FICHA DE OBSERVACIÓN REALIZADA A LOS ESTUDIANTES DE INICIAL II PARALELO “B” DE LA UNIDAD EDUCATIVA “PEDRO

Once the NC and ETTA were established, NGOs raised concerns that the transition process was being rushed because “the international community [was] more concerned about the appearance of success than facilitating the creation of democratic and sustainable mechanisms of self-government”.515 Anger was directed at the influx of UN personnel “strutting around like they owned the place” and community frustrations were fuelled by over-inflated reporting of pay discrepancies between locals and UN staff.516 In August 2000, Aid Watch, an advocacy NGO monitoring the use of international aid funds, wrote:

Despite having hundreds of millions of US dollars available, UNTAET has achieved very little. Díli has seen little reconstruction outside of UN office buildings…globalisation agencies do not share the vision for East Timor that motivated the 24-year resistance…Whether by deliberate policy or ignorance, these agencies will discourage the strong indigenous democratic movement led by FRETILIN.517

Beyond the goal of independence itself, there was in fact great difficulty in discerning a “single” vision of independence which motivated the resistance. CNRT was divided and lacked consensus about the shape of the future administrative and democratic system. Moreover, by failing to recognise the operational constraints of establishing a transitional administration while responding to a humanitarian emergency, advocacy groups often put forward unrealistic expectations about what UNTAET could achieve.

Advocacy group attacks culminated in “A Popular Challenge to UNTAET’s Achievements”.518 It was issued by critical NGOs and Timorese civil society members at

515

La’o Hamutuk, ‘Issue Focus: Reconstruction & Transition: What are the Next Steps?’, The La’o

Hamutuk Bulletin, vol. 2, no. 4 (July 2001), p. 1 http://etan.org/lh/bulletinv2n4.html (22 June 2002).

516 _{In relative terms UN professional staff from developing countries that earned US$ 70,000 per year}

certainly made a “fortune”, but the same pay rate for a professional from a country such as the United States was often “just enough” to cover home costs, particularly if supporting a family with children, Patrick Burgess interview, Díli, 23 January 2004.

517

Peter Murphy, ‘East Timor Let Down by UNTAET and Australia’, Aid Watch, Aid/Watch no. 20 (August 2000), p. 8.

the La’o Hamutuk and Yayasan Hak compound in October 2001. The challenge argued that UNTAET failed in all 20 major accomplishments declared by UNTAET in September 2001. This included failures with the establishment of peace and security, addressing humanitarian needs during the emergency period, creating government structures through ETTA and power-sharing arrangements with the NC, development of defence and police services, establishment of a civil service and so on. It went on to argue that de Mello, as head of UNTAET, should be held accountable for failures and removed from office to allow an honest accounting of the UN’s achievements.

La’o Hamutuk was the most consistent voice of criticism against international organisations because of its role as a development “watchdog”. Its staff comprised of young local Timorese together with internationals from countries such as Portugal, Australia, Indonesia, and the United States.519 The broader solidarity activist community in Timor Leste was equally diverse, held varying ideological outlooks, and different ideas about what they believed a future Timor Leste should look like. However, at a general level many appeared to adopt what Bjorne Hettne calls a “Green ideology” approach to development,

[A] contemporary synthesis of neo-populist and neo-anarchist ideas that were revived in the 1960s forming part of the New Left movement in the US and Europe, and later to be merged with ecology and peace movements. These ideas bear a certain resemblance to the classical populism and anarchism in urging for community (Gemeinschaft) and in their distaste of industrial civilisation.520

It was common for solidarity activist groups to express opposition to the World Bank’s neo-liberal economic reconstruction strategies and the sort of economic system, they believed, the World Bank hoped to introduce to Timor Leste.

518

‘A Popular Challenge to UNTAET’s Achievements’, NGO Forum, 14 September 2001.

