The last principle of crisis management is to avoid creating future precedents. Extraordinary circumstances created by crises and the corresponding demands placed upon the authorities to respond, must not be allowed to infringe upon existing agreements. In addition to ensuring that response actions comply with domestic and international law, the response strategies adopted must take cognisance of existing treaties and agreements between any parties that may be involved or affected.316 By making hard and fast rules, an agenda is created for an adversary to exploit by engineering a situation where the only solution necessitates the infringement of those rules. An example of this was the Reagan Administration's principle that it would not negotiate with terrorists.317 For most democratic governments, responding to terrorism through negotiation, is unavoidable and inevitable. The alternative is the implementation of para-military instruments and techniques of coercion, which is not always a desirable option for state actors who cannot afford to sustain unacceptable levels of collateral civilian damage and incur criticism for contravening human rights. For democratic states the principles of democracy create precedents which already hold the state hostage and limit its options for dealing with terrorism. The notion exists that in guaranteeing the protection of
316 See Hanspeter Neuhold, "Principles and Implementation of Crisis Management: Lessons From the Past," in Daniel Frei (ed.), (1978), op.cit:. pp.13-14
317
See William Beck, U.S. Foreign policy in Lebanon Under the Reagan Administration 1981-1989, (M.A. Thesis, George Washington University, 1989), pp.61-63
their citizens, democratic governments are obligated to practice democracy while protecting it Wilkinson explains that, "One obvious but extremely important factor is the inherent civil rights and freedoms of liberal states which terrorist organisations can exploit. Freedom of movement both between and within liberal states, freedom of association, and freedom from totalitarian style police surveillance and control, are all rightly highly valued by citizens of Western liberal states. Yet they can be all too easily taken advantage of by terrorists."318 The establishment of an effective response strategy using intelligence assets poses difficult issues for democratic states.319 Demands for justification of actions undertaken by the authorities can place intelligence sources at risk and jeopardise ongoing and future operations.
Concern of incurring unacceptable risks to innocent bystanders is what prevented the U.S. government from exacting "swift and effective retribution" against Hizb'allah in the Bekaa Valley following its attack on the U.S. embassy and the Marine barracks in 1983.320 This statement, together with Reagan's pledge that the U.S. would not give in to terrorists, forced the administration to search for an alternative technique to manage the hostage crisis which evolved later. Their alternative strategy was to make use of an intermediary which was Iran, who they perceived to have an influence over the leader of the terrorist group that was holding the hostages.321 The administration believed that by using Iran as an intermediary that it could negotiate an acceptable solution to the hostage crisis without compromising on its publicised principles of not negotiating directly with terrorists.322
318 See Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, (London, MacMillan Press, 1977), pp. 102-103
319 See Stephen J Cimbala, (1987), op.cit:. pp.171-173 and Walter Laqueur, (1985), op.cit:. pp.201-203.
320 See Caspar Weinberger, (1990), op.cit:, p.188 321 See Oliver North, (1991), op.cit:, pp.277-278
The irony of the administration's stated policy towards terrorism, however, was in the fact that among U.S. security agencies, negotiation is standard policy. It is standard operational practice for law enforcement agencies, such as local police Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams and the FBI to establish direct lines of communications with the parties and to negotiate for the release of any hostages in either barricade or hostage situations.* 323 This doctrine is regularly taught in unclassified courses which is provided nation-wide by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), in conjunction with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), as well as representatives from the FBI, the Department of State, Justice Department, the Treasury, Army, Navy, Coast Guard, Defence and Intelligence Community.324 To the contrary, most countries that claim not to deal with terrorists, however, do. Israel has negotiated with Palestinians, Britain with the IRA and Spain with ETA. Virtually the entire U.S. foreign policy network and the intelligence community were aware of the policy.
The problem arose, however, when President Reagan specifically announced that the U.S. would not negotiate. Had the administration been more "in-touch" with the intelligence community from the outset, this blunder may have been averted. One of the principle reasons for this 'short-circuit', is the tendency on the part of most new presidential administrations to announce policy changes merely for the sake of demonstrating change and a departure from the practices of the previous government. Change is implemented for its own sake and not necessarily for any perceived benefit or advantage. President Reagan's statement was made before the new administration had taken time to consult, reflect and formulate its
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Stansfield Turner, (1991), op.cit:. p.192 and Jeffrey Simon, (1994), op.cit:. p.175 323 Robert Grace, Special Agent In-Charge, FBI Crisis Management Centre, Quantico Bay, Maryland, interview, on July 13, 1995
stance on this issue.325 The reality was that the U.S. maintained a dual policy with regard to terrorism and the hostage crisis. While publicly announcing that it would not compromise on its principles, the administration was conducting secret negotiations with a third party, Manucher Gorbanifar an Iranian-born intermediary who claimed to have influence with moderate elements among the Iranian government. Iran was the state sponsor of the terrorist group that was holding the U.S. to ransom. The Reagan Administration also paid millions of dollars in ransom money to secure the release of some of the hostages.326
While it must be acknowledged that dealing with terrorists on an international platform is different from confronting terrorists in one's own country, the limitations that the authorities face as a result of international law, geographical boundaries and territorial sovereignty are further reasons for governments to face up to the reality of their limitations and the restraints in applying instruments and techniques of coercion.327 * In most cases, negotiation is the only viable option available and governments should refrain from making public statements to the effect that they will never negotiate as this is untrue and impractical. The Beirut crisis demonstrated that statements of intent and principle should be limited and drafted in a manner that does not limit options for crisis resolution by any conceivable means.
