F UNCIONES  BÁ SICAS

It is commonly though that in particular the Roman Catholic Church and the TEC had close relationships to the government of Nyerere, in part because Nyerere was a devout Catholic (e.g.

Luanda 1996; Mbogoni, 2005). It has been suggested that various catholic congregations maintained close links with Nyerere even before independence, and that there was a measure of expected reciprocity behind the maintenance of these relations. Through their influence on the government, the Catholics hoped to counter what it perceived to be the two largest “undesirable tendencies” in society, namely communism and the influence of Islam (Mbogoni, 2005, 128-130;

Luanda, 169-170). The Catholic church had controlled a large part of the missionary schools in colonial times and played an active role in “leadership education” in independent Tanzania, and combined with personal links to the ruling elite, it managed to “carve out a special niche for itself in the political affairs of Tanzania” (Luanda, 1996, p. 169). However, it was not only the Catholics but also the CCT had close relations with the state throughout Nyerere’s reign (Ludwig, 1999), and as mentioned above, BAKWATA was closely aligned with TANU/CCM from the beginning.

This is largely in line with Jeff Haynes (1996) conceptualization of state-religious relations, where

he predicts that “mainline” religions will strive to maintain stable and cordial relations to the government. Haynes defines mainline religions as those religious institutions which have

“established regularized forms of interaction with the state over time, and which are regarded by the latter as official representative of large numbers of people” (Haynes, 1996, p. 20). Haynes includes in this definition those Muslim organizations represented by the ulama, the religious authorities, but with regard to Tanzania, it could be argued that Muslims organizations such as BAKWATA would rather fit the description. On the Christian side, this would refer mainly to the Anglican, Lutheran and Catholic denomination and their corresponding institutions. Haynes⁴⁵ frames the religion-politics relations of the mainline religions in terms of the neo-patrimonial system prevalent in many African countries as outlined in section 5.2 above. He sees state-religion relationships in accordance with a Gramscian notion of hegemony, according to which state and religious elites are both

engaged in a “hegemonic” striving to legitimate their rule. The maintenance and construction of hegemony is facilitated by the allusion to common interests of the whole nation such as national unity or national self-determination (self-reliance). Religious leaders are thus part of the same patrimonial networks as politicians, and particularly in times of economic and political insecurity, they are likewise dependent on upholding networks of reciprocity, involving to some extent also kin and family. (Haynes, 2004, pp. 63-71; 73-79)

In consequence, Haynes sees religious and state elites as having common interests, and therefore the mainline religions have had a vested interest in the maintenance of a stable political order in post-colonial Africa. A number of specific issues have influenced the incentives of religious leaders, particularly Christian, to maintain good relations to the state, according to Haynes.

Religious leaders and their institutions may have benefitted from the prevailing order and also realized that their “corporate position”, that is influence, in society hinged on state support. Church-state relations were close in colonial times, and these relations were in many cases simply

maintained in post-colonial Africa. There have been consistent and close personal relationships between religious leaders and secular elites as well, which furthers stability. Also, Haynes suggests that religious leaders and institutions may be considered inherently conservative, believing that public authority and power was ordained by God, and should therefore not be interfered with. This also explains the church’s hesitance, according to Haynes, to back democratization before the push for democracy has received sufficient popular support. (Haynes, 2004, pp. 69-70; 71; 73-76) In general, mainline religions will be reluctant to challenge the status quo, as their main goal,

45 I refer here to Haynes 2004 article Religion and Democratisation in Africa but the same arguments are made in his 1996 book Religion and Politics in Africa. For the sake of clear referral, I mainly mention the article in the references

according to Haynes, is “the maintenance of order and continuation of elite domination” (2004, p.

73).

While I cannot engage in a discussion on the potential patrimonial interest between church and state in Tanzania, it is clear that the church during the one-party period put a primacy on stable and personal relations to the state, and was not prone to push for change. Ludwig (1999) writes that the churches actively sought to establish good relations to the state and avoided open conflicts, which implied that whenever an issue of concern arose, the church – particularly the CCT and the TEC – would send delegations to meet the president or the minister in question. The meeting would be held behind closed doors, with the main issues commonly revolving around the church’s role in service provision (education and health care) given the expansion of state services, and the influence of Muslim communities (Ludwig, 1999, pp. 61-64) The concern that the Christian Churches expressed was that Muslims were less “tolerant” of religious plurality in Tanzania than Christians and therefore would seek to establish an Islamic state, if Muslims were to assume power (Mbogoni, p. 131; Luanda, p. 170). More realistically, in particular the Catholic Church may have been concerned about loosing its privileged access to the state if Muslims influence were to increase. (Luanda, ibid.).

