PIC theory (Mindel et al. 2018) examines open access systems online that integrate user-generated content and information as “common grounds.” According to this lens, social media and other open access systems online that enable digital activism may be conceptualized as “information commons,” that is, as manifestations of collective action taking place in cyberspace. This is a departure from prior research on digital activism, which primarily examines the enabling online systems as communication tools (Harlow and Harp 2012; Obar et al. 2012; Segerberg and Bennett 2011).
When examining the use of new technologies to promote change, digital activism literature broadly distinguishes between two types of actors: institutional and non-institutional (Bimber et al. 2012; Selander and Jarvenpaa 2016). This distinction works well when examining the dynamics between a single, identifiable organization (an institutional actor) and everyone else outside of this organization (non-institutional actors). The challenge, however, is that activism often involves multiple organizations and actors entangled as part of an “institutional field,” which obscures the institutional/non-institutional dichotomy. In the dichotomous view, for example, a social movement organization dedicated to a cause is an institutional actor, while the individuals accessing the organization’s social media page to make comments or acquire information are non- institutional actors. However, people accessing the organization’s information may be politicians, reporters, business owners, and other actors who belong to various organizations and whose individual actions impact institutional change. To avoid the confusion, we appropriate PIC
109
theory’s distinction between three types of actors relevant to digital activism as follows: (1)
producers: the architects and organizers of the digital activism platform; (2) providers: the people
who supply information by posting content; and (3) appropriators: the people who acquire information for various reasons (Mindel et al. 2018).
While collective action is typically viewed as a generative mechanism (Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006), PIC theory sees it as potentially degenerative to the point that it might undermine the system’s sustainability (Mindel et al. 2018). In the same way that commons in the physical world face sustainability pressures as the aggregate result of smaller-scale actions (Ostrom 1990), information commons in digital activism are vulnerable because of their high degree of open access, widespread anonymity, and lack of hierarchical control (Mindel et al. 2018). Thus, as with common pool physical resources such as forests or grazing grounds, these information commons are likely to experience pressure due to pollution, congestion, violations, and rebellion.
Low barriers for participation in digital activism increase the odds that a certain portion of the uploaded content may be polluted by inaccurate or even deliberately manipulated information.
Information pollution—defined as “the extent to which information is contaminated and fails to
align with the information commons overarching goal” (Mindel et al. 2018, p. 617)—is a problem for platforms that invite users to contribute content and information (Gu et al. 2007; Hu et al. 2012; Kittur et al. 2008). Further, prior research finds that the spread of misinformation online reinforces echo chamber effects, which can lead to increased polarization and other negative spillover effects (Del Vicario et al. 2016; Kata 2012; Silverman and Singer-Vine 2016).
Digital activism can also suffer from activity spikes that jam the system. Such congestion—that
is, “the extent to which appropriation and provision clog the information commons” (Mindel et al. 2018, p. 616)—may cause the system to crash and create information overload. Digital activism
110
research finds that simultaneous uploads of posts can create messy feeds and cause confusion and information overload, which in turn may lead to fatigue among activists (Branagan 2013; Kelly Garrett 2006). Frequent crashes caused by congestion may frustrate existing and potential activists alike; moreover, it may prevent important messages from spreading, subsequently muffling the potential impact of digital activism.
Because digital activism that touches on political issues is likely to be controversial and heated (Lee 2005), it can be a fertile ground for harassment, cyberbullying, hate speech, and trolling (Li 2005; Warzel 2016). Defined as “the extent to which providers in an information commons violate rules and laws” (Mindel et al. 2018, p. 617), violations such as harassment may cause some activists to quit and may even attract pressure from outside actors. Although digital activism literature does not address harassment specifically, plenty of anecdotal evidence suggests that it is indeed a problem (Larkin 2016).
In digital activism, rifts between producers and providers may cause the latter to desert or rebel.
Rebellion—that is, “the extent to which providers in an information commons are dissatisfied and
exit it” (Mindel et al. 2018, p. 617)—jeopardizes the supply of content (Clifford 2010; Graham- Felsen 2006; Gross 2012). So, while digital activism can grow exponentially because of low participation barriers, it can also experience rapid participation decline. Donor reactions to reports that Red Cross stashed money donated to help the 2010 Haiti earthquake victims (Sullivan 2015) exemplifies how rebellion can adversely affect digital activism.
