Fauna – Especies de valor especial.

67 Reuter, Kuala Lumpur, August 25, 1992. 68 MC, April 27, 1993, pi.

6 9 For China’s efforts at naval modernisation in recent years, see, for example, Tai Ming Cheung, “Fangs of the dragon”, FEER . August 13, 1992, p20.

exploitation to the exclusion of China. Even if it has been apparently energetic in advocating the policy of conducting joint exploitation and shelving the sovereignty dispute, China has not stopped occupying islands and reefs across the Spratlys. Hence a conspicuous contradiction in China’s behaviour emerges in the eyes of regional countries. For example, in June 1992 China landed troops on the Vietnamese-claimed Da Lac reef and set up a sovereignty post there, but at the 25th AMM in July Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen repeated the offer to shelve the sovereignty dispute.7 0

After clashing with Vietnamese troops in March 1988 near Sinh Cow Island, Chinese naval forces occupied eight reefs and islands and by early 1990 held seven of them.71 By August 1992, China was believed to have occupied nine islands and reefs. 7 2 To demonstrate its effective control of the islands, China has built small concrete fortresses on them. In late July 1988, China's permanent base on Yongshu Jiao Reef was completed, thereby significantly strengthening its military capability in the Spratlys. The base includes an oceanographic observation station, a helipad and a 300- metre pier capable of handling 4,000-tonne ships. Direct postal and telecom m unication links with the mainland have been

70 Nayan Chanda, "Treacherous shoals", p i5.

71 Mark Valencia, "Solving the Spratlys", Pacific Research. May 1990, plO.

See also Nayan Chanda, "Security Issues and Potential Conflict in Indochina: a Perspective for the Nineties", in Tai Ming Cheung, ed., Changing Patterns of

East Asian Security (Centre for Asian Pacific Studies, Lingnan College,

December 1991), p94.

e s ta b lis h e d .7 3 To enhance the legitimacy of China’s newly established sphere of influence in the Spratlys, Beijing has dispatched government delegations to visit the islands and reefs it has occupied and erect sovereignty markers there.

The regional countries have produced some formulas aimed at preventing escalation of conflict in the South China Sea by creating transparence concerning troop exercises and movements so that eventually a zone of demilitarisation would be established around the Spratlys.7 4 For the regional countries, such frameworks with China’s full engagement could deter China from activities that could threaten the security of the region. However, given its mind-set regarding the Spratly dispute, China may well believe that the regional claimant countries’ enthusiasm for Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) in the South China Sea is due to their awareness that they are already winners in the status quo, and be reluctant to have its hands tied by CSBM.

China has stepped up its scientific investigation of the Spratlys in order to assist the exploitation of resources and for various military purposes. As already indicated, one of the priority projects of the Seventh Five-Year Plan was a comprehensive scientific survey of

7 3 Chang Pao-min, "A New Scramble for the South China Sea Islands", C S A .

Vol. 12, No. 1, June 1990, p27. See also Wang Jingsheng, “Nansha Yongshu

Jiao haiyan guancezhan (Yongshu Jiao Reef oceanographic observation

station in the Spratlys)”, Zhongguo Jianshe (China Construction), January,

1989, pp46-47.

7 4 See, for example, Mark Valencia, “The regional imperative”, F E E R . 13

August 1992, p20; and Muthiah Alagappa, "Confidence-and Security-building in South-East Asia (working group II)”, Disarmament: Topical Papers 6. 1991, ppl 59-160.

the Spratly archipelago and surrounding waters. The project, led by the prestigious Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), was strengthened in the process of considering the new situation surrounding the Spratlys. By the end of 1990, more than forty top- level institutions and three hundred scientists had participated in the project.7 5 The period from late April to early June 1989 saw the climax of the project. During that period, CAS launched a large- scale, 35-day intensive scientific survey of the entire northeastern section of the Spratlys, clearly with a view to perfecting its knowledge of the geological and navigational conditions of the a rc h ip e la g o .76 in May 1992 the China National Off-shore Oil Corporation signed an agreement with the US-based Crestone Energy Corporation, allowing that company to explore for oil in 9,700 square miles in the Vanguard Bank area of the western Spratlys. This was China’s first concession to a foreign company in the Spratlys. While negotiating, the Chinese leaders assured Crestone’s Chairman that China was prepared to use all necessary military force to protect the company’s operations.77

7 5 R R. December 29, 1991, p4. For China's intensified scientific research on

the South China Sea in general, see Zhou Renlin, "Zhongguo Kexueyuan

Nanhai Haiyang Yanjiusuo dui Nanhai de kexue yanjiu (scientific research on the South China Sea conducted by the South China Sea Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Science)", paper presented at the conference

"Yataiqu haiyang jingji hezuo: nan Zhongguo hai de xianzhuang yu

zhangwang (maritime economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: current

situation and future of the South China Sea)", organised by Lingnan College, Hong Kong, May 26-30, 1991, passim.

7^ Chang Pao-min, op.cit., p36.

7 7 John W. Garver, “China’s Push Through the South China Sea: the

Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests”, C O . December 1992,

China has expressed its willingness to cooperate with Taiwan on the Spratly dispute. Beijing and Taipei once condemned each other for selling out national sovereignty to foreign powers. China possibly hopes that its assertive Spratly policy in recent years would also help its nationalism contest with Taipei, which has become increasingly popular both in the international community and among mainland Chinese since 1987 because of its economic success, political liberalisation, and the June 4 crack-down in Beijing, thus creating a serious challenge to the legitimacy of the communist government. As early as the 1970s the dispute had become an issue that China attempted to exploit to appeal for unity with Taiwan on a nationalist theme. Thus from time to time, the mutuality of interests between the two rival Chinese governments over the islands had been stressed in China's statements and documents.78 Chinese leaders also gave credit to Taiwan’s sustained military occupation of Taiping Island, the largest island in the S p r a t l y s . 7 9 However, since 1989-90 Beijing has called for coordination with Taipei on the Spratly issue in its own right rather than exploiting the issue to push the process of the reunification of the motherland.

China appeals to Taiwan by stressing that both sides of the Taiwan Strait are "Yanhuangzisun (descendants of Emperor Yan and Emperor Huang)", hence having common interests in issues relating to Chinese territorial integrity. As a Chinese delegate stressed to Taiwanese representatives in a Hong Kong conference on the South China Sea in mid-1991, "being Yanhuangzisun, we should regard it