However, relations between the Roman Catholic Church and Nyerere’s government were not always marked by mutual support, since the Catholics long were quite wary of the suitability of the policies of African socialism which Nyerere outlined in the Arusha declaration, due to their

concerns over the influence of socialism (Mbogoni, 2005, pp. 130; 139-144). Nonetheless, church-state relations were influenced to a great extent by personal contacts between religious leaders and state elites. For instance, Ludwig reports that the Lutheran bishop of Bukoba, Josiah Kibira, was common dining companion of both Nyerere and long-term vice-president Rashidi Kawawa, a Muslim. (Ludwig, 1999, p. 64-65) While Ludwig argues that this resulted in a situation where “any criticism of the policies of the government was almost impossible” (Ludwig, p. 65). Even as the government of Nyerere became increasingly authoritarian, including for instance the deportation of the political dissidents and the prohibition of opposition parties, the churches did not interfere or voice their concerns. The churches generally referred to the need to maintain law and order, which justified the authoritarian measures of the government (ibid. pp. 65-69).

Throughout the 1960s and for most of the 1970s, the mainline churches were by far the most

dominant Christian institutions in Tanzania, while Muslims had been represented exclusively by the

CCM dominated BAKWATA. Towards the 1970s, this started to change, as the Pentecostal movement spread with increasing pace in Tanzania, and later various Muslim organizations emerged who challenged the position of BAKWATA, as mentioned above (for accounts, e.g.

Ludwig pp. chapter 181-190; 206-210; Luanda, pp. 173-178). The “revivalist” or “fundamentalist”

groups were frequently confrontational as the Pentecostal groups engaged in “crusades”, which were focused to a large extent on the conversion of Muslims. The Muslim fundamentalist groupings in turn increasingly engaged in mihadhara, open-air comparative preaching, often including

statements that were perceived as blasphemy by Christians. This discourse also spread to newly established newspapers such as Msemakweli and An-Nuur, which thus emerged as religious media outlets. (Mbogoni, 2005, pp. 171-180). Tensions also translated into actual physical skirmishes, of which the most notable were attacks by Muslims fundamentalist against pork butcheries in

Magomeni in Dar es Salaam in 1993, in which three pork butchers were killed; a police arrest in a mosque in Mwembechai, also in Magomeni, which sparked protests in which two protesters died in 1998; in 2002 two further people died in front of the same mosque in confrontation with police (referred to as the Mwembechai killings); and a series of further confrontations either between Muslims and Christians or between state authority and protesters. (Heilman & Kaiser, 2002, p. 695;

Luanda, 1996, 177-78)

Muslims action was to a large extent based on a particular narrative of discrimination, which posited that the Muslims had been at disadvantage vis-à-vis the Christians since colonial times in terms of education, employment and public/political representation. Muslims had featured

prominently in the independence struggle and in the ranks of the first independence movement, the African Association (AA), and later formed the majority in the council of elders in TANU, but there was a common perception that they had been sidelined in the high-ranks of TANU, as well as later when positions of government were distributed. (Mbogoni, 2005, pp. 115-116). The main issue behind this, as mentioned above, was education. Despite the sometimes rather belligerent rhetoric around the educational issue, it is nonetheless quite clear that Christians have maintained an educational advantage over the Muslims, which harks back to the colonial educational system (Ludwig, p. 208; Ishumi, 2006; Yahya-Othman, 2006). The basis for these imbalances was laid during British colonial rule, as a shift occurred from a dual system of government and private school to an emphasis on private actors. It was mainly the missions who could afford the large-scale construction of schools, which they undertook with particular intensity, while colonial government put little effort into provision of education. As a result there was a clear imbalance in the number of Christian and public schools towards the end of colonial rule, not the mention the ration of Christian

and Muslims schools. (Mbogoni, pp. 107-108; Ishumi, 2006, e.g. pp. 438-40) The consequences of this were considerable, as Mbogoni notes: “Since education in colonial Tanganyika was linked to social and economic mobility, the historical distribution of educational opportunities is an important key to understanding Muslim complaints, then and now, about their marginalization.” (Mbogoni, p.

