FASE II. ESTRUCTURACIÓN

The dynamics and complexity of meso-level activism has traditionally attracted massive scholarly attention ever since the early days of social movement research. This has

24 Ideological explications of transition are recorded in Al-Hudaybi 1977.

63 subsequently produced a wide-range of theoretical propositions (Gurr 1970; Wilson 1973;

Tilly 1978; Klandermans 1988; Mellucci 1989; della Porta 1992; 1995; 1996; Tarrow 1994;

Jasper 1997; Goodwin et al 2001; McAdam et al 2001; Meyer et al 2002, della Porta and Diani 2006). Despite this, there are no known explicit definitions of the mobilization process today.

Here mobilization means the active pursuit of social change through directed collective action. As such, mobilization signifies a collective action process that, as McAdam et al claim, represents “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” (McAdam et al 1996, 6). We also find that collective action is usually sustained by and performed through organizations, which develop their own internal conditions and dynamics (see Gerhards and Rucht 1992; Kurzman 1998).

Meso-level mobilization is represented by entrepreneurs of activism, in this case the organized efforts of the MB core members, where the process of collective dissent coagulates into a loose structure. Dissenting collective action is a process that is apparently fueled by the emotional, moral, mental, and physical commitment of actors through which a specific interpretation of grievances is formed and later expressed.

Firstly, it is quite clear that social grievances are considered to be ubiquitous (Snow et al 2004b, 3-5) and not limited to a specific time and place. They are of various kinds and are found in all human societies. The collective expression of grievances is necessary for dissenting collective action to take place, it is not however sufficient to explain the mobilization process on any level. Secondly, a coordinator of the collective expression of grievances (mobilization) is also necessary for a sustained collective show of dissent to take place. The role of coordinator is usually fulfilled by a social movement organization (SMO), which is most commonly composed of individuals who share the same or similar grievances directed at the same source of complaint.

Organized and sustained mobilization therefore represents a point of symmetry where the supply of organized support for grievances meets the collective demand for change in a specific socio-political context (Klandermans 1988, 175-176; 2004, 374). An SMO, in other words, serves as a coordinator of the supply end of mobilization by constructing

64 frameworks, channels of communication, and venues of (collective dissent) expression.

The demand is, essentially, the shared assertion for social change, which is often visible as the observable public discontent of mental obstacles. For instance, the revolutionary events preceding the Tahrir sit-in, on January 25-26 in Cairo, demonstrated the process of overcoming this mental obstacle (i.e. fear) en masse. The convergence of the supply of protest instruments and the demand for social change is what can be called mobilization.

Moreover, an SMO as defined earlier is considered to represent the nexus of demand for social change and the pre-existing, but also continuously generated, supply of (collective) grievances. As such, SMOs can be seen as mobilization scavengers feeding on popular discontent and grievances in a constant struggle to achieve social change. In other words,

“grievances and discontent may be defined, created, and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations” (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1215). If one adopts the idea that social movement organizations are essentially “manipulative,” one misses out on a comprehensive understanding of mobilization. It is rather a discouraging notion. Social actors, such as those included in this study, are far more resourceful and critical observers of social events and participants of “social reality” than what McCarthy and Zald would have us believe.

Mobilization can also be interpreted as a procedural nexus of the supply of organizational tools (SMOs resources) preceded by the expressed collective demand for social or political change. The nexus is represented by a reciprocal correlation between inter-personal relations on the one side, and dissidents’ strategic choices vis-à-vis opponent(s), on the other. Furthermore, the reciprocal interaction between the dissenting group and most commonly the state regime is irregular and continuously demands strategic adjustments.

The procedural character of mobilization is not static and clear-cut. Fluidity, complexity, and transiency of collective behavior are sometimes reflected in the reciprocity of social actions (Klandermans 2004, 374).

Reciprocity means the relation between those demanding social change and those who this demand is directed towards. Moreover, reciprocity is manifested in another feature of the SMO’s function as a mobilization entrepreneur, namely an SMO is as much a product of the mobilization process as it is its long-term facilitator. For example, the translation of collective dissent into a culturally familiar discourse with all the symbolism and

65 references this entails is usually constructed within an SMO. Schematic and ideologically loaded discourse serves as a mobilizing tool to systematize popular grievances and propose attractive solutions (Klandermans 1984, 585; Klandermans and Oegema 1987, 519).

It is also possible to argue that the nonviolent Islamist movement in Egypt and the wider MENA region can most effectively be described as a set of networks, which hold common beliefs and are based on interpersonal solidarity through which social actors sustainably interact with power holders and other opponents challenging their efforts (see SM definitions in della Porta and Diani 1999: 16; Tilly 1984, 304; 2008, 151). An SMO, such as the MB, is by default an operational part of a social movement and as such belongs to the meso-level of the investigation. Here, an SMO is “a complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals” (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1218). Moreover, an SMO is a collective action unit active in converting social actors into believing their interpretation of the situation (Klandermans 1988, 179-180).

