7. CONCLUSIONS
7.4. E FECTE DE LA REALITAT VIRTUAL IMMERSIVA (RVI) SOBRE L ’ EMPATIA MESURAT AMB L ’IRI
Discrediting policy initiative by contesting problem framing and solution.
Industry actors attempted to limit spillover of a risk governance crisis from the U.S. to Europe by contesting the EU Commission’s claim that Macondo could also happen in the EU because of the presence of similar deepwater conditions in the EU. Instead, they aimed to invoke an alternative problem framing:
“most of these calls for drilling moratoriums tend to focus on deepwater areas. In truth, the depth of water is not the critical element here. Rather, what is critical are the practices and procedures employed to drill the well and to regulate those who are doing that drilling. In this regard, policy and practice in the UK are substantially different to those employed in the US Gulf of Mexico.” (Press release UK Task Force, 7 September 2010).
Industry actors, led by the industry associations, aimed to shift the focus from deepwater as the “critical” risk factor to the risk governance regime in place, effectively saying that if the regime is effective, water depth doesn’t matter. Furthermore, they framed the approach to risk governance between the US and the North Sea as being “substantially different” – the US regime being inferior. This allowed the North Sea constituents to discredit the US regime and distance themselves from it. This strategy aimed to limit generalizability on the basis of shared characteristics between the US and North Sea risk regimes, thereby limiting spillover. In turn, this enabled them to frame the moratorium as irrational; a “wholly
unjustifiable, knee-jerk reaction (UK Task Force press release, 14 July 2010). Hence, by
invoking an alternative problem framing, the tripartite actors could discredit the US risk regime, as well as the rationale behind the EC’s proposal for a moratorium.
Self-idealization by demonstrating effectiveness of risk regime.
The alternative problem framing enabled the tripartite actors to promote and justify the risk governance regime in the North Sea region. For instance, the UK industry association:
“refuted that there should be a moratorium on deep-sea drilling in UK coastal waters […] Our dynamic [regulatory] regime has served us well over twenty years of operations during which time a blowout has not been experienced.” (Press release UK Task Force, 13 August
2010). This quote shows how the tripartite actors highlighted the positive safety record in the North Sea and presented the risk governance regime as the primary reason for it. In particular, industry actors and regulators attributed the robustness of their regime to changes that they implemented in the wake of a different offshore disaster that occurred in the North Sea in the past:
“We had our own sort of Macondo moment nearly 25 years ago, Piper Alpha, in which 167 people died. So this whole topic is sort of deep within the psyche. We did a hell of a lot of moving, changing and shaping following Piper Alpha leading to our legislative regime for offshore safety.” (Speech UK Regulator).
By discursively reenacting the Piper Alpha disaster and the lessons that were learned then, the tripartite actors contested the EU Commission’s position that a radical intervention was required following the Macondo disaster. This shows how the coalition discursively construed similarities between the Piper Alpha and Macondo disasters, despite the fact that these had different causes and consequences. Furthermore, they contested the similarity that the Commission established between the US and Europe in the wake of Macondo. By discursively creating resemblance between the disasters, they could appeal
to improvements implemented following the Piper Alpha disaster, thereby rejecting the need for radical intervention following Macondo: “there were no serious shortcomings [in
the regime], but there were possibilities for recommendations for continuous improvement”
(Interview Dutch regulator). This quote shows the coalition’s approach to learning from Macondo. In contrast to the EU Commission’s proposal for radical intervention, the tripartite group aimed for “continuous improvement” of the established regime. We found that the notion of continuous improvement has been a central principle in the risk governance discourse in the North Sea risk region since the Piper Alpha disaster (Patterson, 2014), which suggests that learning should occur by upgrading established practices. This creates an image of continuous upgrading towards ever-higher levels of safety. A moratorium conflicts with this image, as it indicates doubt in the established risk governance practices and industry’s ability to manage offshore risks.
Despite arguments that the risk regime was already robust, industry actors demonstrated that they took the Macondo disaster seriously. Our data shows that the tripartite actors anticipated that the Macondo disaster would trigger political consequences because it was such a shock. For instance, the director of the UK association reflected in an interview: “we
realized that we had to mobilize and do something about it, because if we didn’t then there would be a serious push for ramifications.” As such, two industry associations in the North
Sea – one transnational and one from the UK – organized separate multi-stakeholder task forces. In particular, the director of the UK association explained how UK task force was created to reassure public and political stakeholders that offshore risks were properly managed in the North Sea: “[UK task force]] was driven by a need to demonstrate to the
public that they didn’t need to worry that Macondo would happen in the UK. And also to persuade the regulators not to take wrong actions.” As such, they were keen to emphasize
that “Our industry is not complacent on [safety] and [UK Task Force] is already carrying out
a thorough review of UK procedures and practices and will institute any changes seen to be necessary” (Press release UK Task Force, 13 August 2010) By indicating that the task force
was supported by different stakeholders groups, it was presented as a broadly supported, legitimate initiative. Furthermore, by portraying their initiative as comprehensive and proactive (“already carrying out a thorough review”). This shows that by showcasing the depth and the proactiveness of their response, the associations aimed create an image of responsibility and ability concerning the need learn from the Macondo disaster, as well as manage risks in general. As such, the tripartite coalition presented itself as being in charge of learning and risk governance.
Proclaiming united stance to legitimate task force initiative.
While the industry associations quickly initiated Task Forces as a response to the Macondo disaster, the director of the UK association explained that it was important to exhibit that they were “not moving ahead on our own” (Interview), but that “industry, the regulators, and
the trade unions are all engaged [in UK Task Force]” (Press release UK Task Force, 13 August
2010). As such, they invoked an image of universal buy-in by industry actors, regulators, and unions. Our data analysis shows that this proclamation of their united stance was an important strategy of the associations in their response to Macondo. This strategy aimed to legitimize the industry’s learning initiatives by portraying the task force as broadly supported by other stakeholders, in particular those with higher levels of public trust
than the oil industry2. For instance, the director of the UK association argued: “what was
incredibly important was that the trade unions came out and support the industry position”
(Interview). Similarly, a trade unionist reflected on their role in an interview:
“[The Commission] was quite happy to stand against the industry. If you want good press in this country just slag of BP and Shell, so standing up against oil companies is not an unpopular thing to do. Standing up against the workforce representatives is.”
Hence, proclaiming that the initiatives were widely supported by industry actors, as well as other stakeholders provided legitimacy to the initiative. Particularly the involvement of trade unions and national regulators provided the initiatives with credibility that industry actors lack given their poor reputation in society.
Furthermore, proclaiming to be united in their response to the Macondo disaster also provided another source of legitimacy. Given the involvement of a multitude of actors, the associations could showcase the collective expertise and experience that underpinned the task forces. For instance, the international association reported how it “pooled its
knowledge and experience to create three dedicated teams drawn from some 20 companies and comprising more than 100 technical experts and senior managers” (International Task
Force, report). Hence, by emphasizing the involvement of a multitude of actors from
2 While national regulators and industry actors cooperated regularly the North Sea co-regulatory regime, the relation between trade unions and oil industry actors is in the UK offshore industry is more antagonistic (Hale, 2014). We found that cooperation between these actors in the Macondo task forces was enabled by the success of another multi-stakeholder task force, which was set up following a helicopter crash in the UK in 2009 in which 16 offshore workers died.
various stakeholder groups and their collective expertise, the associations were able to present the task forces as unparalleled learning initiative.