FASES DEL EJERCICIO INVESTIGATIVO

For the purpose of analysing internal power struggles following 1999, the complexity of Timor Leste’s internal social groups is simplified here into two broad historical categories: a) mestiços, the urban-based elite that descended from indigenous inter- mixing with Portuguese settlers and nationals from other Portuguese colonies; and b) the indigenous population, whose social organisation is based around different kinship networks and ethno-linguistic groupings that correspond roughly to Timor’s traditional kingdoms.396

As a group, mestiços were heavily influenced by Portuguese assimilation policies and as a result saw themselves in a higher social position than the indigenous population.397 The political affiliations of the mestiço class in 1975 varied. Some supported FRETILIN, while the more politically conservative who felt a greater cultural affinity to Portugal had

396 _{The mestiço class expanded to include members of the indigenous population incorporated through}

marital alliances with the Portuguese, with assimilados and service in the colonial administration. The majority of the newly recruited supported ASDT and later FRETILIN and they proved a major factor that allowed FRETILIN to make significant inroads at village-level so as to become the most broadly based popular political party in 1975. However, Xavier do Amaral still contends that within FRETILIN there remained latent discrimination between “historical” mestiços and those more recently recruited to the elite class from the indigenous population, Xavier do Amaral, President of ASDT, interview, Díli, 8 January 2004.

historically supported UDT. Members from the urban-based elite who supported political parties such as APODETI, KOTA, or Trabalhista were limited to a handful of individuals. There was also a small Hakka Chinese community of about 18,000, almost two percent of the pre-invasion population that lived somewhat isolated from the broader indigenous population.398

Rural society, where 80 percent of the population lived, remained strongly class-based and hierarchical upon UNTAET’s arrival. Villagers today commonly refer to these class- based divisions as ema bot no ema Ki’iik- big people and small people. Big people are generally those of higher social standing either inside the village (e.g. chefes), powerful local leaders from the clandestine period that are now influential in government and society, or those that have returned from the diaspora. Social structures were organised around hereditary belief systems and family alliance networks built around common sacred houses (uma luliks). By 1999, it was estimated that lingua franca Tetum was understood or spoken by 91 percent of the population, whereas only 27 percent between the ages of 35 and 50, 11 percent under the age of 25, and 6 percent of those without any formal education, could understand or speak Portuguese.399 The roles and expectations placed upon women varied depending on their socio-economic background and cultural positioning.400 For example, women from modern urban society were not bound by the same social expectations as women from rural villages.

Post-1999 Political Transformations. Father Julió Crispim Ximenes Belo from Baucau gives a succinct description of the simplicity of political divisions inside the country before UNTAET’s arrival: “pro-autonomy and pro-independence only: everyone in the villages, at least east of Manatutu, supported FRETILIN”.401 Pro-autonomy supporters

398 _{Thatcher (1990), p. 3.}

399 _{Asia Foundation, East Timor National Survey of Voter Knowledge- Preliminary Findings (Díli, March}

2001), p. 6.

400

For further reading see Patsy Thatcher, ‘The Role of Women in East Timorese Society’ (Unpublished M.A Dissertation, Department of Anthropology, Monash University, 1988).

and Indonesian civilians still in Timor Leste exited the country en masse following the announcement of ballot outcomes and subsequent militia violence.402 For the most part, this exodus left a vacuum at “elite” levels in the private economic sector and the public administration: a vacuum formerly occupied by Indonesians or pro-autonomy supporters.

In their study on countries undergoing transition from authoritarianism to democracy, O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead demonstrate that societies undergoing political transition will typically experience widespread uncertainty about the outcome of the process and the process itself because of “insufficient structure or behavioural parameters to guide and predict the outcome”.403 The rules of the political game are unclear as often are the identity and motives of key actors in the transition process. Timor Leste confronted this type of uncertainty following UNTAET’s arrival.

By December 1999, an unspecified number Timorese that fled returned to Timor Leste through refugee repatriation efforts or “spontaneous” cross-border return. Combined with pro-independence supporters, there were some 14,000 Timorese with public service experience in the Indonesian administration who were unemployed. All of these would begin to compete for new economic opportunities made available by the Indonesian withdrawal, for work in the NGO sector, with UNTAET, or with the Timorese public administration as it evolved. Timorese returning from the diaspora added a further level of complexity to the social transformations taking place and the ensuing competition to fill elite government and economic positions.404

401

Father Julió Crispim Ximenes Belo interview, Baucau, 5 November 2003. One obvious reason for the pattern of support at village-level was because the Timorese did not form alternative political parties until 2001.

402

CEP District Staff Focus Group Discussion, 6 Staff Participants, Facilitated by Author, Baucau, September 2001.

403 _{See O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), pp. 3-38} 404

See, World Bank, ADB, UNDP, ETTA, ‘Poverty Assessment Timor Loro Sa’e, East Timor in Charts- Initial Results from the Suco Survey’ (Díli: Internal Working Draft, 16 June 2001), pp. 48-53.

