Factores de riesgo relacionales.

Taking into account some principal features of the bureaucracy in general and of state bureaucracies in Russia and the Czech Republic in particular (as

CHAPTER VIII

COMPARISON OF CIVIL SERVICE REFORMS IN RUSSIA AND

THE CZECH REPUBLIC: DYNAMICS, DIMENSIONS AND

EXPLANATORY FACTORS

8.1 Introduction

Our methodological approach presupposes that the process of institutional change is subject to the influence of numerous endogenous and exogenous factors. In line with this approach we intend in this chapter to highlight those factors which have had a distinct, often decisive, impact on the initiation and implementation of civil service reforms in each of the selected countries.

The study of civil service systems and reforms in the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic carried out in the previous chapters allows define factors which have performed as either intervening or determining variables. The identification and analysis of these factors is important for understanding the dynamics of the reform, the encountered difficulties and results achieved so far. It is also crucial for the appropriate comparison of the two reforms and exploration of the causes of possible commonalities and differences in reform implementation between the two countries.

The above mentioned factors have been divided into two large groups -

intra bureaucracy and extra bureaucracy factors. This division is entirely conventional and serves mainly the purpose of logical presentation of the research inferences.

First, we look at the factors “arising from within the system” or “linked to the logic of reform preparation and development”. These include clientelistic and patronage networks, corruption, bureaucratic resistance, administrative traditions and culture, mislaid reform priorities and inadequate preparation of reform. Secondly, we examine a range of “external influences” such as constitutional and political framework, economic environment, historical legacy, politicization of civil service, budgetary constraints, political leadership and civil society, and impact of “imported” ideas and concepts.

The second part of the chapter deals with the comparison of civil service reforms in Russia and the Czech Republic. Particular emphasis is made on matching capacities for reform, reforms’ dimensions and dynamics, driving forces, implementation constraints and results achieved so far. Similarities and distinctions across the range of raised issues are separated out and preliminary findings as to the impact of selected variables on the processes of reform preparation and implementation are developed and summarized.

8.2 Intra Bureaucracy Factors

8.2.1 Resistance of the Bureaucracy

Taking into account some principal features of the bureaucracy in general and of state bureaucracies in Russia and the Czech Republic in particular (as

described in the previous chapters), it is unlikely that most civil servants in these countries will support reforms meant to expose them to public scrutiny, enhance accountability, reduce discretionary power and rent seeking opportunities.

It is not easy to substantiate any judgment about the extent of bureaucratic resistance by empirical data since such resistance is always either hidden or masked. Therefore, conclusions are usually based on close observation of behavior, indirect evidence, questioning of experts and thoroughly prepared interviews of civil servants.

One of the useful instruments in this respect is the measure the civil service reform is accepted or approved by civil servants and this can be identified through various surveys.

Such a survey was conducted in November 2003 by the Russian Academy of Civil Service (RACS). It shows that only 11% of interviewed civil servants were ready to fully support administrative and civil service reforms, 79% were ready to do it only partially and 8.5% were not supportive of the reform. (RACS, 2003:17).

Another indicator is the reluctance of state administrators to accept improvements and measures outlined in the proposed reform concept and programme. Quite demonstrative is the extent some radical innovations contained in the draft Russian law ‘On State Civil Service of the RF’ (the law was finally adopted in July 2004) have been cancelled, distorted or ignored at different stages of the approval and implementation of this legal act. For example, the mandatory requirement to hold competition, when a civil servant vacancy needs to be filled in, contained in the first draft of the Law, was complemented by numerous exceptions in the final document. Another well known case concerns a draft law “On Access to Information about Government Activities” prepared in 2002 and since then circulating along the corridors of power without any tangible advance to final approval (Dmitriev, 2004).

It is noteworthy that the Russian Federation’s economic and social development strategy for the period of 2000-2010 elaborated in the late 1990s by the Gref’s Center of Strategic Studies included also a section on the strategy of reform of state governance. However, this section was the only (!) part of this comprehensive document, which was not made public (Zaitseva, ed. 2003:58).

