In the early sixties, central government decided that the best way forward was to close the borders. The Commonwealth Immigrants Act (1962) was enacted in order to restrict immigration into the country. This act “restricted the admission of Commonwealth immigrants for settlement to those who had been issued with employment vouchers” (1976: 353). The voucher category system enabled those who had secured jobs to enter the UK based on their grouping and the UK’s needs (Sivanandan, 1976). This enabled the Home Secretary to restrict undesirables using the persona of what was best for the
by the Labour Government, enabled immigration from the Black Commonwealth to be geared towards the requirements of the British Economy” (Sivanandan, 1976: 354). Several commentators have argued that the Commonwealth Immigrant Acts (1962, 1965) were motivated by colour, as citizens from the Irish Republic who had also entered the UK as migrant workers were not included (Miles, 1993).
The 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act was aimed at making more stringent policies, with the primary goal of managing British passport holders from Kenya. Those from Kenya who were fleeing the ‘Africanisation policies’ were entering the UK en masse. The labour government responded to the criticism by the media and the pressure from the public, resulting in rising limitations on the entry of certain Black individuals even if they had a British passport. Commonwealth citizens had to provide proof that their parents or grandparents had become citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies by virtue of being adopted in the United Kingdom, and had to have the right papers to back up this claim. Those who were unable to provide such documentation were unable to gain employment as they were considered to be visitors, not residents (Bowling and Westenra, 2018).
By basing political decisions on colour, race relations had become part of a racialisation process, as the government used distinct physical differences and politicians like Enoch Powell in key speeches. Powell argued that “the nation was threatened by the presence of an immigrant population, which he emphasised as being both culturally and phenotypically distinct” (Miles, 1993: 27). With national government identifying Blacks as the culprits in cities where riots had broken out, job discrimination continued in Liverpool, which led to widespread unemployment in the Black community due to job losses in shipping (Gifford et al.,1989: 30; Law, 1981: 35).
Furthermore, during this period, the Race Relations Board was established in 1965. The Board focused its attention on areas that had large influxes of migration. It dealt with complaints in inner cities like London and Birmingham. Liverpool, on the other hand, did not appoint a locally based
conciliation officer due to the city’s long tradition of accepting strangers (Belchem, 2014: 226).
By not assigning an officer, it was apparent that there was no one to outline the problems in Liverpool, and this enabled the city council to avoid fulfilling its legal obligation of addressing complaints on racism linked employment challenges. This led to Liverpool continuing to be the only city in the UK that had not incorporated an overdue policy on equal opportunities (Belchem, 2014). However, by 1968, there was a huge piece of proof that threw light on the inequalities based on racism within Liverpool city council, towards the Black community in particular (Liverpool Black Caucus, 1986). A survey performed in shops and factories located in Liverpool found that the number of Black employees was only about 0.75% among staff, and less than 0.1% among those who faced customers at the counter (Gifford et al., 1989). The proof in this report reinforced a common pattern that local officials trusted that within the city of Liverpool there was no issue with a person’s colour. In the late 1970s, with unemployment running above 12 per cent, the Black community in Liverpool bore the brunt of it, as racism marginalised their employment perspectives (Zack-Williams, 1997: 536). Belchem (2014: 197) argues that:
The increasingly dangerous consequences notwithstanding, the discrimination and disadvantage experienced by Liverpool- born Black youths had gone unchecked, obscured from [the] public gaze and discussion by the spurious local rhetoric of harmonious relations and the wider national preoccupation with new immigrant arrivals.
The “Community Relations Commission in 1968 expressed similar concerns following the findings of the Runnymede Trust (1965) that 32% of Liverpool born Black youths were unemployed” (cited in Belchem, 2014: 231). Despite the high unemployment amongst the Liverpool-born Black community, the City Council still rejected the implementation of positive action schemes and instead selected to open language centres, which were aimed at new
influxes, in order to preserve the city’s image and not play “catch up with developments elsewhere” (Belchem, 2014: 232).
Furthermore, the establishment of the Merseyside Community Relations Council (1986) was a sign of Blacks mobilising themselves to create better opportunities and contribute to urban regeneration (Ben-Tovim, 1989). This illustrated their unwillingness to sit back and allow others to influence their situation. This action by the Liverpool Black community coincided with the Conservative Government’s stance on calling an end to migration. In order to adopt an ideology focused on preserving Englishness, the Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher called for “an end to immigration in order to avoid the effects of being swamped by an alien culture” (Ben-Tovim et al., 1986: 17).
During this period, issues with the police arose from “a changing method of control due to there being an increasing use against the Black community of not so much the ‘sus’ law (Suspected Person Loitering 1824 Vagrancy Act), as Liverpool’s own unique ‘Stop and Search’ powers” (Belchem, 2014: 241). These powers, which enabled the police to stop suspects based on suspicion, had resulted in Black young men from the Liverpool 8 community “suffering extreme levels of racial harassment in the form of verbal and sometimes physical abuse by the police. In most cases, police investigations did not amount to prosecution” (MCRC, 1986: 110). The MCRC also noted in a number of reports (1979, 1980) how unemployment rates were spiralling downward among Black youths in Liverpool. It also affirmed that:
Black Liverpudlians not only share the disadvantages felt by many White Liverpudlians, but also suffer the additional disadvantages brought about by racial prejudice and discrimination—simply because they are Black. (MCRC, Gifford et al., 1989: 46).