The mobilization process of the MB has shown that the continuous negotiation and discussion between activists within an SMO creates a diffusion of innovative ideas both on the ideological and operational levels. This has been case throughout the history of Islamism in Egypt. Different groups have both exchanged members and with them ideas on strategies and tactics (see chapter 4; also della Porta and Tarrow [2012] for other examples of similar mechanisms of diffusion). However, sometimes, at the extreme ends of discussion, the rigidity of the forms of discussion and negotiation can create antagonism between the different sub-groups of an SMO. If the SMO’s internal structure and procedure cannot absorb various differences, including doctrinal and operational divergence, internal negotiations could potentially result in the fragmentation of the organization and pushing the Islamist mobilization spectrum even wider. This has, in turn, caused significant friction within the SMO demonstrating the leadership’s inconsistency and perhaps inability to bridge the multiple demands of the grassroots activists. Shortly after the January 25^th revolution the MB experienced the first signs of serious division within the organization (El-Houdaiby 2011).

66 The MB’s activism, already from its first days in 1928, followed the pattern of a social movement representing a process of collective opposition to a specific form of political order. The MB has formed out of (in)formal protest networks with shared ideological beliefs that were involved in a contentios interaction with the authorities, thus challenging the status quo (see Mitchell 1969; Brynjar 1998). The organization organized (public) displays of discontent, protests and demonstrations, facilitated religious sermons, and public lectures and, not least, official political party(ies) (Doran 1999).

If we apply Weber’s definition of politics, we can define all of these activities as political acts, as they are directed towards holders of state power. These and other types of social activism are indicators that some people strive for (political) power, or influence over its distribution (Gerth and Mills (1946, 77). The Muslim Brotherhood is both a complex and formal organization with explicit mobilization goals, often shared with other Islamist organizations. It is an organization with a compartmentalized internal structure, which supported sustained regime dissent over an extensive period of time.

The MB’s internal web of communication on a local level is based primarily on relatively confined relations between activists through friendship networks made up of neighbors, neighborhood mosque visitors, sporting partners, relatives etc.). On a more formal, association level, other forms of affiliation can be found. Here, organizational networks made up of student campus associations and workers’ syndicates become functional as facilitators of collective dissent based on ideological conviction and lifestyle association (e.g. class/professional affiliation). Work-place connections are immensely important, especially for individuals who migrate from rural to urban settings. This study demonstrates in the empirical chapters (chapters 5 and 6) that similar experiences with the state authorities are found within friendship and organizational networks. Members share comparable social backgrounds, and analogous religious understandings which synergize into similar interpretations of perceived grievances and social ills.

Through processes of communication and inter-personal relations within organizational settings, activists usually develop a sense of solidarity and like-mindedness, constructed around common definitions of contentious issues and their solutions. This inter-personal familiarity in turn increases emotional bonding that can be described as “the glue of solidarity” (Collins 1990, 28). Several arguments can be made here, firstly it is through

67 these processes of solidarity that the construction of a group-specific image of an adversary (e.g. state regime) takes shape, and, secondly, it is through this process that activists are able to negotiate mobilization strategies. The strategizing part of an SMO is complex, however its aims are rather simple (Klandermans 1984, 585-587). An SMO continuously seeks to increase its support base as a means to achieve desired changes.

Individual activists compose the building-blocks of the mobilization process and, as is shown in this study, they are the essential part of our understanding of social activism.

Activism is not the mere voicing of (socio-political) dissent but is understood to be a way of life. Islamist activism can be considered as such, mainly because it tightly knits general beliefs and religious faith with socio-political claims into everyday practices with the commitment to produce change. “[P]olitical activism is first and foremost a matter of lifestyle, the expression of deeply felt cultural and political orientations rather than adhesion to any specific political project and the organizations that could support it”

(della Porta and Diani 2006, 132).

Activists, in this case, are central to understanding the motivations behind social mobilization. Social actors must be able to acknowledge the existence of a particular grievance, which (s)he feels strongly about in order to move this individual to participate in dissenting behavior. As previously argued, for social actors to participate, they ought to recognize a particular mode and goal of mobilization as compatible with their moral values and principles (Klandermans 1984, 590).

This consideration of morals and values is not automatically in conflict with what we call rationality. On the contrary, previous research and theorization has demonstrated that there exists a strong element of rationality in collective behavior (see Tilly 1978; 2008;

McAdam 1982). This supposed rationality in the form of the actors’ consideration of instrumentality in collective action is intrinsically connected with emotional stimuli, moral judgments and personal ambitions (see Goodwin et al 2000; Klandermans et al 2002;

Polletta 2006). An SMO represents a dynamic social environment where individual activists’ commitment, lifestyles, and personalities are re-shaped and articulated (chapter 7).

68 The above mentioned arguments about the importance of SMOs in sustaining mobilization, their central role in merging the supply and demand side of protest and exploiting grievances are also supported by earlier scholarly works. Such works have usually argued that the more structured an organization is, the more likely it is to survive occasional “waves of protests” (della Porta and Diani 2006, 145). Moreover, structured SMOs can more capably mobilize resources through sustained efforts and long-term training and planning than those groups that are less structured (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Gamson 1991). This consideration is even more important when discussing mobilization in authoritarian states.