家铸 [Shi Jiazhu], 以和谐海洋理念塑造人民海
军发展有利外部环境 [“On Shaping a Favorable External Environment for the PLAN with the Harmonious Ocean Philosophy”], 海军工程大 学学报( 综合版) [Journal of Naval Engineering
(Comprehensive Edition)] 2 (2012), pp. 67–70.
17. “First China-Made 10,000-DWT Hospital Ship Sails to Sea,” PLA Daily, December 5, 2008, english.pladaily.com.cn/site2/news-channels/ 2008-12/05/content_1573778.htm. 18. “Chinese Navy Hospital Ship Peace Ark
Concludes ‘Mission Harmony–2010,’” People’s
Daily Online, November 15, 2010, en.people
.cn/90001/90783/91300/7199893.html. 19. Xinhua, “PLA Naval Hospital Ship to Provide
Medical Treatment to Latin American Nations: Spokesman,” People’s Daily, November 30, 2011, english.people.com.cn/90786/7661785.html. 20. 成海 [Cheng Hai] et al., “和谐使命-2011”对外
医疗服务中血液保障方案的研究 [“Research
on Blood Supply Program in Overseas Medical Support during ‘Mission Harmony–2011’”], 海军医学杂志 [Journal of Navy Medicine] 2 (2014), pp. 108–10.
21. “Chinese Hospital Ship Peace Ark’s on ‘Friend- ship’ Mission to Philippines,” South China Morn-
ing Post, November 21, 2013.
22. Chi, Shao, and Shi, “On Shaping a Favorable External Environment for the PLAN,” pp. 67–70. 23. 刘慧 [Liu Hui] and 刘杰峰 [Liu Jiefeng], 提
高国际舆论影响力 推进我军“软实力”建设
[“Enhancing the World Opinion Influence to Develop Military Soft Power”], 海军工程大 学学报(综合版) [Journal of Naval Engineering
(Comprehensive Edition)] 4 (2011), pp. 13–16.
24. Peter A. Huchthausen and Alexandre Sheldon- Duplaix, Hide and Seek (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2008), pp. 181–88.
25. A Type 812 on the hull of a Type 635 (1,100 tons). 军事论坛 » 三军论坛 » 海军版 » 精! 中 国舰艇锦集 [“Military Forum—Armed Forces Forum—Navy Version—Fine Chinese War- ships!”], Sina, p. 4, club.mil.news.sina.com.cn/ thread-87564-4-7.html; Desmond Ball, Signals
Intelligence in the Post–Cold War Era: Develop- ments in the Asia-Pacific Region (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Regional Strategic Studies Programme, 1993), pp. 53–56. 26. Ex-V350; excessive vibrations led to cancellation
of the project. 27. Ex-814.
28. “Fine Chinese Warships!”; Ball, Signals Intel-
ligence, pp. 53–56.
29. “Fine Chinese Warships!” 30. Ibid. Xing Fengshan is ex-V856. 31. Ibid.
32. Ball, Signals Intelligence, p. 54.
33. Built respectively at Zhonghua (Dong Ce 226, 227), Guangzhou (Nan Ce 420), Jiangzhou/ Jiangxi (Nan Ce 427, Bei Ce 943), and Guijiang/ Wuzhou (Nan Ce 426, 428).
34. Oleg A. Godin and David R Palmer, History of
Russian Underwater Acoustics (Singapore: World
Scientific Publishing, 2008), p. 612. 35. Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 2003
(Tokyo: 2003), pp. 67–68. 36. Ibid.
37. A laser electro-optical turret was visible forward of the bridge of 853 before its refit. “Fine Chi- nese Warships!”
38. Sudhi Ranjan Sen, “Chinese Ship Caught Spying on India,” NDTV, August 31, 2011, www.ndtv .com/article/india/china-ship-with-22-labs -spied-on-india-130174; “Navy Spots Chinese ‘Spy’ Ship near Andamans,” YouTube video, 4:27, posted by “inKhabar,” April 7, 2013, www .youtube.com/watch?v=0VCaUA7mFC8.