Moreover, “between 1974 to 1981 unemployment rates in Liverpool rose again, by 120 per cent but in the same period Black unemployment in Liverpool 8 increased by 330 per cent” (Liverpool Black Caucus, 1988: 96). In
addition, the City Council continued to rebuff any actions that would lead to the implementation of race-relations legislation or initiatives as “local councillors were still apt to dismiss those who raised racial issues as (in the words of Labour leader Bill Sefton) ‘interfering do-gooders and sensationalist sociologists’” (Belchem, 2014: 239). The Council’s failure to address the issue led the Black community in Liverpool to change its approach in the 1980s. They decided to pursue a policy of mobilisation with organisations like the self-appointed Liverpool Black Caucus. The Liverpool Black Caucus took on the mantle for the Black working-class community. It produced a book called The Racial Politics of Militants in Liverpool – The Black Community’s
Struggle for Participation in Local Politics 1980–1985. The Liverpool Black
Caucus, believed in protesting rather than standing on the side-lines. By organising protests, the Liverpool Black Caucus was able in the early 1980s to elicit an admission from Liverpool City Council that racism existed and was active within the city (Liverpool Black Caucus, 1986). As they moved forward, their core efforts were focused on “racial equality in employment for the Black community in Liverpool” (Liverpool Black Caucus, 1986: 9). The Black Caucus had already made the connection via the research of Wally Brown and Gideon Ben-Tovim as to why employment was inaccessible for the Black community in Liverpool. Arguments centred on:
1. The existence of institutional racism in Liverpool.
2. Racism, which to the Liverpool Black Caucus was an “ideology rooted in the economic system of capitalism and perpetuates class divisions in order to maximise profits” (Liverpool Black Caucus, 1986: 8).
Frustration continued to breed for Blacks within Liverpool, “as in central Liverpool, where most blacks live, the chances of unemployment are four times greater on the periphery” (Belchem, 2014: 238); hence, an incident occurred in one of the biggest stores in the city centre. Endorsing the teachings of Karl Marx and using his theory of socialism, members of the Liverpool Black Caucus enacted a plan, which they implemented, of hindering the capitalist bourgeoisie who were the storeowners in Liverpool city centre.
When a young boy was arrested in Liverpool for shoplifting, an act that he refused to take the blame for, this enabled the Black community to mobilise itself with the help of the Black Caucus. Instead of protesting outside the store where the young boy was manhandled, organisers from the Black community decided direct action was required. People from the Black community, wanting to participate, were asked to meet outside the Liverpool city centre store at one of its most critical times. The store, which had eight tills, was the target. Using the smallest currency possible, eight shoppers were asked to purchase items from the store. “Within two hours, the retail store had come to a standstill and the management called the protestors into a room, asking for their demands” (Clay, 2008: 90).
When their request for a full apology was met, the store was able to continue trading, but the action taken by the Black community in Liverpool, a direct demonstration against this incident, showed how justice could be achieved when unity was applied.
Despite this small victory, the Liverpool Black Caucus was unable to engage with Liverpool City Council on a wide variety of issues. Despite providing data from reports produced by an emerging academic group of intellectuals (Torkington, 1983; Ben-Tovim, 1983; Law, 1981), the local council “had no targeting mechanism to ensure main programmes and resources and new regeneration schemes were bent towards the Black population” (Ben-Tovim, 1989: 44). The literature produced by the Liverpool Black Caucus was insightful and demonstrated statistical and written information regarding unemployment rates amongst the Black community. Brown argues that:
Interactions with local government surmounted into personal conflicts, ineffective appointments like that of an outsider from London called Sam Bond, who was recruited as the lead for race relations in the City and meetings or forum sessions, which in the end produced utter opposition for the Black cause in Liverpool. (Brown, 1998: 10).
Both local and central government continued to neglect their responsibility to the Black community in Liverpool. A prevalent feeling of police brutality led “the Chairman of MCRC (who at the time was Inquiry member Wally Brown) to write to the Chief Executive of the Liverpool City Council on behalf of 16 Merseyside Black organisations” (Gifford et al., 1989: 48). Brown argued in this letter that the Council had an obligation to implement race-relations legislation that would end racism in employment for the Black community in Liverpool (Gifford et al., 1989: 48).
This letter also outlined key measures that needed to be introduced by Liverpool city council in order for equality of opportunity to prevail for all communities residing in the city. The letter focused on health, education, housing and employment. This action, taken by the MCRC, led to the council passing “a resolution in December 1980 to adopt an equal opportunities policy, including a formal equal opportunities statement and the creation of a liaison committee” (Gifford et al., 1989: 48). The committee, which included key Black groups from the community, drafted an equal opportunities policy, which was adopted by the council in 1981. However, despite this enactment of a new equal opportunities policy, changes within the council were insignificant, as the number of Black workers in the council stood at 225 out of 30,000 in 1980 (Belchem, 2014).
In 1981, Parliament published its report from the select committee, which claimed that the city of Liverpool was “the most disturbing case of racial disadvantage in the United Kingdom” (Belchem, 2014: 244). But, as the council had by now adopted its equal opportunities policy, in this report’s absence, no longer was the committee willing to condemn the local authority for its inaction. Failure to act sooner devalued the council’s actions and led to the 1981 riots taking place within a month of the select committee’s report’s publication (Belchem, 2014). With Liverpool suffering another economic recession, high youth unemployment, police aggression and racial discrimination, the 1981 Toxteth riots were an uprising in response to the tensions in the city by the Black community (Belchem, 2014; Gifford et al., 1989; Ben-Tovim et al., 1992; Law 1981).