519 _{For further discussion see Simpson (2004), p. 459.}

520 _{Bjorn Hettne, Development Theory and the Three Worlds (England: Addison Wesley Longman Limited,}

1995), p. 166. See also Andrew Dobson, Green Political Thought: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 3-11. Hettne argues that many ascribing to these views come from middle-class origins and,

Like CNRT, advocacy groups and solidarity campaigners experienced difficulty adjusting to the reality of state-building challenges.521 Kaplan notes that,

One NGO may be struggling with the transition in “attitude” from resistance to responsibility, in the wake of a political transition, while another NGO…may be dealing with attitudinal issues which it refers to as organisational culture, issues of meaning, principle and motivation.522

La’o Hamutuk, for example, appeared to employ advocacy methods similar to those used by advocacy groups to pressure Western governments into supporting the Timorese during the years of resistance. In reference to the broader advocacy community, UN officials later argued that solidarity activists believed that by taking the role of watchdog over the international aid industry, their own actions were “perfect, immune from criticism and without consequence”. Moreover, it was argued this grew from “morale arrogance”, which translated into “irresponsible activism” that was counter-productive to state-building.523

The monitoring activities of activists sometimes bordered on propaganda advocating the construction of a state based upon loosely articulated principles of alternative development and participatory democracy.524 For example, Jonathan Morrow, former legal advisor for UNTAET, argues that criticisms,

[W]ere not accurate, bore no relation to the views of the majority of East Timorese, and moreover [were] dangerously close to the anti-UN invective of the fugitive East Timorese militia groups in West Timor, who

citing Kitching, claims “they all want the impossible, namely the conditions of bourgeois existence without the necessary consequences of those conditions”, Hettne (1995) p. 167.

521

Patrick Walsh interview, Díli, 18 February 2004.

522 _{Allan Kaplan, The Development of Capacity (Geneva, Switzerland: UN Non-Government Liason}

Service, 1999).

523 _{Patrick Burgess interview, Díli, 23 January 2004.}

524 _{Defined as a “deliberate attempt by some individual or groups to form, control, or alter the attitudes of}

other groups by the use of the instruments of communication, with the intention that in any given situation the reaction of those so influenced will be that desired by the propagandist…In the phrase ‘the deliberate attempt’ lies the key to the idea of propaganda. This is the one thing that marks propaganda from non- propaganda…any act of promotion can be propaganda only if and when it becomes part of a deliberate campaign to induce action through the control of attitudes”, Terence H. Qualter, Propaganda and

Psychological Warfare (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 27, cited in Kalevi J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988), p. 193.

[were] prepared to assume the identity of anti-colonialists, ashamed no doubt of the fact that they were serving interests of the real colonial threat to East Timor [Indonesia].525

Ultimately, the focus that advocacy groups gave to international aid meant that they gave little serious consideration to local social and political realities. In turn, this prevented the development of workable alternatives to the strategies being used by UNTAET or the Timorese leadership. More importantly, all too often the nature and tone of criticisms fuelled frustrations among Timorese that threatened to undermine political stability and contribute to a social breakdown in Díli during the early transitional period. Ironically, such a breakdown would have been used by the Indonesian government to support its rationale for the invasion of 1975 and to buttress explanations it offered for the causes of militia violence in 1999: that it was a product of intra-Timorese conflict. It was only through speedy humanitarian relief efforts, rapid moves on state-building, UNTAET’s position as an outside arbitrator to state-building and the moderating influence of key Timorese leadership figures that “irresponsible activism” did not have destructive consequences during the early stages of state-building.

4.6 Summary Discussion

Did the Timorese leadership really “buy-in” to UNTAET’s plan for state-building? The evolution of CNRT’s own strategic planning, the violence leading up to and during September 1999 and the CNRT’s need to work through the referendum’s political obstacles, suggest otherwise. Rather than buying-in to DPKO’s focus on humanitarian relief and peacekeeping, the Timorese leadership was itself focused on the same issues to ensure security and stability before progressing to state-building. Even then, state- building was poorly defined and focused mainly on creating core administrative structures which could be developed following elections for the Constituent Assembly and the drafting of a national constitution. In other words, DPKO’s strategic plan paralleled that of CNRT’s leadership.