The World Bank’s report stresses “All earlier reform efforts (over the last 12 years) have been comprehensively blocked by the bureaucracy they were meant to reform” (World Bank, 2004:24). Perhaps most convincing evidence comes from the highest authority – the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin, who acknowledged in his Presidential address to the Federal Assembly in 2002 that the country’s huge potential was blocked by the cumbersome, inert and inefficient government bureaucracy and that officialdom resisted reforms (Otechestvennyie Zapiski, 2004:111).

In many ways a similar situation, as far as “rejection” of reform is concerned, though with its own peculiarities, has existed in the Czech Republic. This can be well illustrated by both delays in implementing the civil service reform programme and by surveys of Czech civil servants and Czech citizens. Postponement of the full enforcement of the Civil service Act (adopted in 2002) till 2005, then to 2007 and then to 2009 can serve as a clear signal of non-acceptance of the reform by both politicians and top bureaucrats. One of the reform documents described it in the following way: “Current attitude of the state officials is rather illustrative of the method of “passive resistance” towards reform efforts in central

described in the previous chapters), it is unlikely that most civil servants in these countries will support reforms meant to expose them to public scrutiny, enhance accountability, reduce discretionary power and rent seeking opportunities.

It is not easy to substantiate any judgment about the extent of bureaucratic resistance by empirical data since such resistance is always either hidden or masked. Therefore, conclusions are usually based on close observation of behavior, indirect evidence, questioning of experts and thoroughly prepared interviews of civil servants.

One of the useful instruments in this respect is the measure the civil service reform is accepted or approved by civil servants and this can be identified through various surveys.

Such a survey was conducted in November 2003 by the Russian Academy of Civil Service (RACS). It shows that only 11% of interviewed civil servants were ready to fully support administrative and civil service reforms, 79% were ready to do it only partially and 8.5% were not supportive of the reform. (RACS, 2003:17).

Another indicator is the reluctance of state administrators to accept improvements and measures outlined in the proposed reform concept and programme. Quite demonstrative is the extent some radical innovations contained in the draft Russian law ‘On State Civil Service of the RF’ (the law was finally adopted in July 2004) have been cancelled, distorted or ignored at different stages of the approval and implementation of this legal act. For example, the mandatory requirement to hold competition, when a civil servant vacancy needs to be filled in, contained in the first draft of the Law, was complemented by numerous exceptions in the final document. Another well known case concerns a draft law “On Access to Information about Government Activities” prepared in 2002 and since then circulating along the corridors of power without any tangible advance to final approval (Dmitriev, 2004).

It is noteworthy that the Russian Federation’s economic and social development strategy for the period of 2000-2010 elaborated in the late 1990s by the Gref’s Center of Strategic Studies included also a section on the strategy of reform of state governance. However, this section was the only (!) part of this comprehensive document, which was not made public (Zaitseva, ed. 2003:58).

The World Bank’s report stresses “All earlier reform efforts (over the last 12 years) have been comprehensively blocked by the bureaucracy they were meant to reform” (World Bank, 2004:24). Perhaps most convincing evidence comes from the highest authority – the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin, who acknowledged in his Presidential address to the Federal Assembly in 2002 that the country’s huge potential was blocked by the cumbersome, inert and inefficient government bureaucracy and that officialdom resisted reforms (Otechestvennyie Zapiski, 2004:111).

In many ways a similar situation, as far as “rejection” of reform is concerned, though with its own peculiarities, has existed in the Czech Republic. This can be well illustrated by both delays in implementing the civil service reform programme and by surveys of Czech civil servants and Czech citizens. Postponement of the full enforcement of the Civil service Act (adopted in 2002) till 2005, then to 2007 and then to 2009 can serve as a clear signal of non-acceptance of the reform by both politicians and top bureaucrats. One of the reform documents described it in the following way: “Current attitude of the state officials is rather illustrative of the method of “passive resistance” towards reform efforts in central

state administration. This attitude can in a way beunderstood since neither political leadership nor top management has given any clear signal that realisation of reform measures constitutes a definitive priority of the government” (Further Advance…, 2005 point 2.3.2).

