I have mentioned that Sen’s arguments against resource-based metrics apply much more readily to Rawls’ primary goods than to Dworkin’s resourcist view. Dworkin takes this point further and argues that the capability view is either identical with the resource egalitarian view or with equality of opportunity for welfare. This is because resource egalitarianism allows people to value their personal as well as impersonal resources and it is these together that enable people to ‘do what they want.’266 Dworkin suggests that in order to avoid a collapse into equality of resources, Sen must insist upon a strong outcome-based position, comparing the outcomes people are able to achieve, which would then be equivalent to equal opportunity for welfare. However, there are reasons to think that they are different. Andrew Williams presents two areas
264 As I will discuss in the remaining chapters of this thesis. 265 Beyond the brief discussion above.
266
90 in which the two approaches appear to differ; social norms and the continuity test. I will discuss the first in this section and the second in section 2.9.
Williams presents the example of Ann and Bob, twins who are similar in every way except their gender. Both wish to have a family and a career, but it is harder for women to find a partner who is willing to share parental duties than it is for men. As such, Ann is worse-off in capability terms than Bob, despite their otherwise equal personal and impersonal resources.267 Capability theorists emphasise that social norms can affect the relationship between goods and functionings.268 A further example is the subservient role of women in many societies, which greatly reduces the relative capabilities of women compared to men. It may be considered that women have internalised these roles, or would face censure if they acted in certain ways that are acceptable for men, such that women would be more limited in their capabilities even if they had equal resources. Capability theorists can therefore argue that their approach is better able to take account of social norms that cause inequalities than equality of resources.269 I will discuss this issue fully at this point as I will argue that social norms neither undermine the case for equality of resources nor require consideration in later discussions of tax policy.
Dworkin’s immediate response to Andrew Williams’ example was to insist that this must rest upon a welfarist notion. This is because it refers to the preferences of the ‘community at large,’270 something which equality of resources generally takes as fixed factor around which people are held responsible. As such, Ann’s lesser capability is based upon the desires of others, and the only way to determine that her capabilities
267
Andrew Williams, 'Dworkin on Capability', Ethics, 113 (2002), 23-39 at 31.
268
Referred to as a social conversion factor in Robeyns, 'The Capability Approach: A Theoretical Survey', at 99.
269 As emphasised, for example, in Sen, The Idea of Justice at 90, 255, Anderson, 'Justifying the
Capabilities Approach to Justice', at 89-90, a summary of the issues here appears inRoland Pierik and Ingrid Robeyns, 'Resources Versus Capabilities: Social Endowments in Egalitarian Theory',
Political Studies, 55/1 (2007), 133-52 at 144-8.
270
91 are less valuable is to value them in a welfarist fashion. Dworkin makes the point that both have the same capabilities given the costs of their preferences to others; it is just that Ann’s preferences are more expensive given the preferences of men in her society. I am not convinced that this is an adequate response as it seems that Ann and Bob have the same desires and the interplay of their biological sex and social norms are all that makes a difference.271
It appears that the capability approach readily allows assessment of social norms while equality of resources appears to acquiesce in whatever social norms exist. So for example, according to the capability approach it is possible to say that the social norms in Afghanistan are unequal as men and women do not have an equal capability to go out in public. Since it focuses on legitimate applications of authority (i.e. government) rather than overall justice in society, it is not clear how equality of resources can make parallel claims. I will now consider whether this undermines a resource egalitarian approach to taxation.
What are the implications of this difference between capability and resourcist metrics? One claim against equality of resources might be that it is an inadequate theory of equality if it is unable to criticise social norms that are obviously unequal and damaging to those who suffer from them. However, this would be too quick. While Dworkin presents equality of resources on an island with no prior social prejudices with which to deal, and has not proposed practical responses to troubling social norms, he has
271
Dworkin’s claim is more powerful when we remember that the gender bias in this particular case does not only affect women; there may be men who would like to be a homemaker but who find it difficult to find a female partner who wishes to be a bread-winning ‘ideal-worker.’ As such it is not clear that the social norms can be considered to be unfair to one gender or another, and Dworkin assumes that such comparisons must be based on welfare differences.
One strong capability-based response could be to insist upon a requirement that all have an equal capability to have a particular form of domestic arrangement. However, such a proposal appears implausible and unattractive. There may be a difficulty in specifying this as a particular capability for comparison, and deciding how to weight this against other capabilities. The problematic nature of this example will recur in later sections, for now it is only worth noting that it is not necessary to consider social norms on a welfarist basis if not a resourcist one.
