Filosófico

There does not appear to be any statement directing the Authority to conduct any review in any specified time period. The researchers were informed that there is provision in the Casino Act 1997 for the Authority to conduct reviews of the suitability of the licensee from time to time. Although the provision is worded differently to those in Victoria and New South Wales, the scope of the investigation is their equivalent. The Act provides for the Authority to recover the cost of the investigation from the licensee. There is, at present, no investigation planned in relation to SkyCity, Adelaide.

3.5.4 UK Gambling Commission

In their foreword to the consultation document22 _{on improving social responsibility measures with}

respect to gambling, the UK Gambling Commission acknowledged that debates on gambling are “characterised by often polarised and deeply-held views,” but that two fundamental concepts needed to be accepted in order to have an informed debate and as an objective basis for the formulation of gambling policy and regulation:

(1) first, while most people who gamble do so safely most of the time, gambling causes harm, sometimes serious harm. One does not have to be a gambling addict to experience harm. Harm can arise from excessive ‘binge gambling’. It is important to remember that harm can and does impact on friends, families, employers and communities;

(2) second – and this is a point that is often lost – gambling is fun. People who gamble do so generally because they enjoy it. They make an informed adult choice to gamble because they want to. In an open and free society like ours, that is a decision they are perfectly entitled to make, provided that in doing so they do not impose unacceptable costs on society through harming themselves or others.

The Productivity Commission in their two national studies have consistently referred to the two concepts stated above and the need to balance the benefits and costs of measures to minimise harm relative to informed adult choice.

The UK Commission noted the rapid introduction of new products and new forms of gambling, the equally rapid developments in technology enabling growth in on-line gambling and changes in consumer preferences, but voiced concern in regard to the “corruption of sporting events,” expansion of gambling advertising and harms from gambling. The policy environment needed to keep pace with these and other developments. Industry also had a role to play in minimising harm from gambling and this required continual improvements in player protection strategies.

The Commission concluded, in inviting responses to the consultation paper that:

“There is a growing understanding that a sustainable and successful future for the gambling sector depends on public confidence in its efforts to minimise the harm that its products can and do cause. Ultimately, society is much more likely to accept a gambling industry that is unequivocally pursuing means of limiting harm arising from its products.” (See foreword)

Initiatives to minimise harm recommended by the UK Gambling Commission most of which have also been recommended by the Victorian VCGLR and the New South Wales ILGA include, inter alia:

Play Information

 “Play information has the potential to help individuals in this regard (i.e. minimise harm) by providing, for example, a message relating to the length of time an individual has spent gambling or the amount of money they have spent, won or lost in a session, i.e. quantitative information about the player’s personal gambling activity.” (ibid, p. 25)

The provision of information in real time is a fundamental element in the design of pre-commitment programs as recommended by the Productivity Commission.

Access to Sessional Data

 “As a minimum we would expect all gamblers to be provided, or be able to access, their sessional net win or loss”. (ibid, p. 26)

Better Use of Information Available to Operators

 “One of the greatest areas of challenge, and perhaps one of the most difficult that operators face, is deciding when to initiate a customer interaction with an individual player.” (ibid, p. 30)

Exclusion from Particular Products

 “Licensees should offer the facility for customers to exclude themselves from particular product types”. (ibid, p. 41)

Improved Self-Exclusion Options and Monitoring

 “It should be possible to establish a self-exclusion arrangement without visiting premises”. (ibid, p. 53)

3.6

Casino taxation and government revenue

Since the 1960s, gambling taxes on those forms of gambling that have been legalised have formed an important source of revenue for state governments “raising funds for community services” (PC, 1999, p. 2.4 and Chapter 2.2). In some cases the taxation revenue was hypothecated for particular purposes, for example all taxation revenue, and any distributed surpluses, from Lotteries SA must be paid into the “SA Hospitals Fund”, except for revenues from sports related betting such as the pools, the revenue for which is hypothecated for sports related grants and programs.

The nature of current Commonwealth-State fiscal relations creates pressures for state and territory governments to maximise their gambling tax revenues as these are one of a limited range of ‘own source’ revenues available to the states. The Commonwealth Grants Commission uses the revenue raising per capita capacity of state/territory governments as one of the factors in determining the

distribution of grant funds, so states are effectively penalised if they do not raise revenue at a typical rate to other jurisdictions.23

As well as facing the standard range of corporate taxes, gambling operators are taxed on their gambling operations (hereafter referred to as gambling taxes). These gambling taxes are usually based on gambling revenue (either gross turnover or net revenue) but can include flat licence fees. The rates of taxes applied vary not only between jurisdictions, but also by gambling product (e.g. EGMs, wagering, racing, table games), venue type, by the type of gambler (e.g. casinos are often taxed at a different rate for gambling by ‘VIP’ gamblers) and by the scale of the venue (e.g. a number of jurisdictions impose ‘super taxes’ when either total venue revenue from EGMs or revenue per machine exceeds a certain level).

Taxes are a significant part of the casino industry’s cost structure, typically second only to labour costs (Australasian Casino Association24_{, 2011). In 2013/14, Australian casinos paid taxes of AU$1.36b to}

various levels of government; about 30 per cent of the revenues they generate. Table 3.3 sets out the taxes paid by casinos to the various levels of government. ‘Gambling taxes’ paid to State and Territory governments account for just under 60 per cent of the total tax revenue from casinos in each year shown, with the remaining 40 per cent coming from general business taxes.

Table 3.3: Taxation paid by Casinos, Australia(a) _{2008/09, 2009/10 and 2013/14}

2008/09 2009/10 2013/14