It is noteworthy that the officials in the Czech Ministry of Interior used deliberately the term “modernization”, not “reform”, when they developed in 1999 a concept of reform at the level of central administration. According to Pavlik, the experts of the Ministry of Interior advocated the view that the process in question could be better defined using the term ‘modernisation’ especially because that process is step-by-step, long-term and of evolutionary character. Unlike reform, modernisation does not affect the substance of the system as such, but it rather modifies the way that it works (Pavlik, 2000:21). This idea of modernisation was in stark contrast with recommendations made earlier by the Czech non-government National Training Foundation in a comprehensive analysis of the Czech public administration. These recommendations called for “a complete and principal qualitative transformation of the public administration” (NTF, 1998: 1-3-2). Some authors assert that in the Czech Republic one can witness “an active fight against reform proposed by EU” (Scherpereel, 2002:6).

Opposition has taken different forms. For example, reluctance of various governmental institutions and agencies to submit to the Czech Ministry of Interior proposals for devolved competencies (the former were obliged to do this within the frames of civil service reform – A.K.). In this connection Coombes remarked that transitions in Central and Eastern Europe seem “to confirm generally the extraordinary capacity of bureaucracy to withstand political turbulence” (Coombes, 2002:7).

Celebrating his first anniversary of election to the office President Putin told a group of journalists that the main lesson he had learnt was “the extreme difficulty of fighting bureaucracy” (The Observer, 8 June 2003).

8.2.2 Problems of Reform Management

As we have shown in the preceding chapters a civil service system is a complex organization made up of various elements connected by multilateral links and relations. Therefore, management of this organization and coordination between its elements is essential for effective functioning of the whole system and even more so for its reform.

Inadequate or weak management appears to be one of the reasons that delayed or misdirected advance of civil service reform in both countries. As a rule weak quality management is characterized by a badly prepared start, incorrect diagnosis, imitation instead of innovation, hidden agendas, inconsistent approach, poor coordination, inability to obtain and command resources and win internal and external support, and absence of regular monitoring and assessment.

Civil service reform in Russia appears to have lacked a proper mechanism for reform management in particular at the operational level. The Commission for Improvement of State Governance turned out to be an ad hoc structure having irregular meetings. The Civil Service Directorate in the Presidential Administration was assigned mainly coordinating and information gathering function and did not have full authority to manage the reform process. In practice the reform has been

state administration. This attitude can in a way beunderstood since neither political leadership nor top management has given any clear signal that realisation of reform measures constitutes a definitive priority of the government” (Further Advance…, 2005 point 2.3.2).

It is noteworthy that the officials in the Czech Ministry of Interior used deliberately the term “modernization”, not “reform”, when they developed in 1999 a concept of reform at the level of central administration. According to Pavlik, the experts of the Ministry of Interior advocated the view that the process in question could be better defined using the term ‘modernisation’ especially because that process is step-by-step, long-term and of evolutionary character. Unlike reform, modernisation does not affect the substance of the system as such, but it rather modifies the way that it works (Pavlik, 2000:21). This idea of modernisation was in stark contrast with recommendations made earlier by the Czech non-government National Training Foundation in a comprehensive analysis of the Czech public administration. These recommendations called for “a complete and principal qualitative transformation of the public administration” (NTF, 1998: 1-3-2). Some authors assert that in the Czech Republic one can witness “an active fight against reform proposed by EU” (Scherpereel, 2002:6).