To reduce the prevalence and impact of collective-action threats in digital activism, PIC theory proposes four mutually reinforcing governance practices that may help actors balance openness and order to achieve stability. These practices (Table 3.1) may be embedded in the system’s
111
technical features and design, as well as in its official and unofficial rules and norms of conduct (Mindel et al. 2018).
Table 3.1 PIC Theory Appropriated to Digital Activism
Concept Definition Construct Definition References
Collective- action threats
Adverse aggregate effects that are caused by individual-level actions during digital activism
Pollution
The extent to which information is contaminated and fails to align with the overarching goal of digital activism Kata 2012; Kelly Garrett 2006; Lampel and Bhalla 2007; Mindel et al. 2018; Stien 2016 Congestion
The extent to which appropriation and provision of information clog the system that enables digital activism
Violations
The extent to which providers of information violate rules and laws related to digital activism
Rebellion
The extent to which providers of information are dissatisfied and exit a digital activism effort
Polycentric governance practices
Digital activism practices that promote order through independent adjustments as part of an emergent system of rules
Boundary regulation
The extent to which rules and technical infrastructure features regulate anonymity and content during digital activism
Mindel et al. 2018; Ostrom 1990 Incremental
adaptation
The extent to which actors gradually introduce changes in infrastructure features and rules during digital activism
Shared accountability
The extent to which rules and features afford peer monitoring and gradual sanctioning of violators of rules and norms during digital activism
Provider recognition
The extent to which providers of information are acknowledged by peers, appropriators, and producers during digital activism
Boundaries that align with digital activism’s overarching goal reduce the prevalence and impact of collective-action threats. Boundary regulation—defined as “the extent to which rules and
technical infrastructure features of the information commons regulate anonymity and content” (Mindel et al. 2018, p. 619)—may therefore help reduce collective-action threats in information commons (Butler and Wang 2012; Di Tullio and Staples 2013; Hertel et al. 2003; Jarvenpaa and
112
Lang 2011; Ren et al. 2007) and thereby improve digital activism outcomes. For example, rules and design features, such as login requirements, can reduce the adverse effect of anonymity, while boundaries on content can prevent the discourse from getting overly heated.
Information providers and appropriators are sensitive to changes they perceive as too sudden or radical. Given this, incremental adaptation—that is, “the extent to which changes in infrastructure
features and rules are gradually introduced” (Mindel et al. 2018, p. 619)—may reduce the likelihood of alienating digital activism participants and, as a consequence, reduce instances of rebellion and violations. PIC theory would suggest that a digital activism effort is more likely to be sustained when it involves information providers in governance and incorporates community feedback into an incremental adaptation of the system’s rules and features.
It is important that participants have a sense of collective responsibility toward digital activism efforts. This self-emerging shared accountability—defined as “the extent to which rules and
features afford peer monitoring and gradual sanctioning of violators of rules and norms of the information commons” (Mindel et al. 2018, p. 619)—can improve outcomes in various open access systems (Chua et al. 2007; Wise et al. 2006). Consistent with this insight, we suggest that actors adopt shared accountability and peer monitoring to reduce collective-action threats to their digital activism efforts.
The more content providers feel recognized for their efforts by other stakeholders, the more likely they are to continue participating and contributing (Lampel and Bhalla 2007). Given this, provider
recognition—defined as “the extent to which providers are acknowledged by peers, appropriators
and producers” (Mindel et al. 2018, p. 619)—is an important source of motivation (Von Krogh et al. 2012). Recognition may come as direct congratulatory messages and posts, or as badges, icons,
113
“likes,” and other features that tell providers that their efforts are noticed. Provider recognition is an important driver of continued engagement during digital activism, which often succumbs to drops in engagement level (Van Laer and Van Aelst 2010).
We build on these PIC theory concepts (Table 3.1) to empirically examine and theorize about how digital activism may be harnessed for institutional change. At the same time, we observe that PIC theory is generally concerned about the sustainability of information commons, whereas digital activism’s primary objective is to drive action and achieve some form of change Given this, we suggest that digital activists not only sustain the information commons but also collectively achieve a legitimacy threshold (Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002) as a basis for maneuvering other partisan actors and the complex institutional landscape in which they operate.