Factores que afectan a la oxidación lipídica de los alimentos.

In addition to the autolimitation theory, there is a second consensualist theory, advanced by Prof. Triepel and o th e rs .T h e ir view also relies on the State's will as the source of all legal obligation. They differ from the former in that they emphasise the law-creating role of a collective will', formed by the union of individual wills having the same content. Triepel's theory, in particular, presented a new ingredient: the collective will stands both as an aggregate of individual wills and as a will distinct from each individual will.

This view alone is also unable to explain the law-creating force of the collective will', except by reference to something else. In a word, if the collective will of States brings about law then it must have this effect because an international rule, for instance, so provides. When applied to the customary process, this theory encounters some difficulties. There is no clarification as to whether the existence of will alone is sufficient, regardless of any external criteria such as uniformity of practice and so forth. Naturally, this could be overcome by saying that the will is evinced by those external criteria, as Oppenheim did, but in this case it will be objected that the collective will idea is an abstraction of little use since what actually counts in a legal process is the manifestation of those criteria (see infra). In addition, the proposition that the collective will is the factor which creates a customary rule seems to run against an accepted distinctive feature of the customary process, namely, the normative role of State practice.

Triepel's proposition that the collective will is distinguishable from each individual will also raises the question whether this distinct collective will does not imply the existence of a distinct legal personality. According to Strupp, it follows from Triepel's theory that the formation of a collective will signifies the concomitant creation of a distinct legal person endowed with legislative competence.^^ In reality, it is known that any such legal person is a mere hypothesis. It seems likely that Triepel adopted a type of contractarian view without paying due regard to the reality of the international legal process or the international system. The original conU"act theory was formulated by Rousseau with a completely different purpose in mind. It was an attempt to justify the basis of legitimate authority within municipal societies.^^ Rousseau put forward the theory that an act of association involving every individual person produces 'a moral and collective body', a 'public person' which has a general will'.^^ Each individual, however, can still have a private will contrary to or different from the general will that he has as a citizen'.^ While Rousseau's theory attempted to explain that which he recognized as a sovereign State with a proper will on the basis of the voluntary alienation of each individual's rights and liberty, it would seem a futile exercise to apply the same reasoning on the international plane, for there is no such comparable sovereign in the international system, at least in the sense of a sovereign with legislative powers.^

If the collective will theory follows Rousseau's analogy, and therefore each State is considered to exist both as an individual and autonomous entity and as a member of a sovereign with legislative powers, the objection could be raised that this sovereign does not really enacts law, for legislation is supposed to be enacted towards third parties, although the sovereign himself may also be bound by i t Another question arising out of this possible twofold condition of a State is whether a State's will which has already been manifested (and therefore integrated into the collective will) may be withdrawn. According to those who maintain this theory, the will may not be withdrawn. If this were to be so, then it could be theoretically conceivable that an individual State which changes its will would stand in contradiction to itself in this way: it would be holding an individual will which is contrary to

the will which it had previously manifested and which remains a part of the collective will. Needless to say, that is a logical impossibility.

A contractarian view presumably starts from a well-defined initial situation in which the agreement is formulated. This being so, the collective will theory would have to be reformulated in order to explain the existence of special customs, opposing customs, individual practices differing from an established general custom, and so forth. The reason is that those possibilities would require the acknowledgement of distinct sovereigns, sometimes having opposite wills, and therefore distinct initial situations, sometimes opposite to each other.

The role of a sovereign in a legal process has been discussed so far without any serious questioning of the basic premise of the argument Thus, one should ask whether a social practice has to be sanctioned (expressly or tacitly) by a sovereign's will in order to become a custom, or, in other words, whether it is the sovereign's will that which imparts to a given custom its legal character. It seems fair to hold that this question is not settled in legal theory on municipal custom. There are those which undoubtedly advocate such a view.^ They state, firstly, that a statute in a municipal society is plainly enacted by a sovereign on the exercise of its legislative powers. But is the statute's legal force based exclusively on the authority of the sovereign? Could it not be the case that the normative effects of the exercise of the sovereign's authority, and his authority itself (let alone 'sovereignty' as a quality), was rirst conferred by rules of the legal system? As to municipal customs, they may argue that a social practice is not a custom unless and until it is applied by the Courts and other State officials. The fact, they argue, that the State recognizes a custom, applies it, and does not abrogate it by means of a subsequent statute, for example, indicates that the sovereign has manifested its will regarding that practice. However, this is still an inappropriate analogy, since the condition of the international system is completely different Its decentralized and anarchical character determines that the possibility of a superior sovereign is only conceivable if one identifies it with the community of States, an assumption which begs the question.^^

Triepel did well in not equating the collective will of States with the will of all States. It is widely accepted nowadays that general customary law is formed by the participation of the generality of States and not the universality of States.^^ Nevertheless, he did not espouse an explanation given by Rousseau for the prevalence of the majority's will over the minority's will, namely, the existence of a previous pact by which this majority rule was unanimously adopted.^^ Triepel may have rejected this assumption for the reason that he saw it as a mere hypothesis; or else, that this assumption could give rise to the objection that the original pact was derogable. On the other hand, he also jeopardized the consistency of his theory by asserting that a State finds itself bound, regarding an international legal rule, both by its own will and the common will. If general customary law is created by the general will as opposed to the universal will', and if it applies to all States, then surely there should be States which for some reason had no will of their own regarding some general (customary) norms and are nevertheless bound by them.