FIGURAS Y TABLAS

Vandekerckhove (2006: 304) argues that, to the extent that “the semantic constructs used to legitimate those [whistleblowing] policies - stabilize the globalisation semantic … [it] implies that the concepts of flexibility, decentralization, governance, network and stakeholder

maintain relevance in our meaning-making”. The problems identified above with the network perspective, as contained in the OSR (organisational social responsibility) whistleblowing legitimisation, indicate that the concept „network‟ (in Vandekerckhove‟s sense) might not be maintaining relevance in our meaning-making and thus cannot stabilize the globalisation semantic. In other words, the network perspective as argued for by Vandekerckhove does not satisfactorily eliminate the conflict between the organisation and society because it does not reconcile the opposing meanings emanating from whistleblowing‟s essential aporia -

organisational loyalty versus preventing public harm.

Vandekerckhove bases his understanding of the network perspective, and the legitimisations that follow, on networks as autopoietic systems. The problem seems to lie in the fact that organisational networks, as operationally closed systems, cannot satisfactorily deal with the openness required in the recipient element. On the other hand, opening up the organisational network completely to its environment leads to other problems - such as stakeholders who receive information but who then, due to a lack of expertise, cannot effect any changes as a consequence of receiving that information.

67 Critical Complexity theory, like the theory of autopoietic systems, also focuses on the

interactions in the system but crucially, is not operationally closed. Critical Complexity theory allows the system to generate meaning only if the system remains open to its

environment. Critical Complexity does not however require that that system be completely open - if it was completely open then there would be no way to distinguish between the system and its environment. Critical Complexity will allow the organisation and

organisational network to be understood as an open system that is nonetheless still bounded. Critical Complexity, it will be argued in the next chapter, will allow the concept of „network‟ to maintain relevance in our meaning-making and so stabilize the globalisation semantic i.e. eliminate the conflict between the organisation and society. An exposition of Critical

Complexity and the ethics of Critical Complexity will be undertaken in Chapter 3.

Critical Complexity will also allow us to posit a resolution to Vandekerckhove‟s paradox by conceiving of organizational and social identity as coterminous, i.e. that the identity of the whistleblower as parrhesiastes is not ontologically prior to the identity of the corporation and/or civil society.

6. Conclusion

The shifts in understanding, and legitimising of whistleblowing over the last thirty years marks an attempt to understand whistleblowing as a historically determined and culturally mediated social practice within the context of globalisation. We saw that trends in

legitimising whistleblowing attempted to eliminate the conflict between society and

organisation, manifesting as organisational wrongdoing harming the public interest, by trying to contain that conflict within the organisation, or a proxy of society. Society opts not to exert direct control over the organisation and its practices, but instead to mediate its influence over organisations through various governmental agencies as well as legislation.

Ultimately, this compromise has proven unsatisfactory. Globally, whistleblowing still remains a highly problematic issue, in so far as organisational retaliation against the

whistleblower has not been eliminated, and the internal/external disclosure issue has not been resolved. The conflict between society and the organisation over organisational wrongdoing remains. Locally, within the South African context, whistleblowers are in an even more

68 precarious position. The historical weight against those who disclose seems to be becoming more burdensome as our society moves into a politics of suspicion.

Our analysis has showed that one of the principal reasons for these failures is conceiving of the organisation and the stakeholders in its environment - the network perspective - as an operationally closed system. This conception leads directly to the problems and paradoxes involved in opening up the recipient element. These were that stakeholders who, due to lack of expertise, could not action the information contained in the disclosure and the fact that encouraging whistleblowing needs an open and democratic society, but that whistleblowing itself contributes to an open and democratic society. What is needed is a conception of the network as an open system. It was briefly outlined that critical complexity theory can conceive of an organisational network in this manner. We now turn to a full exposition of Critical Complexity and show how, by allowing us to reconceptualise the whistleblower as

parrhesiastes, Critical Complexity can resolve the conflict between society and the

