition partners met shortly afterwards and agreed to terminate the coalition within a week. Within two weeks of the initial disagreement, Shipley announced the

composition of a new government, complete with agreements. A week later, Shipley moved a confidence motion, which her government won. This entire process took about four weeks. The then Governor General, in another carefully choreographed speech, later set out what he saw as the key principles for mid-term crises.188 _{The Governor General’s key priority remained}

the same: to determine where the confidence of the House lay. The Governor General would continue to act on the Prime Minister’s advice, provided the latter appeared to command the support of the House of Representatives. Where this was uncertain, it was up to the political parties to clarify, within a reasonably short timeframe, whether the Prime Minister continued to enjoy that support. In short, political crises remained a matter for politicians to resolve. Where a government has lost the House’s support, the Prime Minister will either indicate a readiness to resign (which meant the resignation of all Ministers), if another government can be formed, or seek a dissolution. The incumbent Government was expected to operate in accordance with the caretaker convention.

The Prime Minister’s power to dissolve Parliament was clarified in 2008 to resolve a potential conflict with the caretaker convention: a Prime Minister who has lost the confidence of the House must demonstrate they have the confidence of a simple majority of MPs before the Governor General will grant a dissolution.189

183 S. Levine, N. Roberts, N. Salmond and R. Salmond, ‘A Wider View: MMP Ten Years On’, in S. Levine and N. Roberts (eds.), The Baubles of Office: The New Zealand General Election of 2005 (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2007), pp. 445-475.

184 For instance, ‘overhang’ or ‘backdoor’ MPs: see S. Levine and N. Roberts, ‘MMP and the Constitution: Future Political Challenges’, Paper delivered at the MMP and the Constitution: 15 Years Past, 15 Years Forward Symposium (2008), available at: http://ips.ac.nz/events/ downloads/2008/Levine%20and%20Roberts%20August%202008%20MMP%20symposium%20paper.pdf.

185 Http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/mmp+referendum+be+held+2011+election; see also, ‘Two-Stage MMP Vote Gives NZ Plenty of Time to Decide’, NZ Herald, 21 October 2009, at:. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10604414. 186 All journalist interviewees confirmed this point.

187 J. Boston, S. Church and T. Bale, ‘The Impact of Proportional Representation on Government Effectiveness: The New Zealand Experience’,

Australian Journal of Public Administration, (2003) Vol. 62, pp. 7-22.

188 Sir M. H. Boys, ‘Governing under MMP: the Constitutional and Policy Challenges’, (1998), at: http://www.gov-gen.govt.nz/node/403. 189 2008 Cabinet Office Manual, 6.58.

The other example of an early end of a government – although not dissolution – took place in 2002. The Alliance had by this time broken into two warring factions, although both factions agreed to uphold the coalition arrangements and remain part of ‘the government’. Prime Minister Helen Clark called an early election, on the basis that the Alliance’s troubles were making it difficult to govern. But there was never a dissolution, and at all times, Clark had the confidence of the House.

There is little evidence of brinkmanship, or a willingness to push for an early election. All parties are afraid of snap elections in NZ: the history of snap elections has been that those who initiate them tend to lose them.190 _{New Zealanders have punished parties – small and}

large – who subject them to an earlier, costly election. This militates against early elections and thus increases government durability.

4.5 Conclusions

Drawing lessons from the NZ experience is not easy: the NZ Parliament consists of only 120 (currently 122) MPs; party discipline is far stronger than at Westminster; parliamentary terms are short; and the proportional representation electoral system, which means the ongoing likelihood of hung parliaments, provides a strong incentive for all parties to cooperate over the long-term.

But there are some general lessons. First, a hung Parliament need not be disastrous. Multi- party governance, where two or more political parties cooperate on a regular basis to govern, can be far more stable than critics suggest, if sensibly and practically managed. Concerns about government durability, executive ineffectiveness and small parties holding a disproportionate influence have not come to pass. There are various reasons for this, but amongst them are the fear of punishment by the electorate; the conflict-averse nature of politicians; the imbalance of power between the larger established parties and the smaller supporting parties; and perhaps most fundamentally, good coalition and support management.

Second, multi-party governance is difficult, but not impossible to manage. The tools are already present, but may need modification and a flexible attitude from those involved. Third, ‘nothing succeeds like success’. Unusual arrangements will be accepted if they work; and these can be made to work if managed by careful and sensible people.

Fourth, multi-party governance, more than any other form of government, relies on maintaining strong personal relationships. Conducting interparty relationships on the basis of good faith and no surprises is essential. This does not mean a ‘touchy-feely’ approach, but rather a pragmatic stance which acknowledges that relationships with other parties cannot be taken for granted.

Finally, there are real benefits in setting out authoritative guidance on constitutional issues and procedures in advance, rather than formulating them in the heat of the moment.

190 The exception is 1951. Interviewees split over whether Helen Clark’s decision in 2002 to have an early election was successful or not. Labour was doing relatively well in the polls, yet was unable to secure a majority; but it was possible that had Clark not called an early election, Labour’s popularity would have affected by the collapsing Alliance Party.

5. Learning from Scotland’s Parliament