Las facultades y obligaciones del Presidente son las siguientes:

five percent an average of 223 rai each. Of the remaining 94 per cent of landowners (404,725 landowners), 25 per cent (100,396 landowners) possessed from 20 to 50 rai; and 69 per cent (or 304,329 landowners) possessed less than 20 rai.145

Very few people would argue that the ownership of agricultural land in Thai rural areas is not the single most significant factor in the well-being of the common people. But since the Limited Land Tenure Act of B.E. 2497 (1954) was abolished by Sarit's Revolutionary Party Proclamation No. 49, farmers had been losing their lands through selling (of their own free will or by being forced), and resumption by the state for the construction of roads, dams, forestry schemes and "public works", with little or sometimes no compensation.146

It could be said that, with the support of government development policies during the past two decades, big landowners, domestic and foreign enterprises or the so called "the tripod structure o f dominant capitalist groups" controlled most of the productive resources (e.g. land, capital and labour) in the Thai economy.147 As a consequence, this concentration created an unequal distribution of income which has a great impact upon the poor living condition of the common people and has determined the continuing structure of underdevelopment of the country, socially, economically and politically.148

Kroekkiat, "Khrongsang kankrachai raidai", pp. 7-8,13. Kroekkiat uses as his primary source the Office of Land Reformation for Agriculture, Statistic Document no. 4036. The government officers explored fifty districts within 22 provinces to study land reformation and found many problems in terms of land monopoly. See also A. Turton, "The Current Situation in the Thai Countryside", Journal of Contemporary Asia. Vol. 8, No. 1, 1978, pp. 110-112. Turton argues that in one district of a Northern province, the land tax records for 3,430 owners in 1974 revealed that only 1.4 per cent of landowners (48 landowners) possess land from 45 rai to 1,600 rai whereas 56.3 per cent (or 1,932 small landowners) have land 5-10 rai. According to Paisal, the land holding by the Crown Property Bureau (CPB) which is owned by the King, and which, the article claimed, was "the wealthiest institution in Thailand", was estimated at about 40,000 acres in up-country and at roughly 13,300 acres in Bangkok [Paisal, op. c it . pp. 60-61].

Chai-anan and Morell argue that besides the corruption scandal in the Irrigation Department, in 1969, "large dams produced electricity for the cities, rather than serving the needs of small farmers." In addition, "[R]oad building became a top priority in the development plans. While the government claimed that these roads were of great economic importance to the farmers, some critics argued that the road construction program had little effect on agricultural output" [D. Morell and Chai-anan Samudhavanija, Political Conflict in Thailand: Reform. Reaction. Revolution. Cambridge: Gunn & Hain Publishers Inc., 1981, p. 208]. According to Jacobs, most roads were built to serve strategic purposes in "the event of an international conflict in Southeast Asia" [Jacobs, op. cit.. p. 145].

147 148

See explanation in Suehiro, op. cit.. pp. 275-286. Ibid.. Ch. 8.

Analysing the distribution of ownership of the Thai big business during two development decades (1960s and 1970s) using first-hand data and information149 from the Ministry of Commerce, Kroekkiat found that "the degree of concentration in all major business sectors are very high and the foreign companies have played an important role in the Thai economy, particularly in the industrial sector" and "the government's economic policies in the past two decades have also promoted high business concentration and high degree of monopoly power".*50 Kroekkiat argued that the financial business (e.g. banking) had more influence than others (e.g. import, export, manufacturing and agricultural businesses) in the use of capital, of social resources, the promotion and expansion of big business as well as the control of economic change. Although agriculture was a fundamental sector in Thai economic system in which most people were involved, it played only a minor role in the control and change of Thai economy.151 Kroekkiat also considered the increasing role of foreign enterprises on which the Thai economy was dependent in terms of capital investment, technology and trading and said that the trend towards dependency was advancing.152

Besides the lack of productive resources (e.g. land and capital), the small farmers' poverty and landlessness comes from their indebtedness and inability to pay rents and high interest rates on borrowing.153 They also suffer from natural conditions such as the fluctuation of climate and low productivity, and human exploitation through low market price depressed further by pre-harvest contract sales or immediate post-

149 150 151

152 153

For example, the financial statements and lists of shareholders of about one thousand limited companies belonging to the major business groups in 1978 and 1979.