69 Chapter 3: Reconceptualising the whistleblower in a complex world

1. Introduction

In the previous chapter we examined whistleblowing as a historically determined and socially mediated practice, which came unstuck when we enlisted Vandekerckhove‟s analysis of whistleblowing within the context of globalisation of the last thirty years. The principal weakness in Vandekerckhove‟s analysis, it was argued, was his conception of organisations, and networks of organisations, as autopoietic systems, i.e. operationally closed systems. Vandekerckhove‟s‟ legitimisation strategy aimed to eliminate the conflict between society and the organisation by containing that conflict within the organisation. In this chapter we attempt to recast that conflict by a reconceptualisation of the whistleblower, with the organisation conceived of as an open system at the heart of that reconceptualisation. What follows from that reconceptualisation is that the distinction between internal and external disclosure becomes inconsequential, while the central dilemma of whistleblowing loyalty is dissolved.

The chapter starts by introducing Critical Complexity theory, which posits that the properties of complex systems emerge from the interactions between the systems‟ components which form the system in a self-organising process. A complex system is constrained by the boundaries with its environment which cannot be clearly defined. Defining such boundaries is a function of the system and a function of a framing strategy, which always leaves some features of the system out in order to reduce the complexity and model the system. Framing has important implications for our knowledge of complex systems, which are explored in the remainder of Section 2. Section 2 is thus descriptive and serves as the theoretical

underpinning to Section 3 which goes on to make the claim that organisations can be understood as complex systems. I examine how the identity of corporations and corporate members emerge through cooperative and competitive activities in the workplace which coalesce into „iterative themes‟, which, in a process of „normative congruence‟ bound the organisation‟s purpose and identity. This understanding of corporate identity then affects how we understand corporate responsibility, which is presented as a notion of „relational

responsiveness‟.

Section 4 then applies these insights directly to the ethics of whistleblowing, primarily as a means to render the distinction between internal and external disclosure as obsolete.

70 Reframing organisational boundaries also encompasses individual corporate members

reframing their corporate roles and thus the extent of their responsibilities. Section 5 extends the reframing of the organisation‟s boundaries to encompass the bigger boundary issue between society and the organisation. The contentious nature of the boundary between society and the organisation is revealed in the uneasy relation between business and ethics. Despite some theorists‟ claims, most notably that of Milton Friedman (1970), that the only responsibility of business is to make profits, society has intervened in this regard. In the wake of corporate scandals such as Enron it has attempted to institutionalise ethics in the

organisation. This attempt has failed to stop corporate wrongdoing and thus the conflict between society and the organisation persists. The final part of this chapter employs Critical Complexity to conceive of „business ethics as practice‟ (instead of business ethics as rules and universal, immutable principles) which in the instance of the whistleblower as

parrhesiastes, aims to demonstrate that the act of whistleblowing is an act of loyalty to both

the organisation and society simultaneously. 2. Critical Complexity19

We commence our exposition of Critical Complexity with a quote: “Complexity is not something that can be pinned down by analysing the properties of a certain part of the system or by taking the components of the system apart and seeking for traces of complexity within the isolated parts” (Preiser & Cilliers 2010: 266). Complexity arises because of the

interaction between the components of a system and the interaction between those

components and the system‟s environment; a complex system is constituted through both the sum of its components and the relationships between those components and the relationships between those components and its environment (Cilliers 1998: 2).

Before continuing my exposition I need to note the distinction between systems that are complex from those that are merely complicated (3), such as the brain versus the space shuttle. The latter can in principle be given an exact description, while the former resists the analytical method. Cilliers acknowledges that this distinction can sometimes be difficult to draw and depends on the state of our present knowledge - what is considered complex today,

19

Cilliers (2010) develops a critical theory of complexity, which against other forms of complexity, does not harbour the hope of finding essentialist descriptions of reality. He cites Edgar Morin’s (2007) distinction between ‘restricted’ and general’ theories of complexity; the former which “acknowledges the relational nature of complex systems, but hopes that essential characteristics of these systems can be positively

identified”, and the latter which avoid this reductionism (Cilliers 2010: 4). Cilliers’ theory of Critical Complexity is thus identifiable with Morin’s ‘general’ complexity.

