The Foreign Affairs Division (FAD) is the isolated bastard child of Aegis. Every Cell that has an international mission or investigation will have some contact with FAD, even if the Cell members aren’t aware of it. For the size of its mandate, howev- er, the Foreign Affairs Division is seriously undermanned, sub- ject to arbitrary budget and personnel restrictions, and often interfered with or ignored by other bureaus.
HISTORY
When Aegis was first created out of the ashes of The Watch, the concept called for a strictly national agency to protect American interests from supernatural and paranormal interfer- ence. Some interaction with various British agencies was main- tained, but for the most part, little or no thought was given to any attempt at moving Aegis operations into the international realm. As early as 1955, what little operational resources were dedicated to foreign policy were placed under the control of the Bureau of Operations and Tactics, which resulted in those assets being expended in stateside programs.
There were some attempts to keep ties with various other nations’ conspiracy groups, particularly those closely involved in the original Watch efforts. Specifically, in addition to British
groups, contact was kept with Italy’s GLADIO movement through the CIA’s right wing faction and with the Israeli Zionist organiza- tion inside the Mossad. The West German organization known as the Orchestra was also an instrumental part of early diplomatic agreements between Aegis Prime and international agencies.
At first, these agreements were limited to promises of nonin- tervention and the assurance that any agents of an allied organ- ization would be returned unharmed should they be stranded inside the host nation. With very little actually happening to Aegis or its allies on the international front, the senior members of all the agencies believed that no further complicated arrangements would not be necessary. Throughout the Fifties and Sixties, foreign operations by Aegis were solely the province of overzealous or extremely dedicated Cells. These early foreign operations were fly-by-wire affairs, with funding and equipment often purchased illegally in the host country, or else smuggled in with the aid of criminal concerns. In 1956 a total of three Cells were based outside the continental United States: one in Puerto Rico, one in Hawaii, and one in Japan.
The first event to signal a need for a centralized foreign divi- sion was a disastrous mission into Africa’s Congo region in 1957. Undertaken by an unauthorized Aegis Cell, the mission to recover a crashed Atlantean beamship failed, and the Cell was met by stiff resistance from the African military. In Aegis Prime, a panic ensued when the exact final disposition of the Cell members could not be determined. Not only was it impossible to find out if the Cell members had been killed, no method existed to undertake any kind of intelligence gathering in a for- eign country. Senior officials sweated out a terrible month, finally managing to confirm the deaths of the majority of the Cell. It wasn’t until the FAD began operations in South Africa in 1986 that the capture and interrogation of at least one Cell member was uncovered and linked to the formation of the Laager, a progovernment conspiracy in South Africa.
Following this debacle, discussion began on the best way to handle any further international operations. While decisions were being made, from 1958 until 1964 no Cell operations were permitted outside the country or its territories without express permission from Aegis Prime. In 1965, with the escalation of events in Southeast Asia, a working group was created to study the proper means to ensure safety and deniability during any overseas operation. Led by a young DIA operative named Éti- enne Boudreaux, this group determined that the Black Book was already operating outside the country and aggressively pursuing relations with like-minded agencies in other nations. Boudreaux decided that a lack of international connections would not help Aegis resist the Black Book’s long-range goals. The working group developed a five-point plan to guide Aegis Prime in the creation of a foreign affairs division.
The original document delivered to Aegis Prime was a politi- cal bombshell. It implied a conscious attempt to sabotage Aegis operations by a person or persons inside of Aegis Prime. The document also informed Prime that, should Aegis fail to estab-
lish connections in overseas areas, a time would come when international efforts by the alien enemy would overwhelm any power locally in the States. Finally, Boudreaux demanded the immediate formation of a separate division inside Aegis, answerable directly to Aegis Prime, with its own budget and resources, and with its own operational staff. In fact, what Boudreaux and his group were proposing was an entirely new operation, part of Aegis only in name, causing quite a stir in Aegis Prime.
After some heated discussions, Aegis Prime conceded that foreign efforts needed coordination. Although Boudreaux was moved on to other duties, OpTac was given direct control over Cells operating overseas. At the same time, control over for- eign intelligence operations was given to ISS, further widening the split between the two divisions. To further complicate mat- ters, psychics in Psi-Div were producing hard intelligence through remote viewing experiments, and the CIA was run- ning the MKULTRA project as well, with various subprojects based on foreign soil. None of these other projects was over- seen in any way.
Another failed mission in 1970 highlighted the dangers of splitting chains of command over a topic as sensitive as this. An Aegis Cell operating in Japan became involved in an unpleasant incident involving rioting students at a Black Book–subsidized lab, and shots were fired. In the confusion, agents were arrest- ed and placed on trial as foreign saboteurs. Attempts to secure the agents’ release were refused by Aegis’ newly designated Legal Affairs Division, on the basis that no legal resources had been developed overseas. OpTac began making arrangements for an exchange of prisoners with Japanese officials, when someone in ISS authorized an attempt to rescue them. When the details were leaked by an unknown source, the rescue was aborted and the agents were sentenced to prison terms. Fortunately, none talked and security was maintained, but the lesson was obvious. A centralized chain of command was need- ed to provide support and intelligence to Cells, and it had to control all aspects of foreign operations.