Kroekkiat, Wikhro laksana kanpenchaokhong. p. 10.

The pattern of ownership (e.g. the shareholding in companies) was concentrated in a small clique of family businesses. For instance, three quarters of the financial businesses were under the control of five commercial banking (family) groups, namely Sophonphanich, Techaphaiboon, Lumsum, Rattanarak and Nanthaphiwat families. About 90 per cent of financial resources (altogether 500,000 million baht during 1978-1979) were in the hands of 30 big business groups; and about 70 per cent of that amount of financial resources belonged to only 12 commercial banking groups and large industrial groups.

Ibid., pp. 360-364, 367-369.

Chai-anan says that in the North and Northeast regions about 20 per cent of the peasants have no buffalo to work in the rice field. Farmers therefore have to rent buffaloes at a costs of 50- 100 tang of paddy rice for only one planting season, whereas they can gain by average only 28 tangs [280 kilograms] per rai [Chai-anan Samudavanija, "The Farmers' Movement in Modem Thai Politics", paper presented at the Thai-European Seminar on Social Change in Contemporary Thailand, Anthropological-Sociological Centre, University of Amsterdam, 28- 30 May 1980, p. 14; and Morell and Chai-anan, op. cit.. p. 211]. See also Kosit Punpiumrat, "Kanpatthana Chonnabot yakchon nai raya khu'ng phan patthana chabap thi ha lae thitthang kanpatthana nai phan patthana chabap thi hok" [The Development of Poor-Rural Areas Half- Way through the Fifth National Economic and Social Plan and the Direction of the Sixth National Economic and Social Plan], in The National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), Chonnabotthai. [Thai Rural Areas], [in Thai], Bangkok: NESDB, Office of the Prime Minister, B.E., 2527 (1984), p. 14.

harvest sale, high rents and the imposition of fines for delayed payment. Even though the Agricultural Land Rent Control Act of 1974 fixed a maximum rent of one-third of the crop, it has been ignored by officials and landowners. After the "parliamentary period" ended in 1976, the landowners seized any opportunity to evict tenants and to re­ negotiate new tenancies with various forms of cash rent in advance. The Agricultural Land Reform Office has achieved very little in implementing the policies of the 1975 Agricultural Land Reform Act for the benefit of the tenants and, according to Turton, from 1975 to 1981 "only 30,000 ha of land in the Reform Areas had been purchased from private owners ... this benefited less than 3 % of tenant households."154 At the same time there has been considerable land fragmentation and subdivision and also a shortfall in land development for agriculture.

Furthermore, illness and illiteracy are serious problems among small farmers. For instance, in the mid-1980s, 63 per cent of the poor in the rural areas, in particular the Northeast region, were subject to parasitic illnesses and 90 per cent on average had anaem ia.155 The causes of illness are malnutrition, poor living condition and hard physical labour, especially in new forest-fringe areas which present particular health hazards such as virulent types of malaria. In 1981, 14.5 per cent of the population of that region was uneducated and lacked the basic knowledge necessary to prevent themselves from getting diseases.156 In addition, illiterate farmers were sometimes simply cheated by landowners and money lenders and eventually they lost their lands.157

At the same time, the poverty of urban workers has been exacerbated by low wages and a high rate o f unemployment. For example, in 1981, the government declared the average wage for the workers in Bangkok to be 61 baht (about US$ 2.9) per day. While this is appreciably higher than in 1973 when the average wage was only 12 baht (US$ 0.57), the workers in the nearby provinces such as Samut Sakhon and Samut Songkhram earn even less than those who worked in Bangkok. Moreover, according to the NESDB's statistical data, there were 286,000 unemployed workers in 1980 and the estim ated figure for unemployed was expected to rise to 552,000 in 1990.158 154 155 156 157 158

Turton, Production. Power and Participation, pp. 22-23. Kosit, op. cit.. p. 14.

Ibid., p. 14.

Morell and Chai-anan, op. cit.. pp. 211-212.

It is clear that without power and any effective voice in government, the common people have been ignored and successive governments have supported narrow elites in agriculture, in business and in social development at the expense of the common people.