92 indicated that he thinks equality of resources can deal with such issues.272 Indeed, in order to take seriously people’s choices it is necessary for them to be sufficiently authentic,273 which might not to be the case where victims of damaging social norms have been forced to internalise the oppressive norms of their society. More specifically, Dworkin proposes a principle of independence, which insists that prejudice will interfere with market-based equality and is hence an issue to which to respond.274 Others have taken these few remarks on in order to develop a stronger response to the problem of social norms.275
Equality of resources may be able to respond to social norms, and hence the above argument, but it is not as powerful as the capability approach in this regard. In response to this, I would claim that equality of resources is sensitive enough to the issue of social norms, as it could be used to deal with the most serious problems of this type without straying into perfectionism. I mentioned above that equality of resources appears vulnerable to the issue of social norms because it focuses on the preferences that people have and the choices they accordingly make. However, it is not clear how the capability approach can avoid going too far in the opposite direction, for example if the state encourages the values that would maximise capabilities. The encouragement of these values would interfere too much in people’s view of the good life, overriding the assignment-responsibility people have to determine for themselves their good in life.
272
Dworkin writes that equality of resources presupposes a society free from ‘unjust patterns of discrimination.’ In the case of Ann, there would be a requirement to provide ‘remedial measures, including special child-care support for women at work.’ Dworkin, 'Sovereign Virtue Revisited', at 137.
273
Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue at 159-60.
274 Ibid. at 162. 275
Browne and Stears, 'Capabilities, Resources, and Systematic Injustice: A Case of Gender Inequality', Roland Pierik, 'Reparations for Luck Egalitarians', Journal of Social Philosophy, 37/3 (2006), 423-40, Rasmus Hansen, 'Equality of Resources and the Problem of Recognition', Res Publica,
93 Kamm expresses this concern as being that the capability approach struggles to distinguish capability inequalities that are problematic from the perspective of justice from those which are not.276 An example given by Browne and Stears is that of Amanda and Brian.277 The society in this example has gender differences regarding whether people are talkers, listeners, or conversationalists.278 The ratios of each are not even such that women are more likely to be conversationalists and men are more likely to be talkers. Browne and Stears consider the impact of this on the marriage market, where a woman will find it much harder to find a partner who is a conversationalist than a man. However, I do not think this an injustice that needs to be rectified.
Taking this further, I would question the role that the state should play in adjusting the behaviour of its citizens.279 This seems to have the potential to stray perilously close to government interference in the development of conceptions of the good. Of course, no one develops their theory of the good in a vacuum, and their surrounding society will be very important in developing such a theory. Indeed, people often try to influence others in their choice of what is good in life, and perhaps the capability approach is useful to us as private citizens in our deliberations about the effects and desirableness of the theories of the good in society.280 However, the capability approach does not seem to be able to specify a line whereby interventions in the name of equalising capabilities are unwelcome and unnecessary interferences with people’s autonomy. Equality of resources suffers from the same problem but from the other direction; it is
276
One important—but missing—requirement is that the approach should explain how to account for injustices that exist to compensate for larger injustices, F. M. Kamm, 'Sen on Justice and Rights: A Review Essay', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 39/1 (2011), 82-104 at 85-6. More relevant to my point, is the question of whether proposed improvements are really improvements in justice at all; Kamm, 'Sen on Justice and Rights: A Review Essay', at 86-90.
277
Browne and Stears, 'Capabilities, Resources, and Systematic Injustice: A Case of Gender Inequality', at 361.
278
Conversationalists like to talk and listen in turn, sharing their thoughts and feelings as part of interaction with another. In contrast, talkers are happy to talk but not so keen on conversing and listening, while listeners are happy to listen but less keen on contributing to discussion.
279 Sen, The Idea of Justice at 268.
280 No doubt development charities and influential individuals and organisations would do well to
94 difficult to determine genuine preferences from those that are determined by unacceptable social relations. Drawing these lines is a big problem for both approaches.
Fortunately, it is not necessary to consider social norms further in this work. To the extent that it is the place of the state to interfere in social norms, it is not clear what impact this would have on redistributive taxation. One possibility would be that those who suffer from discriminatory social norms should be given special tax-breaks as a result. Alternatively, “sin” taxes could perhaps be imposed on products related to problematic social norms. The advantage of this approach over direct payments or advertising is an empirical matter relating to government administration.281 However, even if taxation was the best available response, such policies would be ad hoc and personalised or issue-specific. Therefore, they would not impact on the tax system options I will discuss in later chapters. At this point it is possible to conclude that the issue of social norms does not undermine the case for equality of resources, and that social norms do not have any general implications for the tax system. Having dealt with this diversion, it is now possible to return to the question of the ways in which capabilities are distinct from resources.