39. Andrew S. Erickson and Emily de La Bruyere, “Crashing Its Own Party: China’s Unusual Deci- sion to Spy On Joint Naval Exercises,” China Real
Time Report (blog), Wall Street Journal, July 19,
2014, blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/07/19/ crashing-its-own-party-chinas-unusual -decision-to-spy-on-joint-naval-exercises/. 40. 专家:中国新电子侦察船下水猛增远海斗争优
势 [“Expert: China’s New Electronic Surveillance Ship Launched for Sea Superiority Struggle”], China.com, January 29, 2015, military.china .com/important/11132797/201501. 41. Ex–Dong Jiu 301.
42. Transferred to China Fisheries Law Enforcement in 2008 as Yu Zheng 311.
43. Dazhou class: Nan Jiu 502 and Bei Jiu 137, ex–Nan Jiu 504. Dajiang class: ex–Bei Jiu 121, ex–Dong Jiu 302, ex–Nan Jiu 506. Dalang class:
Bei Jiu 122, Bei Jiu 138, Dong Jiu 332, and Nan Jiu 510. Dadong class: Dong Jiu 304. 44. Tuzhong class: Nan Tuo 154, Bei Tuo 710, and
Dong Tuo 830. Hujiu/Dinghais: Nan Tuo 147, 155, 156, 164, 174, and 175; Bei Tuo 622, 711, and 717; and Dong Tuo 837, 842, 843, 875, and 877. Hujiu IIs: Nan Tuo 185; Bei Tuo 635, 712, and 715; and Dong Tuo 836. Tuqians: Nan Tuo 181, Bei Tuo 721, and Nan Tuo 189.
45. Norman Polmar, The Naval Institute Guide to
the Soviet Navy, 5th ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1991).
46. “Chinese Submarine Docks in Sri Lanka despite Indian Concerns,” Reuters, November 3, 2014. 47. Bradford Dismukes and James M. McConnell,
Soviet Naval Diplomacy (New York: Pergamon,
A
s the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy (PLAN) works to meet the PLA’s “New Historic Missions” and protect Chinese interests abroad, the PLAN surface force has confronted the challenge of sustaining a growing number of ships on extended op- erations away from home port. Since 2008, the PLAN has supported units in operational deployments lasting, in some cases, over six months without the benefit of a network of permanent overseas bases. Images of PLAN logistics vessels replenishing PLAN surface combatants under way at sea, seldom seen before 2010, have become routine, a staple of PLA press releases.Most studies of PLAN sustainment have focused on either PLAN mastery of underway replenishment techniques or the adequacy of the logistics vessels that support underway delivery of fuel and stores. These units are the critical last step in delivering logistics support at sea, and the ability to employ them consistently represents a fundamental level of seamanship accomplishment. However, mobile logistics forces are only the most visible expression of the PLAN’s efforts to adapt its logistics support to a higher tempo of operations at greater distances from the Chinese mainland. The PLA recognizes that changes in the logistics-support structure ashore are also a key part of meeting this chal- lenge. The service’s official newspaper, People’s Navy, describes the overall PLAN support construct as “a shore-sea integrated support system with strategic home ports at the core and with at-sea comprehensive support groups as the focal points.”1
Extended deployments and an increasing emphasis on regular, year-round surface-force readiness have placed new demands on the PLAN surface-force maintenance system as well. Combined with the growing technical complexity of PLAN surface-force payloads and platforms, these extended deployments have caused the PLAN to develop new maintenance approaches. This chapter examines the PLAN’s systematic effort to address its logistics and maintenance challenges and the place of these initiatives within larger efforts to improve logistics and maintenance throughout the PLA.
In studying recent conflicts, the PLA has recognized the centrality of logistics and main- tenance support to modern combat operations.2 Chinese military studies of the British
Dale C. Rielage