This observation was made by Noel Koch, in a telephone interview on February 21,
326 See Oliver North, (1991), op.cit:. pp.277-280
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The United States discovered this when their attempts to arrest the hijackers of the Achille Laura at Italy's Sigonella airbase, were frustrated by the Italian government.
3.7 Conclusion
Tasking failures result in intelligence failures when policy makers and intelligence managers neglect to identify relevant requirements for collection. Impediments to effective crisis intelligence arise from poor communication between the decision maker and the intelligence analysts.328 This was certainly the case between the administration and the intelligence community with regards to their objectives and initiatives in Lebanon. A sense of overriding superiority and invincibility of the U.S. and its superpower status on the part of the administration and in particular key individuals, such as Philip Habib, George Schultz and Robert McFarlane, created a cognitive barrier which prevented threat analysis. The administration failed to recognise the importance of terrorism as a primary threat to their objectives and the safety of their forces, despite numerous warnings to the contrary. Following the first embassy attack, there was no sense of urgency in increasing security precautions at the Marine barracks.329 The tendency to downplay terrorism was influenced by the overall fear of an expanding threat to their policy objectives in Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East, such as the Persian Gulf and the Iran-Iraqi war. In Beirut, immediate problems such as securing the base at the airport, which was inundated with large quantities of unexploded ordnance, a series of clashes with Israeli forces and Druze artillery and sniper fire directed at the Marines, all detracted from the phenomenon of terrorism.330 With regard to the
329 See Stan Taylor and Theodore Ralston, "The Role of Intelligence in Crisis Management," in Alexander George, (ed.), (1991), op.cit:. pp.397-399
32 9 -
See Stephen Engelberg, "A Warning Preceded Beirut Barracks Attack," New York Times, September 24, 1986. Engelberg reports an assertion by Noel Koch that he informed Caspar Weinberger nine months before the BLT bombing that international terrorists had moved away from kidnapping and that they had switched tactics to assassinations and large car bombs. Caspar Weinberger tasked Koch with the responsibility for drawing up a plan of action and to report back. He alleges that after nine months of failed attempts to obtain an appointment to brief the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the BLT was attacked - one month before the scheduled briefing date.
330
See "The U.S. Marine Tragedy: Causes and Responsibility," New York Times, December 11, 1983
wider issues, the administration failed to ask the right questions. They failed to direct the intelligence community to provide intelligence on the nature of the political and social environment within which the administration intended to implement its policy initiatives.
The intelligence community failed to support the administration in other areas of the intelligence cycle as well. Collection failures occur when the community fails to collect relevant and specific information. In Beirut none of the intelligence reports received by the Marines contained any specific information pertaining to the time or date of a predicted attack. Most could not be verified. The problem was not the quantity of intelligence available, but the quality, given the shortcoming in necessary details.331 The only report that came close to warning about the attack was a report in the National Intelligence Digest on October 20, 1983, to the effect that U.S. forces (Marines) might soon be the target of a major terrorist attack.332 Although this report was accurate from a temporal point of view it failed to provide any further specifics.
Guidance in selecting collection targets can be initiated through sources within the intelligence community, or by external stimuli through requirements levied by the policy maker. Often consumer ignorance pertaining to the capabilities of the intelligence services can produce unrealistic expectations. The expectation that specific details of a terrorist attack can be provided reflects a fundamental lack of appreciation of what intelligence organisations are able to achieve under difficult circumstances. Intelligence gathering on the intentions of terrorist organisations is a daunting task, given the
According to the testimony of General Paul X Kelley, the Marines received at least 100 intelligence reports of car bombs between June 1 and October 23, 1983. Between September 15 and October 23, one intelligence section provided over 170 pieces of incomplete information. None of this was useful and had the reverse of effect of desensitising the Marines to the potential danger. See Report of the POD Commission on Beirut
International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983, December 20, 1983 See the New York Times, December 11,1983
operational constraints that are generated by secrecy, paranoia and fanaticism, as well as the usually small number of individuals who are involved. The collection of specific details pertaining to terrorists' intentions in most cases remains almost impossible.
Despite the frustration experienced by the intelligence community at not being requested by the consumers to produce a comprehensive estimate on Lebanon, the analysts in turn, did not make any great effort to stimulate a request for an estimate from somewhere within the administration. Neither did they volunteer to produce one on their own accord.333 Their lack of initiative can be attributed to the traditionalist approach and the injunction against analysts offering policy advice which created a mind-set that the analysts would not speak unless spoken to. The intelligence community operated according to the norm that it was there to provide a service as prescribed by its policy masters and therefore focused its attention solely upon those areas selected by its master. The adherence to the traditionalist discipline in this instance undermined lateral thinking and adaptation to the dynamics of the socio-political climate in Lebanon.