The diaspora community, many being descendants of the historical mestiço class, often brought nostalgic visions of the territory which corresponded to the social and political hierarchies that existed prior to the invasion of 1975. Moreover, those from the African- diaspora were highly mistrustful of indigenous Timorese whose “independence credentials” had been tainted by their involvement with the occupying Indonesian administration. Tensions between the indigenous population and different segments of the broader diaspora community were framed around political affiliations at the formation of the CNRT in 1998. It was often the case that conservative-minded diaspora members of the CNRT looked down upon indigenous Timorese, believing it was their “rightful position to rule” an independent Timor Leste.405 To varying degrees, this view manifested itself across the CNRT’s disapora community irrespective of political outlook. At the same time, twenty-four years overseas meant that the diaspora community had little understanding of the social and political realities inside the territory, with some expressing feelings of being “foreigners in their own land”.406

Indigenous views of the diaspora community varied depending on political alliance networks and generational divisions. Those aligned with FRETILIN’s fringe groupings commonly accused the diaspora of “returning as colonisers seeking incorporation with Portugal”.407 Similarly, Timorese youth had little exposure to Portuguese language or cultural influence. Youth political awareness generated by exposure to pancasila, Indonesia’s glorification of its own decolonisation process against the Dutch, and modernist streams of development thinking, combined with FRETILIN’s historical promises of liberation and egalitarianism to create expectations among them that colonial and traditional hierarchies would be a thing of the past in a liberated Timor Leste.408 This

405

Informant Number 12 (Timorese Diaspora).

406 _{Informant Number 6 (Timorese Diaspora Community).} 407

Aitahan Matak, interview, Díli, 19 January 2004.

408 _{Joaquim Fonseca interview, Díli, February 2004; Nelson Belo interview, Baucau, 29 September 2001;}

Cesar Quintas interview, Díli, 2 November 2001; Josh Trinidade interview, Díli, 3 November 2001. George Aditjondro argues that the youth, rather than ascribing to a neo-liberal economic development frameworks, accepted the original 1975 strategy of FRETILIN which was more socialist, agrarian, and stressed self-reliance, see Aditjondro (2001). This certainly appears to be the case with youth members in

does not mean there were simple dualisms between young and old, or indigenous culture and diaspora cultures.409 Youth involved in the clandestine front were themselves divided along lines that corresponded to political cleavages within CNRT.410 Diagram 2 and Diagram 3 below outline the class structure and social divisions that began to take root following UNTAET’s arrival in 1999.

various NGOs, those aligned with PST, or those exposed to alternative development approaches through higher education. At the same time, students were exposed to modernist development principles during the Indonesian era, which should introduce caution about what youth, as a whole, actually believe.

409 _{On flows of the Timorese diaspora following 1975 see Patsy Thatcher, Submission Made to the Foreign}

Affairs Sub-Committee in Melbourne 4/2/1992. (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, Joint Committee

on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 4 February 1992), pp. 101-114; Patsy Thatcher, Profile of East

Timorese Chinese Community Resident in Australia 1986-1990 (Melbourne: North Richmond Family Care

Centre, 1990), p. 4. On different influences upon Timorese diaspora communities see Grayson J. Lloyd, ‘The Diplomacy on East Timor: Indonesia, the United Nations, and the International Community’, in J. Fox and D. Babo-Soares (eds.), Out of the Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction of East Timor (Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, 2000); FW De Klerk, The Last Trek. A New Beginning, The Autobiography (London: MacMillan, 1998), pp. 117, 263; Renato Aguilar, Angola’s Incomplete Transition (Sweden: Gothenburg University, 2001); Peter Hawthorne, ‘Endless Wars’, Time, no. 36, (6 September 1999), pp. 37-39; Simon Robinson, ‘Africa’, Time, no. 36, (6 September 1999), pp. 40-41; ‘Hopeless Africa’,

Economist, vol. 355, no. 8170 (May 2000), p. 15; Carol Lancaster, Aid to Africa: So Much to Do, So Little Done (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999); and Adrian Guelke, ‘South Africa’s Transition:

Lessons for East Timor?”, in P. Hainsworth and S. McCloskey (eds.), The East Timor Question: The

Struggle for Independence from Indonesia (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2000), p. 191. On differing

views of returning Timorese diaspora members see Amanda Wise, ‘No Longer in Exile?: Shifting Experiences of Homeland and Identity for the East Timorese Refugee Diaspora in Australia in Light of East Timor’s Independence’ (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, n/a, University of Western Sydney, 2002), p. 221.

410 _{On divisions among Timorese student groups see Constancio Pinto, ‘The Student Movement and the}

Independence Struggle in East Timor: An Interview’, in R. Tanter et al (eds.), Bitter Flowers Sweet

Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia, and the World Community (Sydney: Pluto Press, 2001), p. 31; Nunu

Santos, ‘The Story Behind the Díli Massacre’, Inside Indonesia, no. 44 (September 1995), p. 14; Jacinto Dos Santos, ‘Post-Portuguese Colonial Education: Its Relevance to the East Timorese Resistance Movement’, in It’s Time to Lead the Way: Timorese People Speak About Exile, Resistance, and Identity (Collingwood, Victoria: East Timor Relief Association, 1996), p. 70; and Fernando de Araújo, ‘The CNRT

Diagram 2 – Class Structure, 2000

Campaign for Independence’, in J. Fox and D. Babo-Soares (eds.), Out of the Ashes: Destruction and

Reconstruction of East Timor (Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, 2000), pp, 112-113.