Opposition has taken different forms. For example, reluctance of various governmental institutions and agencies to submit to the Czech Ministry of Interior proposals for devolved competencies (the former were obliged to do this within the frames of civil service reform – A.K.). In this connection Coombes remarked that transitions in Central and Eastern Europe seem “to confirm generally the extraordinary capacity of bureaucracy to withstand political turbulence” (Coombes, 2002:7).

Celebrating his first anniversary of election to the office President Putin told a group of journalists that the main lesson he had learnt was “the extreme difficulty of fighting bureaucracy” (The Observer, 8 June 2003).

8.2.2 Problems of Reform Management

As we have shown in the preceding chapters a civil service system is a complex organization made up of various elements connected by multilateral links and relations. Therefore, management of this organization and coordination between its elements is essential for effective functioning of the whole system and even more so for its reform.

Inadequate or weak management appears to be one of the reasons that delayed or misdirected advance of civil service reform in both countries. As a rule weak quality management is characterized by a badly prepared start, incorrect diagnosis, imitation instead of innovation, hidden agendas, inconsistent approach, poor coordination, inability to obtain and command resources and win internal and external support, and absence of regular monitoring and assessment.

Civil service reform in Russia appears to have lacked a proper mechanism for reform management in particular at the operational level. The Commission for Improvement of State Governance turned out to be an ad hoc structure having irregular meetings. The Civil Service Directorate in the Presidential Administration was assigned mainly coordinating and information gathering function and did not have full authority to manage the reform process. In practice the reform has been

implemented by single ministries and regional authorities often duplicating each other and experiencing lack of uniform approach to reform. The weakest points of reform management were poorly defined responsibility, shortage of clearly formulated specific targets and deadlines, sporadic monitoring of implementation process and actual absence of evaluation of the reform progress and achievements. Relevant work done in this respect by international donors could not substitute for comprehensive and regular assessment that should have been done by official authority.

The overall approach to management of civil service reform in the Czech Republic evolved as more comprehensive and well thought over. The reform implementation mechanism was based on project management principles with structures and responsible persons in place and with assigned specific authority and responsibility: e.g. project teams and project managers, team leaders, reform managers in each large ministry or institution, reform steering committee and, the Office of the Government acting as the central management and supervision body.

The biggest problem for reform management in the Czech Republic appeared to be lack of sufficient support for its mission from the political authority. In practice this meant that although formally the reform was led by the Head of the Government Office, that person often could not or did not want to resolve various problems and difficulties of reform implementation, in particular issues and disputes arising between ministries and agencies.

Weak quality management can be explained also by scarcity of technical expertise in key reform areas both in Russia and the Czech Republic. There was and largely still is a severe shortage of experts with hands-on practical experience in reform design and implementation. For example, the draft Civil service Act was produced by two part-time experts who occasionally could get support from assigned functionaries representing a number of Czech ministries (Onisko, 2000:71).

The situation was further aggravated by insufficient public relations activities and other measures to promote and spread information about the reform. The weak communications resulted in a lack or poor understanding of reform objectives, principles and contents even by civil servants. Findings of a survey conducted in 2003 by the Russian Academy of Civil Service revealed in particular, that less than 40% of civil servants fully understood the objectives and essence of civil service reform (RACS, 2004: 92). Paradoxically, there were cases in the Czech Republic when some of its parliamentarians made public statements about the necessity to launch civil service reform when it was already in a full swing.

Interesting commonalities between the two countries can be found in the management of the process of reform preparation. It appears that civil service reform preparation and coordination centers in Russia and the Czech Republic were created and dissolved in a surprisingly similar manner. The Czech “Office for Legislation and Public Administration” (OLPA) established in 1992 soon after the formation of the Czech Republic was dissolved in 1996. In the Russian Federation a similar unit called Roskadry was created in 1991 (after the adoption of the first Constitution of the Russian Federation) and it was also disbanded in 1994. No sound reasoning was provided in either case explaining the cause of the closure. After liquidation the centers’ competences and functions in their entirety were handed to no other organisation. Therefore, for some time civil service reform preparation in both