The deadly pace of bureaucracy proved to be near fatal in the next few years. With operations overseas rising at an unex- pected rate, particularly along the Iron Curtain and in the Caribbean, agents were being placed in harm’s way by the political battles between divisions. Finally, in 1975, Aegis Prime agreed to the formation of the Foreign Affairs Division. At first FAD was staffed by personnel from OpTac and ISS who had been working in the overseas area, but divisional policy was always one of aggressive expansion, and FAD started recruiting right away.
The first division chief was Sir Malcolm Withersby, a British lord who was a long-time associate of Aegis through his con- nection to the Royal Cryptozoological Society (see p. 188 and the Paranormal Sourcebook). An intrepid explorer, Sir Malcolm insisted on top-quality personnel and dependable intelligence. He set a standard for all his operatives from day
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one. No interpersonal conflicts were to be tolerated, nor were any agents to withhold any information, no matter how trivial it might seem. At the outset, Sir Malcolm asked for, and received, total discretion in his operational priorities. Operating almost without any administrative constraints, the new division set about rapidly creating an effective and far- reaching overseas intelligence network. With the failure of Black Book’s attempts to overthrow the Italian leftist govern- ment, Sir Malcolm realized that meddling in foreign political agendas was a dangerous task, too potentially harmful to per- mit. A policy of nonintervention was established and adhered to. Agents in Sir Malcolm’s employ were allowed to make one mistake, then their employment was terminated.
By the start of 1977, the Foreign Affairs Division had grown to more than sixty operatives in fifteen countries. Contact and cooperation were established with friendly agencies in Japan, West Germany, Israel, Britain, and China. Formal secret agree- ments protected the identity and status of any agent captured in those countries. Intelligence was gathered on operational dif- ficulties in other key areas, particularly in South America and Southeast Asia. It was a FAD mission that first established the possible location of Russian operations around the Tunguska blast site in 1981. As the division expanded, it quickly outgrew its limited budget of personnel and finances. Urgent requests to Aegis Prime for more of both were met with disapproval, as the senior controllers of Aegis felt that the goal had been satisfied and further growth was unnecessary.
In a secret meeting involving Sir Malcolm, Mark Hampton (Director of Psi-Div), a senior member of the diplomatic divi- sion, and a highly placed member of the Senate Oversight Committee, the need for continued expansion of Aegis’ Foreign Affairs Division was reiterated. Sir Malcolm agreed to pass on all foreign intelligence to both Psi-Div and the diplomats. In return, Psi-Div would share all remote viewing information, and diplomatic ties would be passed on as well. The senator arranged the disappearance of a certain percentage of the national defense budget for black operations, a small sum that was then invested by FAD in various outside sources. The poli- cy in FAD became one of making whatever connections an agent on the scene felt were necessary, and security matters were given a distant second priority. Expansion in foreign areas exploded over the next four years, and intelligence and contacts were soon sealed in many trouble areas. Sir Malcolm also con- ducted limited talks with his associates at the RCS and with other acquaintances in CAPS, securing offers of mutual aid by both organizations.
1985 saw the ultimate test of FAD’s new structure and meth- ods. An agent in place in Kingston, Jamaica, reported the exis- tence of several suspicious persons in the area, accompanied by a sudden series of UFO sightings. FAD operatives delivered a set of forged orders from Aegis Prime to a Cell leader in Florida, instructing her to investigate and report her findings. The Cell leader and her Cell were transported in cigarette boats crewed
by local smugglers on FAD’s payroll. The subsequent investiga- tion revealed a major Black Book operation involving Saurians; the Cell was able to contact sympathetic local police and arrange for a raid on the facility. Escaping the area with samples of Saurian technology and two Black Book prisoners, the Cell returned to the States on a private flight again chartered by FAD agents. After a debriefing conducted by Foreign Affairs with Psi- Div in attendance, the Cell was returned to field work, the pris- oners turned over to OpTac interrogators, and the Saurian equipment sent to R&D. Aegis Prime was presented with a fait
accompli; the result was another series of meetings and anoth-
er shutdown of Foreign Affairs Division operations.
Sir Malcolm refused to apologize for the unauthorized and unorthodox methods by which the operation was run. He focused instead on the obvious results. Aegis Prime argued for weeks before finally allowing FAD to reopen for business. It extracted a promise from Sir Malcolm that no more pirate oper- ations would be tolerated, but the final point went to Sir Malcolm. Two weeks after his promise he retired, handing off his control to his second in command, the Cell leader who had just completed the Kingston operation. Celeste Shea was a per- fect choice for the new leadership of FAD, leading many inside the division to believe that Sir Malcolm had been grooming her for the position for years. While Sir Malcolm stayed in close contact with his old division from his home in Santa Fe, there was no doubt that Shea was now in charge.
In the past twenty five years, Shea has continually risen to the challenge of operating a rogue division as outcast as FAD. Shea manages the division’s limited resources and expands the scope and function of FAD. Her latest brainstorm, the Strike Team, has met with interest among other divisions and is lead- ing Aegis forcefully into the future.
