Having considered the collectivist approach to collective responsibility problems and found it unsatisfactory, particularly for an analysis of social structural harms, we are left with the more traditional approach of individualism. In this chapter I examine one particular individualist account, that of Young, who attempts to overcome problems that many individualist accounts encounter regarding under-determination of responsibility ascriptions in cases of structural harm.113 Young argues that collective responsibility is based on structural participation, and results
in a specific type of responsibility she labels ‘political’ which is different from moral and legal forms of responsibility. I suggest that Young’s account draws out many of the most salient reasons that participation in social structures bestows responsibility upon participating agents. It focuses on the collective nature of our lives and the responsibilities this generates whilst remaining distinctly individualistic. However, I suggest that the type of responsibility for which Young argues is both unsustainable and unnecessary. Her account provides much of the foundation for an explanation of individual moral responsibility in cases of social structural harm without the need to appeal to new or alternative forms of responsibility.
All individualist approaches to collective responsibility, then, argue that collective contexts can be analysed at the level of individual agents, rejecting the need for responsibility at the collective level. Whatever the nature of the group involved, all collective actions are ultimately performed by individuals, and it is therefore argued that the responsibility for those actions lies with the individuals involved. Individual agent responsibility is at the heart of much traditional moral thought, where agents are held to be the proper objects of blame or praise depending on their acts and omissions. Individualism sits better with these traditional accounts of moral responsibility and avoids many of the problems associated with collectivism; individualists avoid blaming innocent group members for the actions of others, or accounting for group agents. However, individualism regarding collective responsibility is not without problems. The main shortcoming of these accounts concerns responsibility ascriptions in cases where individual contribution to a collective harm is unclear, immeasurable, or epistemically unavailable to us in some way. In these situations, individualists are unable to adequately attribute responsibility for collective harms. This is a particular problem for large-scale harms, like those caused by social structures, where a great many individuals contribute to a harm but where the actual harm each individual produces cannot be identified or is minute.
53 In an attempt to address the gap in standard individualist approaches to collective responsibility between harms and responsible agents, Young develops an account that focusses on the collective nature of our daily lives, particularly the large social structures which provide the framework for much of our social interactions. These structures, she argues, cause widespread injustice and harm, and result in most members of society bearing responsibility for harms caused by the structures in which they participate daily. Many harms have no ‘isolatable perpetrator’, but instead result from millions of people participating in institutions that cause harm.114 Due to the
lack of identifiable specific agents who can be held directly responsible for causing particular harms, Young argues that traditional responsibility models are unable to adequately explain responsibility ascriptions in cases of structural harm. She therefore develops an alternative account of collective responsibility based on participation in social structures, in which individuals bear responsibility for harms caused by the social structural processes of which they are a part.
Young’s account has a number of distinguishing features. Her focus on structure over individuals is unusual for an individualist account, as is her rejection of traditional models of responsibility in cases of large-scale harms. Her most controversial, and problematic claim, is that collective responsibility is what she describes as ‘political responsibility’. This is a distinct type of responsibility arising from participation in social structures, which is held by all participants and focuses on the duty to make such structures less harmful. It does not bring with it notions of praise and blame in the way that moral responsibility does, nor does it entail guilt. Collective responsibility for Young, then, is a responsibility to support social justice through the development of fair and harmless social structures. Participation in harmful structures is currently all but unavoidable, however this is not something agents need to feel guilty about, nor blameworthy. Political responsibility instead requires agents to endeavour to work with others to improve these structures.
The distinction Young tries to maintain between moral and political responsibility, however, faces a number of problems which I argue leave it unmaintainable. For example, Young attempts to develop a kind of responsibility that ‘is more forwards-looking than backwards- looking’115 and rejects praising or blaming individuals for their previous involvement in collective
harms. This is motivated by wishing to avoid the problem of attempting to discern the precise harm caused by specific individuals, which is unlikely to be possible, and also has a pragmatic motivation. Young worries that blaming people is unproductive and leads to defensiveness and
114 Iris Marion Young, ‘Responsibility and Global Labour Justice’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 12 (2004), 365- 388, (p.377).
54 ‘blame-switching’.116 Whilst blame can potentially demotivate, it can also provide agents with a
specific reason to act. Understanding that previous actions have been blameworthy and that this generates a responsibility to address those wrongs can provide powerful motivation. Also, if the actions of an agent are identified as culpably causing harm and therefore blameworthy, the possibility that the agent might be demotivated by this analysis makes them no less responsible and blameworthy. Refraining from making responsibility ascriptions for this kind of reason fails to take moral responsibility seriously and fails to treat individuals as full moral agents.
In order to draw out the arguments for individual moral responsibility in collective harms from Young’s account, I begin with an analysis of Young’s ‘social connection model’ in section 2. I start with an examination of the motivation behind Young’s account, discussing some of the reasons for her development of an alternative form of responsibility. I then analyse her ‘social connection model’, particularly the five characteristics she argues distinguish political responsibility from moral responsibility. I argue that the distinctions Young draws are difficult to maintain, and that the arguments for conceiving of responsibility for participation in harmful structures as a separate form of responsibility is unsustainable. In section 3 I focus on the first of two aspects of Young’s account which I believe are most insightful and useful to an account of responsibility for structural harms, that social structures can be the generators of collective responsibility. Through a discussion of a variety of descriptions of social structures, I provide a more detailed analysis of their nature and their effects than is offered by Young. In section 4 I discuss the second of Young’s insights, namely the importance of participation in harmful institutions to an account of collective responsibility, analysing the way individuals become responsible for collective harms through participating in social structures. I conclude that from Young’s work we have a good foundation for the development of an account of individual moral responsibility for social structural harms.