Fase 5: Evaluación.

The  ideas  of  positivism  and  state  law  which  argue  for  the  imminence  of  peace   and  tranquillity  once  rule  of  law  and  sovereignty  are  established,  do  so  in  the   presence   of   evidence   to   the   contrary.   As   stated   above,   it   is   not   only   in   areas   where   the  state   does   not   exist   that   violence   takes   place,   but   that   the   violence   exists  despite,  and  perhaps  because  of,  the  presence  of  the  current  form  of  state   as   it   exists   in   Pakistan.   The   notion   of   perverse   state   formation   presents   primarily   this   idea.   Through   a   detailed   study   of   Latin   American   countries,   Pearce   argues   against   the   commonly   held   view   of   ‘failed   state   threatened   by   urban   social   violence.’628   _{She   argues   that   in   the   Latin   American   scenario,   the}  

state  has  not  sought  to  find  solutions  to  violence  or  to  monopolise  it;  rather  the   ‘state   gains   huge   political   capital   from   its   ongoing   confrontations   at   the   same                                                                                                                  

625  _{Pakistan  Criminal  Records  (5  October  2012)  (n  532).}   626  _Ibid.  

627  _{Jenny  Pearce,  'Perverse  state  formation  and  securitized  democracy  in  Latin  America'  (2010)}  

17  (2)  Democratization  286,  297  

time  as  it  allies  with  pathological  and  corrupt  violent  actors  outside  the  state  in   order   to   gain   temporary   victories.’629   _{The   state,   then,   not   only   constructs   the}  

boundaries  between  citizens  and  non-­‐citizens,630  _{but  ‘positively  contributes  to}  

the   multiplication   of   deadly   personal   interactions   and   private   violences   (sic.).’631   _{This   account   is   equally   applicable   to   the   situation   of   Pakistan   and   if}  

this   is   indeed   the   trend   adopted   by   the   state   of   Pakistan,   the   assertions   of   a   stronger  state  and  greater  writ  of  the  government  will  not  resolve  the  crises.    

Another   major   issue   that   emerges   from   the   dominant   narrative’s   approach   to   link  law  with  governance,  administration,  Access  to  Justice  and  ADR  concepts,   as  mentioned  in  the  foregoing  analysis,  is  that  these  do  not  target  the  root  of  the   problems.  The  focus  of  these  projects  is  not  on  improving  the  democratic  nature   or  accountability  of  the  legal  system  as  a  whole,  but  to  address  issues  of  access   and  inefficiency  within  it.  They  largely  focus  on  commercial  and  civil  cases,  with   the   idea   (or   ideology)   that   contract   enforcement   and   an   efficient   legal   system   will   lead   towards   an   improvement   in   the   economy   and   attract   foreign   direct   investment.632   _{These   initiatives   do   not   question   or   challenge   the   foundational}  

notions   behind   legislations,   institutions,   procedures,   or   the   legal   system   as   a   whole,   but   emphasise   the   perception   that   it   is   the   wrongful   and   inept   implementation  which  is  the  problem.  

629  _{Ibid.  299.}   630  _Ibid.   631  _{Ibid.  300.}  

632  _{Investment  Climate  Advisory  Services  in  Middle  East  and  North  Africa,  'Promoting}  

Alternative  Dispute  Resolution  through  Mediation'  

<https://www.wbginvestmentclimate.org/uploads/IFC%20ADR%20Project%20Pakistan%20F act%20Sheet%202010.pdf>  last  accessed  17  December  2013.  

However,  a  more  evident  deficiency  that  emerges  from  the  dominant  narrative   on   law   in   Pakistan   is   its   inability   to   account   for   the   plurality   of   legal   and   normative   structures   that   exist   within   the   country.   The   excessive   focus   on   predictability  and  certainty,  as  well  as  the  need  to  govern  the  disparate  social   realities,  compels  the  legal  and  juridical  institutions  to  co-­‐opt  or  reject  all  that   does   not   fit   their   neat   categorisation.   But   is   it   a   fair   criticism   that   the   legal   understanding  does  not  take  the  fluidity  of  legal  orderings  into  account?  As  Carl   Schmitt  notes,  ‘all  law  is  situational  law’633  _{and  that  there  is  no  law  or  norm  that}  

can  be  applied  to  chaos.634  _{For  law  to  maintain  its  functionality,  it  has  to  make}  