People's reaction towards the government's implementation of development policies

The government has achieved very little in solving social problems which have been growing since at least the 1930s. The people express their frustration in unproductive ways such as drinking, gambling and committing crime, which the government regards as problems of individual behaviour rather than as wider social problems.159 Common attitudes towards the government officials are quoted in Demaine and Seri:

These people who came to us, whom in general we called "town people," counted on and respected only educated or rich persons, or somebody of high rank; no matter how young, how stupid, how ignorant they were, age meant nothing to them. ... But we knew that they expected us to respect them because they were educated and they were government people too. So we did as they wanted by acting humble. But it would also [have] hurt them awfully if they ever knew that we counted them as what we thought they really were. ... Sometimes we even called some of them stupid asses.160

You are the one[s] who plans thing for us. But you never take any responsibility when the plans fail. We farmers have to find our way out by ourselves.161

Chai-anan, Chirmsak and Davis argue that one of the main reasons for these outpourings of frustration is that the poor have not been able to bring meaningful political pressure upon the government. Most Thai poor tend to accept their misfortune and poverty as their inescapable "karma" and the people's apparent passiveness may derive from the fact that no strong grass roots movement has been formed.162 Because the common people are not organized and do not present a direct threat to government security, the government has not made any serious effort to take their problems into account or attempted to really improve the economic welfare of the people.163 Where 159

160 161

162

163

For instance, the Fifth Plan reveals that the crime rate rose from 20 cases per 100,000 person in 1959 to 40 cases per 100,000 persons in 1976 fThe Fifth Plan, p. 7].

Demaine, op. cit.. p. 110.

Wibun Khemchaloem, quoted by Seri Phongphit (ed.), Back to the Roots: Village and Self: Reliance in a Thai Context. Bangkok: Rural Development Document Centre (RUDOC), 1986, p. 15.

Chai-anan explains "karma" as "the degree to which the present status is determined by past lives" [Chai-anan, "The Farmers' M ovem ent", p. 6].

Chirmsak makes a comment on government policies concerned with farmer organizations that "farmers' organizations have been much discouraged and destroyed in the past two decades while business and industrial interests promoted and consolidated" [Chirmsak, op. cit.. p. 20]. See also R. Davis, "Little Change in a Northern Thai Village", in B.J. Terwiel (ed.), Seven PrQteS

security has been a perceived problem, however, the government has not been slow to bring force to bear with little concern for eliminating the economic conditions which produced opposition in the first place.

W herever there were grass roots movem ents, the governm ent reacted.164 During 1973 and 1976, the peasant and worker movements became better organized than ever before in the Peasant Federation of Thailand (PFT) and Labour Unions of Thailand (FLUT), and in particular when they co-operated with the student movements. The so-called "Sam-pra-san" or "Tri-Co-operation" between farmers, workers and students, voiced the grievances of the common people and put strong political pressure on the government. The ruling elite felt threatened and consequently tried many ways to destroy the em ergent co-operative organization of workers, farmers and students, eventually achieving this objective with the 1976 coup. Moreover, the government felt even more threatened when large numbers of students, workers and farmers fled to join the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) with the declared intention of taking up arms to fight against the government.165

At that time, the political-oriented people's m ovem ents wished to devise development strategies to attack the root causes of problems concerned mainly with land ownership and an unfair labour system (e.g. the minimum wage), by influencing the government, or if necessary, by campaigning against it. The people organizations stated that they aimed to achieve their struggle by peaceful means and were initially far from the influence of the CPT. As Srithorn Yotkantha, President of the Northern Region PFT said in an interview in September 1976 just before the October 1976 coup:

in Rural South East Asia. Bihar (India): The Centre for South East Asian Studies, 1979, pp.

20-22.

There had been peasant movements in various forms operating for many years more or less against state suppression and exploitation, especially in the North and Northeast regions. The worker movements were very recent by comparison. For the peasant movements, see further details from Chatthip Nartsupha, "The Ideology of Holy Men Revolts", pp. 111-134. For the state suppression and exploitation, see Somsamai Srisudravama (pen name of Chit Poumisak), Chomna sakdinathai. pp. 43-148. For the peasant movements in the 1970s, see Luther, Peasants and State in Contemporary Thailand: and Turton, Production. Power and Participation. Ch. 3. For the labour movement, see Morell and Chai-anan, op. cit., pp. 181- 204, Chs. 6, 7, 8; and Girling, Thailand. Chs. 4 and 5.

