The theory of norm circles helps us to explain the tendency of human agents to follow somewhat standardised practices across a social group. Indeed, because social structure is a particularly poorly defined and polysemic term which lacks ontological rigour, the perennial problem of structure and agency remains in social sciences (Elder-Vass, 2010a). For example, a
lack of clarity exists concerning exactly what social structure is and how it can influence our behaviour as agents. In line with critical realist logic, a problem exists here in that previous work has often failed to fully understand what social structure ‘must be like’ before being able to ‘know about it’. Here, Elder-Vass’ theorising provides one possible solution to this subject of intense debate. Norm circles are the type of social structure that are responsible for normativity according to Elder-Vass (2010a). In short, a norm circle is a ‘group of people who are committed to endorsing and enforcing a particular norm’ (Elder-Vass, 2010a, p. 22). A norm is a belief or value which can be learned (consciously or unconsciously) through interactions with others and stored as a
disposition (Elder-Vass, 2007b). Norm circles thus relate to one particular disposition or belief held (and often endorsed or enforced) by occupants of the norm circle. For example, a norm circle may, through its members, serve to endorse and enforce the norm of queueing (e.g., to board a plane or purchase goods). In line with a relational emergentist approach, the causal power of norm circles to influence action is dependent upon the interactions of and relations between humans to produce, endorse and enforce a norm, which (through storing the norm as a belief or disposition) serves to (downwardly) causally influence the behaviour and actions of agents alongside other entities.
As used by Elder-Vass (2010a), the queue situation presented above provides a useful example of a norm circle and its potential to influence. The way in which humans are related to one another in a queue (i.e., the way in which they physically stand in a queue and perhaps verbally
communicate with one another) creates an emergent property of the group (to queue), which individual parts (humans) and the group itself would not possess if they were not arranged into this specific set of structural relations. Those within the norm circle (i.e., those who hold the belief that the norm is to queue) are likely to conform to the norm and join the back of the queue upon being presented with such a situation. They are said to be causally influenced by the norm circle (through interactions with members of the norm circle a belief or disposition to act in that way is stored). As will be discussed in greater detail later in this section, however, human behaviour is not wholly determined by normative structures; humans also have the capacity to consciously think, deliberate and be reflexive in their own right (Elder-Vass, 2007b; Elder-Vass, 2010a). As such, somebody
may decide to join the queue in the middle, or attempt to jump a space in the queue. Such an act would be likely to stimulate a response from others in the queue who hold the belief that the norm is to queue. These people could act to protect, endorse and enforce the norm (on behalf of the norm circle) by asking the person to join the back of the queue, by frowning, or by arguing with them, for example.
So far, this account is yet to fully explain how norm circles serve to causally influence the action of individuals. This is now addressed through introducing and explaining the boundaries of norm circles and different types of norm circle. Norm circles can be proximal, imagined, or actual. Proximal norm circles are the people in the actual presence of an individual who have served to endorse or enforce a norm (Elder-Vass, 2012a). However, individuals often perceive the extent of the norm circle (those who are likely to enact, enforce or endorse the norm) to constitute a wider range of people than just those whom they have come into direct contact with. This is known as the imagined norm circle. It is not imaginary in the sense that it is not real; what is imaginary is said to be the extent of how big the group may actually be (e.g., in supporting a particular political party an individual may have been proximally influenced by those in their immediate presence – family members, friends – and what they have witnessed on television, however, they perceive that the number of people who support the political party is larger than simply those in their immediate presence). The actual norm circle, then, is the whole set of people who tend to enforce and endorse a particular norm (Elder-Vass, 2012a). Clearly, determining the physical extent of this group would be very difficult to achieve. Hence, norm circles and their (imagined) scalability can thus causally influence the way in which we act (alongside our capacity to make conscious decisions). Norm circles make us aware that we face a systematic incentive to act in a particular way. Importantly, the norm itself is not the causal influence; instead it is the norm circle (through enactment, endorsement and enforcement of the norm storing a belief or disposition) that has the potential to causally influence behaviour (Elder-Vass, 2012a). In this regard,
it is the proximal norm circle that causally influences an individual to adopt a norm in the first place; it is the imagined norm circle that determines when (i.e. in whose presence) the individual believes norm conformance will be enforced and this
therefore influences when they are likely to conform to it; and it is the actual norm circle that determines when actual endorsing/enforcing behaviour is likely to occur (Elder-Vass, 2012a, p. 25).
A set of dispositions or beliefs are produced in individuals through norm circles, which do not
compel agents to adopt the respective norm, but instead, generate a tendency to observe the
respective norm (Elder-Vass, 2012a). In practice, the role of norm circles in influencing the likelihood of an agent to observe a norm (or not) often depends upon: (a) the extent and
applicability of the norm circle, (b) the interaction of different dispositions (endorsed by different norm circles), and (c) a multitude of other entities (e.g., the presence of specific agents) within a specific set of contextual circumstances (Elder-Vass, 2012a).
The intersectionality of norm circles and the influence of multiple dispositions or entities provides us with the answer to how people can be part of more than one norm circle at the same time. Individuals can acquire multiple dispositions to observe numerous norms, however, the norm circles which endorse these norms do not necessarily need to be congruent with one another (Elder- Vass, 2010a). We can acquire norms about being polite from our family, for example, and norms about work rate from colleagues. Equally, it is possible that others endorse and observe the norm to work hard, but do not observe the norm to be polite. Where norm circles for some norms overlap (i.e., largely, groups endorsing or enforcing different norms have the same members) these can be identified as norm set circles (Elder-Vass, 2012a). ‘However even where many norm circles are clustered in this way, individuals may be influenced by a number of such clusters. To the extent that this is true, individuals become sites of normative intersectionality’ (Elder-Vass, 2012a, p. 28). Practically, the skilled performance of agents thus requires sophisticated practical consciousness of the extent, diversity and relevance of norm circles in an individuals’ context (Elder-Vass, 2012a). Further, the differential influence of competing norms is often dependent upon the influence of power. Here, for example, agents may decide between conflicting normative pressures by enacting the norm endorsed by the person or group to which they afford more power (Elder-Vass, 2010a). Indeed, those who conform to and endorse norms do not necessarily even have to be committed to the morality or ‘rightness’ of those norms; they may micro-politically act for instrumental reasons
(Elder-Vass, 2012a). Resultantly, Elder-Vass (2012a) refers to Goffman’s work on the presentation of self (Goffman, 1959), in proposing the altering of performances within front and back stage environments as an example of the operation of this micro-political literacy.
The theory of norm circles is capable of helping this research project to address its questions because it provides an opportunity to explain how the (inter)actions of coaches, among others, endorse or enforce particular norms (on behalf of the norm circle) and how this can store beliefs as dispositions within the neural networks of agents. This can then help to explain how and why athletes act in particular ways, either confirming to or deviating from the norm, accounting for the influence of norm circles and the conscious capacity of agents. Specifically, the
intersectionality of norm circles allows an explanation of how athletes might be required to decide between competing norms. Consistent with the emergentist approach adopted, rather than viewing the influence of coaching as a dominating, powerful act, this theory helps to reflect the more multiply determined, complex nature of social interaction and influence. As should now be evident, events or actions, as described and explained within an emergentist (realist) position, are multiply determined and contingent; they rarely operate in consistent or law like manners (Bhaskar, 1998 [1979]). I now explore how this theory of norms may explain the actions of agents who operate within other types of social structure (i.e., organisations).