Both the Committee on Armed Forces of the House of Representatives and the DOD Long Commission reports found that the upper levels of the chain of command failed to exercise effective oversight of the Marine's operation and to recognise the magnitude of the terrorist threat. They also concluded that they failed to adjust their instructions to the Marines and the intelligence community in accordance with the dynamics of the situation.334
David Kennedy, (1988), op.cit:. p.11
See Adequacy of U.S. Marines Corps Security in Beirut. Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, December 19, 1983, p.26 - which came to the conclusion that security measures taken to protect the Marine Unit from threats and intelligence support were inadequate. See also the Report of the POD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983, December 20, 1983.
An analysis and distribution failure becomes an intelligence failure when the system fails to evaluate and interpret the information properly and to disseminate it to the appropriate consumers for translation into action. The evidence suggests that in addition to the absence of detailed information, there was a also an inadequate capacity to process the volume of warning intelligence that was being fed into the system. The production review process and the convoluted chain of command delayed the timely distribution of intelligence information. In fact, the DOD report not only criticised the FBI for failing to insert its analysis into the DIA, CIA and State Department communication channels, but the processing time required for intelligence reports to be distributed between the naval task force lying off shore and the Marine barracks, took an average of thirty to forty hours.335 The absence of trained analysts, who were experts in terrorism, contributed towards the processing failure. Had the producer - consumer relationship functioned in accordance with the activist approach, however, history may have been different. In the instance of the Marine barracks bombing the intelligence failure was overshadowed by the inability of the key individuals within the administration and the marine commanders to interpret and translate the warnings into action. Access to analytical experts on terrorism may have enabled the Marine commanders to learn what they could expect from terrorism, making them more receptive to the analysis, thereby enabling them to react to the information. Not being experts in terrorism and lacking analysts who were, the Marines failed to interpret and appreciate the implications of the warnings that they had received.
Given the fundamental flaw in the administration's management style, there is no guarantee that the intelligence community could have made a difference. Essentially two different policy failures took place with regard to the Marines' mission in Lebanon. One was the failure to act on warnings received. This failure is evident given the
events and intelligence warnings between the first embassy bombing and the attack on the BLT. The second was rooted in the failure of the administration to re-evaluate the Marines' mission once they had recognised the fact that their environment had changed to such an extent that the mission they had set for the Marines was no longer viable given the environmental dynamics. The Marines were given a political mission which became incompatible with maintaining a non-combatant presence. Despite the objection of the Marine commanders in Beirut, who expressed their misgivings over the wisdom of using naval power to shell the Muslim Druze positions, the administration failed to grasp the potential consequences of that action for the safety of the Marines.
This was not the only level where a dysfunction in the chain of command was evident. Within the White House, despite the existence of a general agreement which prevailed between the various members of the intelligence and security services who served on the National Security Council staff, consensus between senior level staff, i.e. between the principal cabinet members, was notably absent. Conflicting opinions prevailed between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defence. This extended to relations between the Secretary of State and the DCI and between the Secretary of Defence and the NSC staff. Cabinet dissention diluted the defence community's appraisal of their environment in Lebanon. This was reflected in the rules of engagement (ROE) under which the Marines operated. Caspar Weinberger made matters worse by refusing to acknowledge that the Marines were deployed in a hostile environment which necessitated them operating under a different set of rules. Being averse to committing American troops to hostile areas without Congressional and public support and the restrictions imposed upon the him by the War Powers Act, Weinberger made it almost impossible for them to act in self defence except in the most dire circumstances. These restraints did not pass unnoticed by their
adversaries. While the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 precipitated a crisis for the Reagan Administration, the intelligence community failed to apply opportunity analysis through lateral strategic thinking which could have taken advantage of the situation.336 Lebanon provided the administration with the opportunity to achieve strategic goals vis a vis the Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli peace process. The U.S. could have exploited the situation to stimulate the peace process, enhance the security of its allies while curtailing the influence of the Soviet Union. The administration failed in this endeavour as a result of the role played by individuals and the processes that constrained their interaction. Competition for dominance between key cabinet members and their institutions, specifically the White House staff, the State Department, Defence and the CIA, under the indecisive and almost indifferent management style of President Reagan towards Lebanon, undermined initiative. Two schools of thought prevailed within the administration. The first, which was dominated by globalists such as Alexander Haig, Schultz, William Casey, Geoffrey Kemp and Howard Teicher, viewed the crisis in terms of the East-West conflict. The second school of thought, the regionalists, comprised individuals such as Philip Habib, Morris Draper and Nicolas Veliotes, who preferred to analyse the situation in terms of the dynamics and interplay of the political, security, economic and social factors between the region's actors.337
These competing schools of thought together with traditionalist values, which governed the process in the relationship between the