71 might tomorrow, with the aid of some new technology, be revealed as merely complicated (Cilliers 2008: 44). Despite the possibility of this epistemological, as opposed to ontological, complexity (complexity as a function of our descriptions as opposed to inherent

characteristics of the system), “given the finitude of human understanding, some aspects of a complex system may always be beyond our grasp” (45). Nonetheless complex systems tend to share certain characteristics, as identified by Paul Cilliers (1998: 3-4):

2.1.The characteristics of a complex system

1). Complex systems consist of a large amount of elements. Systems with a small amount of elements can usually be described in conventional, analytical terms (3).

2). The elements must interact with one another and the interaction must be dynamic. There is thus a temporal dimension to all complex systems (4).

3). The interactions between the components are fairly rich. This means that any element in the system influences and is influenced by many other elements (3-4).

4). The interactions are non-linear. This means that the system cannot be compressed, and represented by a smaller, equivalent system. It also means that “small causes can have large results and vice-versa” (4). This characteristic has implications for how we model complex systems, which we discuss below.

5). The interactions usually have a short range. Elements of a system usually interact with other immediately neighbouring elements, although long-range interaction is not precluded. More importantly, wide-ranging systemic influence is still possible (4).

6). There are loops in the interactions. The “effect of any activity can feed back on itself, sometimes directly, sometimes after a number of intervening stages” (4).

7). Complex systems are usually open systems. This means that a complex system interacts with its environment. Usually, where the system ends and the environment begins cannot be definitively demarcated. Describing a complex system thus involves a framing strategy, which depends in part on the purpose the observer of the system intends it for (4). The marking off and function of boundaries in complex systems is dealt with in depth in the next subsection.

72 8). Complex systems operate under conditions of disequilibrium. A system under

homeostasis would not be able to respond to its environment. That the system is in constant flux is necessary for the capability of self-organization as the system seeks to adapt to changes in its environment (4).

9). Complex systems have a history. They evolve over time and their past activity and interaction co-determines the present state of system (4). A system must be able to „learn‟ from past experience and previous encounters if it is to be able to adapt and reconfigure itself to new and ever-changing demands made by its environment (92.) However, in order for the system to sustain itself, “at least part of the system [must change] at a slower rate than changes in the environment” (Cilliers 2005: 257). This part functions as the „memory‟ of the system.

10). Each element in the system is ignorant of the behaviour of the system as a whole, responding only to information that is available to it locally. This point can be tied to point 5 above. More importantly, “if each element „knew‟ what was happening to the system as a whole, all of the complexity would have to be present in that element” (Cilliers 1998: 4-5). These characteristics lead to some interesting features which are commonly associated with complex systems, most notably the ability of self-organisation, which enables complex systems “to develop or change internal structure spontaneously and adaptively in order to cope with, or manipulate, their environment” (1998: 90). Self-organisation is “a process whereby a system can develop a complex structure from fairly unstructured beginnings” (12). Crucially, this structure “can evolve without the intervention of an external designer or the presence of some centralised form of internal control” (89).

The interactions also produce the „emergent‟ properties of the system, “the higher order properties which make the system what it is” (Cilliers 2010: 4). As an example, Cilliers cites the property of consciousness which emerges from the interactions between the neurons in the brain (5). Emergence should not, however, be viewed as a passive product of interactions (Woermann 2010a: 170). The presence of feedback loops as identified above in point 6 ensures that “the products and the effects are at the same time causes and producers of what produces them” (Morin 2008: 49). From the interactions also emerge the system‟s structure, comprising boundaries and hierarchies. How these boundaries and hierarchies emerge is explored in detail in the following subsection.

73 2.2. Structure, boundaries and hierarchies

The interactions between the components of a complex system are also asymmetrical, which is “another way of stating that the relationships between the components are relationships of difference” (Cilliers 2010: 7). Difference is necessary for any interesting behaviour to arise, indeed, “without difference there can be no meaning” (7). However there needs to be an “economy of difference”: not unlimited difference, but bounded difference (8). Another way of saying this is that in order for a system to behave in complex ways there must be neither too little, nor too much structure (Cilliers 2008: 46).

