Familia como modelo

Manchu-Chinese relations were undoubtedly the most important ethnic relations in the Qing empire as the Chinese were the most populous group and culturally influential and the Manchus were the ruling group. As of the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Manchus and the Chinese were segregated and treated unequally by the state in administrative, political, and legal aspects. First and foremost, virtually all the Manchus were classified by the state as banner people, namely military personnel, even women

and children who were not actually enlisted12_{. In contrast, the Chinese were classified as civilians}

(minren). The classifications were permanent and hereditary, except for few rare cases where some people

were recruited into or disbanded from the system. These cases required strict procedures, often initiated by the emperor’s instructions (Wang 2002: 122). Different classification intrinsically meant inequality. The Manchus in the first place were a military caste. As such they were forbidden to engage in agriculture, trade, or handicraft industry as the Chinese were. Instead, the state provided a stipend and a certain amount of rice to the soldiers in accordance with their ranks. Three ranks existed: the first rank was the corporal (lingcui) and the vanguard (qianfeng), the second rank was the cavalryman, and the third

rank was the foot soldier. In the Qianlong reign period (1736-1795), soldiers of the first rank stationed in the capital received a monthly stipend in the amount of four taels of silver, the second rank three taels, and the third rank two taels; whereas soldiers in the provinces at each comparable rank received a tael less successively. A banner soldier stationed in the capital received four dou (a dou was roughly equal to a deciliter) of rice per month, and a banner solider in the provinces received about 2.5 dou (Ding 2003: 220). Evidence suggests that stipends and rice increased as time passed by. The favor was extended even to boys 10 years of age and older, who were not actually enlisted. These children were termed “fostered soldiers” (yangyu bing). The institution was established in the early Qing, but later the favor was given to

younger boys who lost their parents or whose families were poor: in December 1738, the Qianlong emperor issued an edict to expand the policy to boys under nine years of age (GZSL: 1288). The state intended to support the poor Manchus so that they could get by without working. The stipend was exempt from state tax. In contrast, the Chinese had to work to make a living, and they were subject to state taxation and services.

The banner troops were only a part of the state’s armed forces. In addition to the Manchu army, the Chinese Green Standard (Lüying) was founded shortly after the Qing conquest, and was stationed across

the Chinese territory in the empire. To the Manchu court the banner troops without doubt were more trustworthy than the Chinese army (Ding 2003: 30). About half of the banner troops were stationed in the

capital, and the rest in the Chinese provinces, Manchuria, and Xinjiang (See Chapter IV). In contrast, the Chinese Green Standard was stationed in China proper only except for a few rare cases.

The Manchu and Chinese armies differed not only in geographical distribution, but in duties as well. The Chinese army, in addition to combat, was put in charge of keeping public order in peacetime, such as arresting criminals, investigating secret religious groups and secret societies, arresting gamblers, and safeguarding important government buildings. In contrast, the Manchu army was freed from the daily task of policing so that they could concentrate on military training in peacetime. The state made the division of labor between the two armies in order to ensure that the Manchu army would maintain its combat

capacity in wartime on the one hand, and keep the Chinese army under Manchu surveillance in peacetime on the other (Ding 2003: 130-133).

The banner troops, however, lost their raison d’être over time as they gradually became fond of pleasant city life, neglected military discipline and training, and eventually lost their capacity to fight. The state stationed the banner troops in the capital and other metropolitan areas in order to intimidate Chinese resistance. This ironically brought about an unexpected outcome as the troops became accustomed to city dwelling. The last major battles they took part in were at the turn of the nineteenth century, when the White Lotus Rebellion broke out in central-west China (see Chapter VII). The pampered Manchu soldiers from the capital were not used to the harsh conditions in the wild. Further, they often disobeyed orders given by their superiors. Frontline officers wrote to the emperor to send the soldiers back to the capital (Zhao 2002: 87). Although the troops ceased to be a valiant force and virtually became a big financial burden for the state, the court kept the army until the very last day of the dynasty, revealing the Manchu rulers’ mistrust of the Chinese army.

The Manchus, like the civilian Chinese, could enter the civil bureaucracy. Indeed, Manchus had an advantage over the Chinese, for many positions were reserved for Manchus exclusively. Rhoads (2000: 43-47) points out that Manchus received preferential treatment in recruitment, appointment, and tenure. For example, the state set four methods for the Manchus to enter the bureaucracy much more easily than the Chinese. First, the state assigned separate and more generous quotas for the Manchus than for the

Chinese in the regular examination (keju). Secondly, the state allowed Manchus to take a set of

examinations less demanding than the regular ones, but nevertheless awarded the same titles as the regular ones did, except for a prefix to the title. Thirdly, the state permitted Manchus to take an easy translation test 13 _{that led them to low-ranking metropolitan officials known as Manchu language scribes}

(bitieshi). Fourth, Manchus could enter government service by taking advantage of their fathers’

hereditary privilege.

In appointments, too, Manchus had an advantage over Chinese, for many posts were reserved for them. The superficially impartial principle of diarchy, that is, appointing equal numbers of Manchu and Chinese officials on positions at the same level (Man-Hancanban), applied only to a few posts at the top

of the government, particularly in the capital. Moreover, the principle did not extend to certain government agencies at all. In any case, the principle of diarchy was essentially discriminative as the Manchus occupied only 1-2% of the country’s entire population. Once they were appointed, Manchus on average held longer tenures than Chinese.

The third dimension of Manchu-Chinese inequality was the legal sphere. The state treated the Manchus preferentially at the expense the Chinese. The Manchus, even though they were living in China proper, were subject to a separate set of laws and were tried by a different system of courts (Chi 2001). As a result, local Chinese officials exerted no legal power on a Manchu person if he or she committed a crime at a location within the jurisdiction of the Chinese law-enforcement personnel; rather, the case was handled by the company and the banner the suspect belonged to, which caused ineffective processing of legal suits. The system lasted until the end of the dynasty, as stated by the prominent Manchu official Duanfang in his memorial presented to the court on August 24, 1907 (ZWC: 29).

When convicted, Manchus received much lighter actual punishment than Chinese who were sentenced to the same degree of punishment. The disparity remained unchanged until the end of the dynasty. For instance, Shen Jiaben, vice minister of the Ministry of Law, and one of the officials charged

13 _{Examinees translated essays from Manchu into Chinese, which became the native language of Manchus living in}

with revising existing laws, presented to the court a memorial on September 9, 1907, in which he reviewed the laws governing the Manchus. If a Manchu was sentenced to one year in prison, he was actually punished by wearing the cangue for 20 days. For each additional year he was sentenced to, five days were added. If a Manchu was sentenced to exile of 2,000 li (approximately 600 miles), the actual

punishment was wearing the cangue for 50 days. For each additional grade of punishment, five days were added (ZWC: File No. 43). In any case, the maximum number of days of wearing the cangue, or the maximum punishment for Manchus, did not exceed 90 days. In prison, Manchus were put in cells different from Chinese inmates, as stated by the intellectual Li Hongcai in his memorial presented to the court on August 14, 1907 (HYZWC: 22). In sum, the institution of “separate governance of the Manchus and the Chinese” (Man-Han fenzhi) was essentially unequal, and resembled extraterritoriality that

Western powers imposed on the Qing after the Opium War.