- Liurais - Chefes - Spiritual leaders (Hereditary elites) Modern Society Elites Indigenous Society

-Various ethno-linguistic groups and fragmented hereditary kingdoms - Primarily subsistence agricultural livelihoods

Traditional Society Middle Class Lower Classes - Ex-Militia - Disaffected fighters - Farmers

Respected resistance leaders/religious leaders/ Diaspora Timorese/ Mestiços/ Foreign traders

Indonesian educated students/ Chinese merchants/Former Indonesian bureaucrats/ Workers/ Timorese NGO workers

Indonesian educated students/ Chinese merchants/Former Indonesian bureaucrats/ Workers/ Timorese NGO workers

Diagram 3 – Timorese Divisions, December 1999

Youth Frustration. Following 1999, many politically active Timorese youth came to feel excluded by what they believed were older generation attempts to dominate CNRT. This was most visible through the use of Portuguese language, rather than its introduction as a national language alongside Tetum.411 Young Timorese recognised the importance of ensuring a separate national identity from Indonesia and the role of language to achieve that objective. Youth anger related to feelings of exclusion from decision-

411

Focus Group Discussion, Melbourne University, Hawthorn Campus, 13 East Timorese Student Participants, Discussion Facilitated by Author and Mike O’Halloran Observed by Professor John Dalton Melbourne, 28 June 2001.

Administrative and Authority Vacuum, New Political and

economic contestation Foreign Business Interests International Solidarity Groups Diaspora - Australian based groups: conservative Timorese, young CNRT members, Hakka Chinese. - Portuguese speaking

mestiço elites

- African based diaspora groups - FRETILIN radical groups - Withdrawing Indonesian state apparatus - Indonesian business - Indonesian social elite - Pro-Indonesian Timorese groups

- Pro-Indonesian hereditary leaders

UNTAET

Filling void left by Indonesian withdrawal Timorese Students -Indonesian educated - Pro-Xanana/CNRT -FRETILIN fringe student groups -FRETILIN moderate student groups -Indigenous - Clandestine resistance groups Pro-FRETILIN Pro-Xanana/ conservative CNRT Hereditary leaders/ Chefes

-Fragmented local level political systems FALINTIL - Xanana Loyalists - FRETILIN aligned - 1st generation fighters - 2nd generation fighters - Clandestine networks - Mestiços - Indigenous

making and policy-making within CNRT.412 It was common to hear stories about how members of the internal clandestine front sat through CNRT meetings throughout 2000 while older leaders from the diaspora, from FALINTIL, or civilian leaders from within the country, spoke to one another in Portuguese, thus leaving the non-Portuguese speakers without any understanding of the issues under discussion. George Aditjondro notes that,

[T]he young Timorese who fought for independence in East Timor and in Indonesia; they soon became simply spectators; they were also shocked to see how the leaders they supported and glorified like Xanana and José Ramos-Horta very quickly started to form inner circles in which East Timorese from exile and from the diaspora including young Timorese who grew up in Australia or Portugal, became their most loyal staffers.413

Instead of seeking to understand the social changes that took place since 1975 or the educational gains made inside the country, diaspora Timorese often viewed the indigenous population as “lazy” or tainted by the corruption of Indonesian administrative practice.414 Such views were reinforced by donor documents, such as those produced by JAM, which talked in terms of corruption, low skill levels, and poor decision-making capacities when referring to Timorese who had worked in the Indonesian administration. These negative views contributed to the sidelining of Timorese youth under the age of 24 from early employment opportunities and gave rise to a sense of “unfulfilled entitlement”.415 It also worked against the “complete acceptance” among local Timorese of those returning from the diaspora.416 Instead, diaspora Timorese were seen as arrogant, acting like “heroes of the resistance”, and failing to recognise the contributions of the student movement or indigenous Timorese to the success of the liberation struggle.417

412

Sérgio Vieira de Mello interview, Díli, 11 November 2001.

413 _{George Aditjondro, ‘East Timorese Becoming Guests in Their Own Land’, Jakarta Post, February 2001.} 414

Joaquim Martins interview, Díli, 23 October 2001; Cesar Quintas interview, Díli, 2 November 2001.

415 _{National Democratic Institute, ‘Timor Loro Sa’e Is Our Nation’- A Report on Focus Group Discussions}

in East Timor (Díli: March 2001), Introduction.

416

Contributing to these tensions was a certain level of “social envy” among the indigenous population over the somewhat better lives diaspora Timorese had during the years of resistance, better educational opportunities, better employment opportunities, and higher levels of wealth they brought back to the country. These factors placed members of the diaspora community in much better positions to secure the best jobs in Timor Leste post- 1999.418 Moreover, there was a significant level of apprehension that the old colonial elite would seek to displace segments of the indigenous population from agricultural lands they had occupied for two decades in districts such as Ermera where, for example, there were once large coffee plantation owned by one of Timor’s most powerful families, the Carrascalão’s.419