FASE IV ELABORACIÓN DE LOS PLANES DE FORMACIÓN

The Dialectic terminates in two short concluding sections: On the Regulative Use of the Ideas of Pure Reason and On the Final Aim of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason. After so much of the Dialectic has focused on showing that God, the soul, and the world-as-a-whole can never be objects of knowledge, these two sections explain the positive results of the Dialectic.

The penultimate section of the Dialectic emphasizes, once again, that the ideas of reason are necessary for the scientific use of the understanding. But Kant here distinguishes between ac- cepting the ideas of reason as mere logical principles and accepting them as transcendental princi- ples. Since we have seen that the latter amounts to making a claim about the relation across the

81 _{Kant says that “maxims of reason” are all subjective regulative principles of reason that drive rea-}

son in its speculative interests toward “possible perfection of the cognition of objects” (A666/B694).

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boundary of pure reason and thereby asserting faith, it is particularly striking that Kant writes the following:

In fact it cannot even be seen how there could be a logical principle of rational unity among rules unless a transcendental principle is presupposed, through which such a systematic uni- ty, as pertaining to the object itself, is assumed a priori as necessary (A651/B697).

Kant continues by writing that to deny the transcendental reality of the ideas would be to claim that reason operates “directly contrary to its vocation” since it would strive for the systematic cognition of empirical reality while denying that transcendental reality for us is actually systematic (A651/B697). Most striking, Kant ends this discussion by claiming that assenting to the transcen- dental reality of the ideas of pure reason is the lynchpin of his entire theory of human cognition. He claims that without such assent all three faculties—reason, the understanding, and sensibility— would crumble:

For the law of reason to seek unity is necessary, since without it we would have no reason, and without that, no coherent use of the understanding, and, lacking that, no sufficient mark of empirical truth; thus in regard to the latter we simply have to presuppose the systematic unity of nature as objectively valid and necessary. (A651/B679)

Whatever we make of the details of this claim, one point is unmistakable: Kant takes assent to the transcendental reality of the ideas of reason, including God, to be a fundamental piece of his entire critical position on human cognition.82

The final section of the Dialectic directly addresses the question of faith in God: “The ide- as of pure reason can never be dialectical in themselves; rather it is merely their misuse which brings it about that a deceptive illusion arises out of them” (A669/B679). Hence, the arduous Dia- lectical assault is not an attack on the ideas of God, immorality, or freedom, but only on a certain approach to those ideas—the approach that takes them to be objects of proper knowledge. While never attaining that level of knowledge, Kant repeatedly affirms the rational necessity of believing in God. Kant writes that due to the nature of reason, “I am not only warranted but even compelled to realize this idea” (A677/B705). He explains:

82 _{I take the precise claim here to be that faith is needed for rationally endorsing the correctness of}

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Hence now it happens if I assume a divine being, I do not have the least concept either of the inner possibility of such a highest perfection or the necessity of its existence; but then I can deal satisfactorily with all other questions concerning the contingent, and reason can ob- tain the most perfect satisfaction in regard to the greatest unity for which it is searching in its empirical use…this proves that it is in reason’s speculative interest…which justifies

starting from a point so far beyond its sphere in order to consider its objects in one com- plete whole. (A676/B704, emphasis mine)

In an attempt to clarify his position further, Kant engages himself in the following imagi- nary interview, in which he is asked specific questions about faith in God. I will use (Q) to refer to the questioner and (K) to refer to Kant.83

(Q) Is there anything different from the world which contains the ground of the world order and its connection according to universal laws?

(K) Without a doubt. The world, as appearance, must have a transcendental ground. (Q) Is this being a substance? A being of the greatest reality? A necessary being?

(K) This question has no significance at all. For all the categories are only legitimate for empirical use.

(Q) Can we nevertheless assume a unique wise and all-powerful world author? (K) Without any doubt; and not only that, but we must presuppose such a being. (Q) But then do we extend our cognition beyond the field of possible experience? (K) By no means. For we have only presupposed a Something which we have given just

those properties that could contain the ground for such a systematic unity in accord- ance with the conditions of our reason.

In sum, the Dialectic indicates the importance of faith in the first Critique. It does so both in terms of an explicit discussion of faith in God and by affirming the central importance of the ideas of rea- son for Kant’s general theory of human cognition.

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