Complexity, argues Cilliers (2010: 15), “is not simply a function of the interactions between many components, but of their organisation.” If there is too little structure the system risks becoming a mere reflection of its environment, changing chaotically in response to every perturbation, no matter how small. “Complex behaviour is only possible when the behaviour of the system is constrained” (Cilliers 2008: 46). However, too much structure and the system becomes rigid, incapable of complex behaviour either (46). This is because if it is too tightly constrained it will not be able to adapt to its changing environment.

Constraints, however, should not be seen as something negative, they are also enabling, argues Cilliers (2001: 139). Elsewhere, Cilliers (2010: 10) elaborates on this point: “The fewer constraints, the more possibility, but possibility left empty. The more constraints, the better we can get at the meaning, but the more bountiful it is.” Constraints “provide a framework that enables descriptions to be built up around it” (Cilliers 2001: 139).

Constraints can be understood as that which bounds a system, which in turn can be equated with the structure of that system.

In order to differentiate one system from another there needs to be some kind of boundary. However, because complex systems are open systems, deciding where or how to draw the boundary between one system and the next, or one system and its environment, becomes problematic (Cilliers 2001: 140). Boundaries are “simultaneously a function of the activity of the system itself, and a product of the strategy of description involved” (141). The problem however is that because “we can never be sure that we have „found‟ or „defined‟ [the boundary of the system] clearly … the closure20 of the system is not something that can be

20 _{Cilliers (2010: 140) maintains that it is acceptable, when dealing with complex systems in an ‘operational’} way, to introduce ‘operational closure’ as a way of dealing with the problems of boundaries, as is the strategy

74 described objectively” (141). Instead, Cilliers urges us to understand boundaries not as something which separates things from one another, but rather as “something that constitutes that which is bounded” (141). This shift in perspective allows us to see boundaries as

enabling instead of confining (141).

Further impoverishing our notion of boundaries is our propensity to visualise complex systems as contiguous in space, thinking of systems in an „organistic‟ manner (141). Social systems, however, may be composed of parts existing in different spatial locations. Indeed, the parts may be located in virtual space (142). One only has to think of the obvious example of the social networking website Facebook, to understand this. An important consequence of this way of understanding boundaries is that “non-contiguous subsystems could be part of many systems simultaneously” (142). Thus, within the virtual system that constitutes

Facebook, there are many smaller communities which usually form around a particular social cause, or trend. These virtual communities, or subsystems, are also simultaneously parts of other systems, which are other social networking sites, such as Linked-In. Under these conditions, locating the „place‟ of the boundary thus becomes a futile exercise.

A further implication of a non-spatial understanding of boundaries is that in a complex system “we are never far away from the boundary … there will always be a short route from any component to the „outside‟ of the system … there is no safe „inside‟ the system … everything is always interacting and interfacing with others and with the environment; the notions of „inside‟ and „outside‟ are never simple or uncontested” (142).

Just like boundaries, systems need, and produce hierarchies. Hierarchies allow asymmetry into the structure of a system (143). Asymmetry is closely related to non-linearity (Cilliers 1998: 120) and operates as a mechanism “to exploit the magnifying power of non-linearity” (120). However, viewing hierarchies as clearly defined and permanent becomes problematic (as was the case with boundaries). In the classical understanding, hierarchies are seen as „nested‟, but in reality, hierarchies, argues Cilliers, „interpenetrate‟ each other - “there are relationships which cut across different hierarchies” (2001: 143). These interpenetrations can be so extensive that it becomes impossible to distinguish which part of the system is

subordinate to which (143). Instead of viewing these interpenetrations as „messy‟ but

unavoidable, Cilliers invites us to see them as indispensable to the adaptability of the system employed in autopoiesis (see Chapter 2, Section 4.1.1). For our purposes, as identified in Chapter 2, Section 5, this will not do.

75 (143). Interpenetrations allow cross-communication between hierarchies which is necessary if dominant or obsolete hierarchies are to be dislodged (143). Hierarchies cannot remain

unchanged - they must change as the context of the system changes. Transforming hierarchies does not necessarily always entail their destruction, though. A shift, changing an existing hierarchy into a different one, is sufficient enough to ensure the vitality of the system (144). With the nature of boundaries and hierarchies in mind we can now turn to the difficult task of