525 _{Jonathan Morrow, ‘The Development of the Constitution of East Timor: A UN Perspective’, paper}

The early transitional period following the humanitarian emergency was accompanied by contested social transformations and acute economic pressures, which created a volatile social environment. Early social pressures were exacerbated by advocacy NGO criticisms directed at neo-colonial control exerted by UNTAET that relegated East Timorese to “second class” status in their own land. As a result, a popular perception emerged that the creation of UNTAET and the subsequent manner in which UN personnel went about their business was the greatest reason Timorese turned to the streets of Díli to protest. The early transitional period also saw the rise of numerous internal competitions for power and authority along political cleavages that existed within East Timorese society and the resistance, prior to 1999. As an umbrella organisation CNRT was fragmented, secretive, confronted with numerous internal struggles framed around unresolved ideological differences from the 1975 period and was ill-suited to act as an institutional partner for UNTAET. The CNRT admitted to some of these issues when, following its national congress in August 2000, it noted the only way to ensure broad representation of Timor Leste’s social and political groups was through democratic elections.526

In the midst of political rivalry, the Timorese leadership became united in their push for a speedy transfer of power from UNTAET to the Timorese leadership so as to ensure a viable state was constructed. Dionísio Babo-Soares argues that CNRT’s dominant political groups tried to oust UNTAET as quickly as possible.527 Perhaps it would be more accurate to suggest that even though CNRT was internally divided its dominant players sought to speed the transitional process, to avoid a dependency model of government, to gain greater control of state-building and to retain an international peacekeeping presence in an effort to provide a safe space for state-building to progress. It appears that all players agreed there was a need to quickly build the basic foundations Challenges and New States: What Role for International Law, 14-16 June 2002 (Australia and New Zealand Society of International Law, June 2002).

526

Outcomes of the CNRT National Congress, 21st to 30th August 2000. CNRT. Díli: Timor Leste.

of a modern democratic state and in a manner that would ensure its long-term viability. There was broad acceptance among Timor Leste’s leadership that it would only be after elections and the formation of a government that would set the development agenda such to allow the complex capacity-development of state institutions and consolidation of the political system to occur.528 The creation of ETTA and the introduction of greater power sharing mechanisms therefore speeded state-building and made it possible for UNTAET to slightly extricate itself from its early politicisation. This allowed it to oversee the transition to independence as more of a neutral arbitrator to Timor Leste’s internal struggles.

While united in pushing for a speedier handover of power, CNRT’s dominant camps believed that each would secure political control during the process of transition. FRETILIN, well-established at the local level through its party structure, seemed confident that through democratic elections it would win power. CNRT’s non- FRETILIN groups, having secured institutional leverage within CNRT and UNTAET, believed they could engineer electoral victory. In this context UNTAET’s recruitment of diaspora Timorese became politicised and threatened to undermine its ability to act as a neutral arbitrator for state-building, because UNTAET itself became a party to internal power struggles. FRETILIN was itself being outmanoeuvred and this became a campaigning strength during the Constituent Assembly elections of 2001, because it was able to capitalise upon popular disaffection for its own political ends.

Often playing a crucial role in moderating protestors on the streets of Díli, Timor’s political “chess masters” were also known to manipulate or create social grievance. The manipulation of social grievance was not in opposition to state-building or even the difficulty UNTAET encountered with handing over real control to the Timorese, but rather formed part of the strategic manoeuvring for power taking place among Timor Leste’s elite groups. De Mello’s approach of gradually transferring authority therefore

“bought time” for the stabilisation of society and elite conflict, which allowed for the free and fair multi-party democratic elections in 2001.529

Chapter 5 –UNTAET’s Missing Link: The Community