CURRENT STATUS
The Foreign Affairs Division is not well liked by many of the other divisions. In some ways, it has usurped power and political muscle. In others, it violates every rule in Aegis. To Aegis Prime, it is an organization constantly on the edge of open revolt, and it is still open mainly because no one seems to be able to think of a good way to close it down permanently. Shea and her band of mavericks aren’t slowing down any, either. The pace and tempo of their operations have increased steadily, and the quantity of illegal resources and foreign national agents has increased with it. Almost 30% of FAD’s budget now comes from outside approved channels, and more than half of its agents have never actually been residents of the United States. As a result, the aver- age agent in FAD is either working from a strong personal moti- vation or for that oldest of motivators, money.
Foreign Affairs divides control of its field agents into nine zones of control: Caribbean, South American, European, Balkan, Southern Asian, Russian, African, Chinese, and Indonesian. Each of these zones has a Senior Controller, who
is responsible for overall coordination and distribution of all resources allocated to that zone. Below the Senior Controller are numerous Desk Chiefs, each responsible for operations and intelligence in several countries with similar needs or problems. Below the Desk Chiefs are an indeterminate num- ber of Field Supervisors, the first true field agents in FAD. These men and women are the on-scene intelligence analysts, arranging for the hiring and control of local foreign nationals to undertake whatever operations Aegis requires. The general structure of field units of the Foreign Affairs Division resem- bles a smaller version of Aegis, with each Field Supervisor run- ning several contacts, who in turn control their own local assets. Many agents below the Field Supervisor do not know who they are actually working for, and false flag or blind recruitments are common. Aegis Cells that utilize FAD assets are warned in advance by the local Field Supervisor which local personnel are cleared for sensitive information. In essence, FAD is running a massive international mercenary organization for Aegis’ use. The significance of the potential for abuse of this group has not been lost on Aegis Prime, and ISS audits and surprise visits of this division are frequent.
Because Field Supervisors often coordinate Cell visits per- sonally, their exposure is high. This problem is solved in one of two ways. First, all Field Supervisors are instructed to maintain a cover identity that is immune to reproach by local authorities. Second, all Field Supervisors are rotated from one posting to another no less than once every two years. Most find them- selves being promoted to Desk Chief within ten years, or trans- ferred to the Intelligence Analysis Desk if there are no openings in the field.
A posting to the IA Desk is considered a good deal, since it means duty at the FAD offices, located in New York City. Even this choice of office locations has been a sticking point with Aegis Prime, since it physically isolates the division from con- trol. The offices, on the seventh floor of a Manhattan skyrise by Central Park, are a prime example of the attitude among FAD agents. It is an elegant and well decorated establishment with a cafeteria and discrete security station. The entire office is listed as a shipping company on the building’s lease, but it is not advertised and generates no business. Through creative tax accounting (assisted by the Legal Division), the entire company is a dummy, declaring modest losses and gains each year to the IRS. The front lobby on the floor holds brochures and company profit and earning statements, and looks exactly like an office for a moderately successful midlevel company. Inside the actu- al offices, the agents and desk chiefs work nonstop, sending messages all around the world, booking flights, and arranging cover operations for Cells outside the country on “business.” The communications center for FAD is a miracle of telecommu- nications engineering, with forty separate protected and secure phone lines with satellite uplinks to individual countries around the world. The local computer network is similar in nature and contains a remote link to HERMES. Both systems are arranged to purge all data on the drives and control stations in the event
that a security breach is detected. FAD protects its contacts very closely, and no one above the local Field Supervisor (or past supervisors of the same area) knows the true identity of any local agents, just as the identities of current Field Supervisors are in turn known only to the Desk Chiefs.
FAD is in the process of beginning another round of expan- sion. With world events in the Middle East still tense, and with Gulf sightings spreading and becoming more frequent, there are plans to focus new networks in these regions. This will require an increase in recruiting and activity in those areas. Also, developments following the break-up of the former Soviet republics have given field personnel in that zone a safer margin of operation, coupled with increased opportunities for stateside Cells to pursue events inside the old Iron Curtain region. Finally, proposals are being assessed to revise the division’s opera- tional relationship with CAPS and the Psi-Div operators, moving FAD toward an actual open alliance with both organizations. Sir Malcolm still handles the division’s contacts within the Royal Cryptozoological Society, although he is easing Shea into a position to take even those responsibilities from him.
The modern Foreign Affairs Division bears little resemblance to the original concept. It has expanded well beyond its initial design as a transport and cover operation, fulfilling actual espi- onage and operational functions in the last decade on par with anything that the other Aegis divisions have managed. Its suc- cess is due to the high caliber of motivation its personnel have, and the small number of actual Aegis operatives employed. All- important and security-sensitive issues are handled by Aegis personnel, but everything else is left in the hands of the local mercs and contacts. The new Aegis Strike Teams (AST), com- posed of highly trained FAD operatives usually stolen wholesale from other divisions, are constantly on standby, ready to go into