Flunger and Zieburtz (2010) propose that several factors influence in-group, out-group attitudes in the mesosystem and can result in extreme in-group, out-group cognitive biases that facilitate ‘us’ versus ‘them’ thinking styles. These factors can include group size and minority versus majority status (Turner, 1999) which contribute to social comparison which can produce pressure for intergroup differentiation and conflict (Flunger and Zieburtz, 2010). Lilienfeld et al (2009) suggest cognitive distortions are the ‘significant contributors to
ideological extremism’ (Lilienfeld et al, 2009, p.390) that present within groups to contribute to the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ thinking patterns:
• Confirmation bias (tendency to seek out evidence consistent with one’s own views and
ignore evidence that contradicts them)
• Naïve realism (believing the world is as we see it) • Bias blind spot (others are biased but we are not)
• False consensus effect (overestimating the extent to which others share our views) • An insider perspective (failure to see how people outside one’s insulated group
perceive a situation)
These cognitive biases are present in typical social cognition and many groups who do not engage in violent extremism. It would be overwhelming if we had to analyse every piece of data and decide what to do with it. Instead we rely on automatic processing of information that is quickly categorised and compared with our schemas (Harrington, 2004). Flunger and
Zieburtz (2010) argue that negative out-group attitudes are not generated through the cognitive processes of individuals, but through the cognitive processes of groups.
Significantly negative out-group thought patterns that we can observe with extremist groups (Lilienfeld et al, 2009) occur when there is a risk that ‘we’ would be subordinated by ‘them’ (Flunger and Deburtz, 2010). Lilienfeld et al (2009) suggest that the most deadly political movements, such as Nazism, Stalinism, Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge and Islamic fundamentalism share extreme forms of cognitive biases, particularly the unshakeable conviction that they are right and that their opponents are wrong. Lilienfeld et al (2009) have not directly researched case studies to evidence this claim, however and use secondary source case material.
Cognitive biases are present in many groups who do not commit acts of violence towards others (Sindnic and Reicher, 2008). There needs to be a clearer understanding of the conditions that make these cognitive biases so entrenched, leading to extreme in-group preference and out-group hostility and eventually violent acts (for example community frustrations which are discussed in reference to the exosystem, Moghaddam, 2005).
Bandura (1998) proposes that one mechanism by which an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ thinking style can lead to violence is through processes of cognitive reconstrual and moral disengagement. What is culpable can be made honourable by cognitively reconstruing the out-group as all bad and blaming the ‘other’ for any suffering experienced (Bandura, 1998). Bandura (1998) proposes that this cognitive reconstrual is facilitated through euphemistic language. Language shapes the thought patterns from which many people shape their behaviours. Activities can therefore take on different meanings depending on what they are called (Gambino, 1973). Extremist groups often take war-like names, such as the National Liberation Army
(Columbia), Revolutionary People’s Struggle (Egypt), Palestine Liberation Front (Palestine), Animal Liberation Group (UK), dehumanising the out-group as ‘Infidels’ (Loza, 2007) to promote ‘us’ versus ‘them’ belief systems. This justifies and diffuses responsibility for one’s actions (Bandura, 1998).
Cognitive biases such as ‘us’ versus ‘them’ thinking patterns are also strengthened through advantageous comparison where self-deplored acts can be made to appear righteous by comparing them with widespread cruelties inflicted on one’s own people (Bandura, 1998).
McAlister and Bandura (2006) sought to clarify the role of moral disengagement and cognitive biases in the public’s support for military force against Iraq. The modes of moral disengagement were assessed through a ten-item scale probing:
• Moral sanctioning of lethal means
• Disavowal of personal responsibility or military campaigns • Minimisation of civilian casualties
• Attribution of blame
• Dehumanisation of one’s foes • Support for military force
Respondents were drawn from a nationwide (US) random digit dialling interview system. Results showed that moral disengagement accounted for a significant share of the variance in support of military force against Iraq. People in favour of military action against Iraq tended to reconstrue violent means as moral actions; minimised civilian casualties; and dehumanised
the foe. This suggests that conflicting relationships between groups in the mesosystem can contribute to moral disengagement.
The information given in McAlister and Bandura’s (2006) methodology section suggests that the interviewers had a strict schedule that relied on Likert scales rather than open ended questions that would allow people to qualify their responses. Likert scales could have distorted the results, forcing people to select a number to indicate how much they agree with the concepts used to assess moral disengagement. People may have given quantitative, numeric responses without thinking about their opinions. Asking for qualitative qualification may have given a greater insight into the thought processes behind the moral disengagement and cognitive biases and increased the validity of the results. This would have taken
additional time however and McAllister and Bandura (2006) may not have been able to select as many participants (1,499 participants were identified with a response rate of 59%), leading to a less representative sample.
McAllister and Bandura’s (2006) research was not conducted with members of extremist groups, although demonstrates that for a selection of the US population, violence and military action can be justified through the above processes of moral disengagement and cognitive reconstrual. Demonstrating these processes in the general population suggests that similar mechanisms may operate in extremists and that moral disengagement may serve to entrench cognitive biases and justify violent actions against an out-group (Moghaddam, 2005 and Meah and Mellis, 2006).
The evidence for the development of cognitive biases through group identification in the mesosystem and moral desensitisation suggests that there is a trend for groups to experience in-group, out-group thinking styles (Lilienfeld et al, 2009, Flunger and Ziebertz, 2010) and that these may become entrenched through processes of moral desensitisation to contribute to the moral sanctioning of violence against an out-group. In addition to these processes risk factors in the exosystem, such as community frustrations are likely to compound this effect (Stout, 2004: Moghaddam, 2005: Meah and Mellis, 2006: Jones, 2008).
2.1.2.4 Risk factors within the exosystem that may contribute to a young person