Ideas not only constitute interests; they constitute the institutions within which interests have a stable and identifiable meaning. They do so by informing the purposive design of formal institutional arrangements, thereby creating the context in which certain behav- ior is incentivized; and by establishing norms that can function as informal institutional arrangements. Analyses of institutions are often divided between those who define these as “stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior” and those who consider them to be “rules of the game” that constrain behavior and generate recurring and stable patterns (Huntington 2006 [1968], 12; North 1990). The distinction is of theoretical consequence, with the first tending to explain behavior as the result of individual agent’s expectations of other agents’ behavior—which when in equilibrium results in stable, ‘institutional- ized’ patterns (Greif and Kingston 2011—and the second tending to explain behavior as the result of rules that allow for the narrowing of information and a consequently greater ability to decide on a course of action (North 1990). Usually accompanying the ‘institutions-as-rules’ perspective is an emphasis on third party enforcement, which is not considered to be necessary in a model of institutions as an equilibrium resulting from the interaction of expectations.34
These approaches are not incompatible, however, and the decision of which concep- tualization to rely upon should reflect the particular problem at hand. An institution is a rule or stricture—either formally established or more colloquially recognized—that has, for whatever reason, become manifested in a stable pattern of behavior. An increase in behavioral predictability is, therefore, a key metric of what is meant by the term ‘institu-
32That is, they want to be able to reduce the costs of securing compliance from a much larger group than the minimal number required to win.
33If, for example, a party wins several successive elections with 70% of the popular vote and this consis- tently translates into a supermajority-proof legislature, it is likely that their opponents will adopt at least some of the policies that they believe underlie this popularity.
34That is, the institutions-as-equilibria perspective tends to focus on institutions that are self-enforcing, in which conformity with the institutionalized behavior occurs because it is in every agent’s self-interest, given their expectations of other agent’s behavior.
tionalization.’ The possibility remains open that this behavior is an emergent equilibrium resulting from agents’ expectations of others’ behavior, but this is one possible mecha- nism rather than the definition of an institution itself.35 A self-enforcing institution is
one in which an agent’s best response conforms to the institutional rule, but addition- ally some institutions are enforced because of the expectation—and often enough, the actual imposition—of some exogenously imposed cost.36 As the likelihood and severity
of external enforcement increases, so does the probability that the desired behavior will be ‘self-enforced,’ i.e., that external enforcement will not actually be required.
Under conditions of institutional stability, the role of ideas in determining interests and strategies might be relatively limited (Blyth 2002). Institutions limit, but do not ex- tinguish, the independent role of ideas precisely because they narrow the possible range of interests and strategies by creating conditions of stable behavior. In these contexts, the calculation of advantage is relatively straightforward, as the costs of violating the in- stitution’s strictures are known and the response of other agents is relatively predictable. The institutions are themselves, however, partly the product of purposive design; insofar as this is the case they are likely to reflect the designers’ beliefs as to what behavior was desired as well as their theories about how to incentivize it. Under conditions of institutional stability the role of ideas might be diminished precisely because other ideas are already embedded in the institutional design. Ideas, in short, define the “motives that persist within institutions” (Skowronek 1995, 94).
But ideas constitute institutions in another way as well: they can be institutionalized in the sense of prescribing behavior that becomes manifested in stable and predictable patterns. Ideas can function as institutions—informal ones, in Douglass North’s well-
35Greif and Kingston’s definition of institutions, I suggest, builds the theory of institutional compliance into the definition itself (2011; Greif 2006). An institution, for them, is a stable pattern of behavior that results from the aggregate expectations of the agents within the relevant situation. Any stable pattern that results from another mechanism, then, is by definition not an institution. The mere existence of a rule does not mean that it effectively conditions behavior, and therefore does not meet our definition of an institution. Greif and Kingston rightly point out that we want to make the question why some rules are “rules-in-use” while others remain “rules-in-form” (Ostrom 2005) answerable within rather than outside our analytical framework. But this is done through a theory of institutions, rather than a definition of institutions. A theory of institutions specifies why some rules are ‘institutionalized’ and others are not, but does not logically equate the definition of institutions with a causal claim about what makes some rules institutions and others not.
36To describe a situation in which a political operative conforms to the strictures of a given narrative of political community because they expect to be expelled from the party if they do not self-enforcing is to stretch the term beyond a useful meaning. But the distinction is always ambiguous, and a political operative acting in conformity to these strictures because they believe it will help them advance within the party might very appropriately be considered self-enforcing.
known distinction (1990)—insofar as there is an expectation that behavior in accordance with an idea’s prescriptions is in some sense beneficial. If an idea is believed to be popu- lar with some relevant constituency—an electorate, party leaders, influential newspaper owners, the members of important interest groups—than the accompanying expecta- tion of the benefits and costs associated with conformity or deviation from the idea will encourage, but not mandate, conformity to its prescriptions. The institution might be enforced exogenously—electoral defeat or being expelled from the political party— but the greater likelihood and severity of this will encourage conformity without relying primarily on enforcement.