See further details in Turton, Fast and Caldwell (eds.) op. cit.: P. de Beer, "History and Policy o f the Communist Party of Thailand", Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1978, pp. 143-157; Girling, Thailand. Ch. 7; and A. Tandrup, "The CPTs Mobilization Policy at the Village level", paper presented at the Thai-European Seminar on Social Change in Contemporary Thailand, Anthropological-Sociological Centre, University of Amsterdam, 28- 30 May 1980.

We will fight peacefully even though the small minority against whose interests we fight may seek to use violence; even when a large number of our peasant leaders up and down the country have been beaten or killed. Any amount of beating, killing or suffering will not be able to break our resolve, because in the past all we have known is hardship and suffering.166

And Arom Pongpa-ngan, the President of the Labour Union of the Metropolitan Waterworks Authority in an interview in The Nation on 11 January 1976 expressed a similar position: "I don't want to reject the present government. I just want to change its ways to work more for the poor people".167

But the government's response to any kind o f counterbalancing activities, criticism and presentation o f alternatives, was to label such activities as "communist", something which it regarded to be "un-Thai". In order to control the growth and expansion of such activities, the governments used the "counter-insurgency" measures and the Anti-Communist Act to suppress the so-called "insurgency."168 Because of this, "national development" and "counter-insurgency" measures [political (non-violent) and military (violent) means] became closely linked and the outcome was to create additional social and political problems rather than to bring benefit to the common people.

With regard to the root causes of the problems, which most scholars agree are most serious in the state of rural development, Davis argues that only vague conceptions of development and democracy have been transmitted to the common people by government officials. The relationship between common people and officials could well be an indication as to whether these concepts were successfully understood and im p le m en te d .169 The 1973 uprising proves the fact that these two concepts (development and democracy) are inseparable, and to attempt to increase economic growth by suppressing people's rights and freedom is a contradiction and must fail.170

166 167 168

169

170

Turton, Production. Power and Participation, p. 41. Quoted from Girling, Thailand, pp. 201-202.

This Act was enforced on 2 April 1933 and initially used against Luang Pradit and the Draft Economic Plan. It was changed many times, being amended in 1935, revoked in 1946 and again enforced in November 1952 after the arrest of the "Peace Rebellion" group, who protested against the Phibun government sending soldiers to fight in the Korean War [Thongbai Thongpao, "Preventive Detention", UCL Newsletter. January-June, 1986, pp. 6-7]. For the current debate on this Act, see Far Eastern Economic Review Asia Yearbook. 1990, p. 236.

However, since Davis’ observation in 1979, economic development programmes have not emphasized developing an effective official-peasant relationships. Instead, emphasis has been on altering the physical landscape, construction of roads, irrigation works, etc.; or on material development which people often misconceive as the sole aim of national development

However, the process of sorting out a consensus between classes have not yet become part of Thai political culture or part of the administration system in Thailand. More often than not, the consensus achieved by the government tends to be imposed by the elites and therefore tends to prevent the occurrence of open conflict between classes (it becomes a hidden agenda).

Within the "representative" democratic society, it is necessary to have the expression of ideas and opinions from the majority; this is fundamental to development.

People organizations create an opportunity for the common people to have a more relevant role and a wider choice in Thai society, even if their condition remains far removed from the aims of developm ent.171 As Heim, Akin and Chirmsak say, these "self-help" organizations are needed to become a formal channel not only for the two- way com m unications between the governm ent and people (i.e., spreading new agricultural, industrial techniques and information as well as understanding the needs of common people), but also the avenue (or power base) for bargaining in the economic, social and political areas.172

As to whether the peasants resisted change and development, Davis confirmed that study after study of peasant economies had demonstrated that peasants were not resistant to change and would increase their productivity given the appropriate conditions. He defined the peasants as:

small-scale rural producers who stand in a subordinate position in their relations with the holders o f political and economic power. ... Peasants are linked to the national community and to the world community in two ways: economically and politically through their role in a market system and through their relationship to the state; and culturally, by their subordinate