sense  of  the  fluidity  and  existence  of  multiple  normative  orderings.  At  the  very   least,  for  law  to  come  into  being  it  has  to  take  the  first  and  constitutive  step  of   distinguishing  between  legal  and  illegal.  For  any  notion  of  law  to  exist,  there  has   to  be  the  first  distinction  of  what  qualifies  as  law  and  what  does  not,  what  lies   within  its  boundary  and  what  lies  outside  it;  it  has  to  ‘draw  any  distinction  and   call   it   the   first’.635   _{To   begin   comprehension   of   the   societal   phenomena   that}  

confronts   it,   law   has   to   define,   delineate,   structure   and   understand   what   it   is   referring  to,  and  what  lies  outside  its  distinction.  But  this  is  where  the  problem   lies,  as  in  this  exercise  of  demarcation,  what  is  left  out  is  as  important  as  what  is   included   inside.   As   Agamben   notes,   it   is   by   looking   at   the   exception   that   we   understand  the  general  and  the  generalisable.636    

633  _{Quoted  in  Giorgio  Agamben  (1998)  (n  491)  16.}  

634  _{Carl  Schmitt,  Political  Theology:  Four  Chapters  on  the  Concept  of  Sovereignty  (MIT  Press,}  

Cambridge,  Mass.  1988)  13.  

635  _{Spencer-­‐Brown,  quoted  in  Andreas  Philippopoulos-­‐Mihalopoulos,  'The  Successful  Failing  of}  

Legal  Theory'  in  Amita  Dhanda  and  Archana  Parashar  (eds),  Decolonisation  of  legal  knowledge   (Routledge,  Abingdon  2009)  45.  

It   is   therefore   argued   here   that   the   mainstream   legal   understanding   and   the   dominant  narrative  on  law  in  the  context  of  Pakistan  is  problematic  primarily   because  the  neat  configuration  it  creates  excludes  much  more  than  it  includes,  it   hides   more   than   it   shows.   The   entire   focus   of   legal   understanding   in   the   country’s   context   on   Rule   of   Law,   predictability,   certainty,   administration   of   justice637   _{fails   to   raise   the   questions:   Which   laws,   and   whose   laws,   are   being}  

referred  to  when  we  talk  about  the  Rule  of  Law?  Which  notion  of  justice  is  being   administered?   What   of   the   constitution   and   the  Grundnorm638   _{from   which   all}  

these   laws   are   said   to   originate?   Who   is   the   subject   of   these   laws?   And   who   decides   on   all   these   decisions   and   why?   The   problematic   tendency   to   focus   simply  on  the  implementation  and  administrative  issues  related  to  justice,  law   and  constitution  portrays  the  predisposition  to  take  these  notions  and  concepts   as   given.   As   shown   above,   without   questioning   what   they   stand   for   and   what   their   consequences   may   be,   the   issues   of   law   are   made   out   to   be   those   of   wrongful   implementation   and   lack   of   access.   An   unquestioning   adherence   to   this  narrative  means  that  the  concepts  of  Rule  of  Law,  Administration  of  Justice,   Access  to  Justice,  and  Governance  have  become  ends  in  themselves,  rather  than   any  goal  that  lay  at  their  heart  in  the  beginning.  

I  argue  that  this  exclusion  of  the  socio-­‐legal  realities  through  exclusivity,  their   omission   through   administration,   and   denunciation   through   governance,   are   some  of  the  key  limitations  of  the  dominant  narrative  on  law  in  the  context  of   Pakistan.   However,   this   is   not   the   only   weakness   of   this   perspective.   It   is                                                                                                                  

637  _{See,  Law  and  the  ‘Administration’  of  Justice,  above}  

contended  here  that  this  dominant  narrative,  its  foundational  assumptions  and   corollaries   are   directly   linked   to   the   legal   positivist   approach   to   law   that   has   dominated   legal   and   political   imagination   in   the   country.   In   this   regard,   approaching   the   theoretical   basis   of   this   narrative   allows   us   not   only   to   trace   the  source  of  this  narrative,  but  also  highlights  the  problematic  reading  of  it  that   emerges  within  the  country’s  legal  and  political  discourse.  The  need,  then,  is  to   consider  some  of  the  underlying  logics  of  this  mode  of  legal  conceptualisation  in   order  to  uncover  the  contradictions  it  presents  in  the  context  of  Pakistan.