111)

The validity of these grievances has been the subject of an intensive debate, where the response from some Christian institutions has essentially been that Muslims were themselves to blame for the educational imbalances, since secular education had not been held in high regard in the Muslim communities and institutions. (e.g. personal communication Prof. Mushi; Prof. Tambila; also Heilman & Kaiser, 2002, p. 702; Mbogoni 116-119). I cannot evaluate the accuracy of either claim here, but it may be noted that Nyerere’s government nationalized schools all over the country in an attempt to guarantee equitable inclusion of all social groups, as explained in chapter 6.5. Whatever the case, towards the end of the 1980s, Muslims grievances were voiced to an increasing extent, and while the content and range of the accusations varied, the basic gist has been that Muslims have been treated as second-class citizens in Tanzania, who have not been allowed to organize in pursuit of their interests despite the close relations between church and state that had prevailed since independence. Further, it was argued that the state has not addressed the historical imbalances between the religious groups and is mainly protecting the interest of the Christian community.

(Heilman & Kaiser, 2002, pp. 701-702; Leurs et al. 2011, pp. 36-37).

In sum: many Muslims “perceive both Christianity and the state as fellow collaborators against Islam” (Luanda, 1996, pp. 172-73). These arguments sometimes took quite extreme measures, as the most polemic of Muslims debaters would accuse the government of Nyerere of having

deliberately subordinated Muslims (Luanda, pp. 176-77; interview with Ilunga Kapungu, 2.6.2011).

However, it must be clearly stated here that far from all Tanzanian Muslims support these claims (Heilman & Kaiser, 2002; Mbogoni 2005) and the most polemic statements seem to reverberate mainly among a niche group of Muslims in Tanzania, as argued in chapter 9.5. Nonetheless, it is likewise true that the basic argument about the privileged position of Christians in the history of Tanzania is supported also by moderate and intellectual elements in the Muslims community (Yahya-Othman, 9.6.2011). As for the Christian groups, Ludwig notes that the mainline churches were slow to react to the changing environment in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and expected to maintain their stable relations to the state and also the Muslim groupings. What turned the tide for the Christians, according to Ludwig, were two incidents: the unilateral membership declaration of

the Zanzibar in the Organisation of the Islamic conference, and a conflict within the Meru diocese, in which the state had intervened in opposition to the view held by the Lutheran bishops and the ECLT. According to Ludwig, the Meru diocese episode showed the church leaders that issues could not longer be resolved behind closed doors with state representatives, and the state would not always necessarily act in their favor. (Ludwig, pp. 210-212).

Zanzibar’s OIC membership was in turn an issue that was ferociously opposed by the churches, in particular CCT and ELCT. The OIC is an international organization whose member states are countries with sizeable Muslims populations and officially, the organization is aiming to look after the “interest of the Muslim world” and to promote “peace and harmony among various people of the world” (OIC.com). Zanzibar had unilaterally joined in the OIC in 1992, apparently with Union government consent, and the move was defended with reference to the economic benefits

membership would bring. Christian institutions protested vocally against what they perceived to be a threat against the secular state of Tanzania. Zanzibar eventually withdrew its membership, but the issue has emerged as a dividing line between Muslims and Christians, since also many mainland Muslims had supposedly supported Zanzibar’s membership. (Ludwig, 1999, pp. 210-214; Mesaki, 2011, p. 256; Luanda 1996, pp. 179-180)

Following these two episodes, Christian churches started demanding the government to act against the spread of mihadhara and Muslim fundamentalism in general. (Luanda, pp. 179-180).

Increasingly, the various Christian organizations started criticizing the economic and political management of the country as well, focusing on issues such as public corruption, to the point that

“the challenges from the Christian churches to the state literally resembled those of a party in opposition” (Luanda, p. 180). Towards the mid-1990s, then, both Muslim and Christian groupings had started to take active part in the political debate, frequently voicing religious sentiments. How did this situation come about? It is clear that stable state-religious relations that had prevailed were challenged by the fact that mainline religious institutions lost their dominant position in presiding over the Christian and Muslims believers in Tanzania with the emergence of competing

congregations and institutions (Ludwig, p. 207). The spread of the “fundamentalist” Christian and Muslims movements is also clearly linked to a global phenomenon of religious revival, as

mentioned above (e.g. Westerlund, 2009). In addition, for the Muslims side, Mwinyi’s presidency might have provided a “conducive political climate for the establishment of several Muslim organizations whose agenda was Islamic revivalism” (Mbogoni, 2005, pp. 171; 146). However, while these enabling factors might have contributed to the rise and spread of the “fundamentalist”

versions of Christianity and Islam, I argue that it is useful in the first place to look at the factors that give the articulation of religious identity social and political relevance.

8.3 Politicization of Religion and Fundamentalist Religious