The last hypothesis states that the presence of security issues associated with refugee influxes, such as the fight against terrorism, violent extremism, and radicalisation, prevents the effective use of refugee resources in fostering economic growth. In 2016 several major terrorist incidents took place in Irbid, Kerak, al-Baqaa camp, and the al-Jafr air base (Milton-Edwards, 2017). These terrorist attacks were performed by Jordanian home-grown terrorists. Above mentioned security issues are high on the agenda for Jordan, both as external and internal threats. The increase of terrorist attacks on Jordanian soil following the Syrian conflict has likely more to do with internal radicalisation and migration of Jordanians to Syria than the influx of Syrians refugees. Jordan is in the top 3 of countries with most foreign fighters that have left to Syria or Iraq, some of them already starting to return (Barrett, 2017). This has been a major point of concern for the Jordanian government (personal communication, May 29, 2019). While it is
Jordanian nationals rather than refugees causing these security threats, security issues such as radicalisation are linked to economic issues. Lack of opportunities for economic participation of the youth could stimulate radicalisation (Al Sabaileh, 2018). Hence the impact of the refugee influx on the Jordanian economy, in turn, affects the national security and political instability of Jordan (Younes, 2018).
The interrelated nature of these issues is recognized in both the JC and the ENP. The ENP concerning Jordan is structured around three mutually reinforcing objectives, one being “regional stability and security, including counter-terrorism” (EC, 2018). King Abdallah II of Jordan has voiced various security concerns both to the international community and nation-wide. While Jordan has prided itself on its open-border policy at the start of the Syrian crisis, border restrictions increased as the conflict went on, followed by international criticism. King Abdullah reacted by asserting that “elements” of Islamic State were among refugees stranded in border zones, hence they would be “going through a strong vetting system”, implying the risk of importing terrorists while admitting refugees (BBC, 2016).
An important side note to this border policy is that it seems more correct to focus on the relation between border zones and insecurity, rather than Syrian refugees in general and insecurity. A suicide attack on a Jordanian army base in the Rukban refugee camp on the Syrian-Jordanian border in 2016 led to the security vacuum that came to exist along Jordan’s northern borders (Ibrahim, 2018). Furthermore, the issue of borders also relates to the Jordanian economy since the securitization of borders meant cutting off of key trade routes.
Although fleeing from the Syrian conflict is a central part of the refugee identity of many Syrians in Jordan and risk of spill-over has serious consequences for Jordanian security, the link between refugees and these security issues is not as straightforward. Jacobsen’s argument that “insecurity reduces the economic vitality of the community and offsets any economic advantages that might accrue from refugee resources” only seems to be true when insecurity is directly and solely related to refugees. Yet in Jordan, security issues are not limited to refugees as a cause. The refugees that are considered a security threat are separated into isolated sections of refugee camps (personal communication, May 29, 2019).
Research by the ILO established that “85% of Jordanian workers feel that Syrians should not be allowed to enter Jordan freely, while 65% state Syrians should be limited to living in refugee camps” (Stave & Hillesund, 2015, p. 113). Nevertheless, this likely has more to do with the sentiment that Syrians threaten the financial security of Jordanians in terms of job competition, rather than a fear of Syrian refugees in security terms. Moreover, in an interview with mayor Abbas Maharmeh Syrian refugees are described as follows: “Syrians are not refugees, foreigners, we treat them like citizens. We’re happy to do our duty to our brothers” (Betts, et al., n.d., p. 14). Maharmeh is mayor of the Sahab municipality, part of the Amman governorate, where 2018 saw the highest amount of work permits being issued. The discourse of Maharmeh concerning Syrians shows a complete lack of securitization. Since the act of securitization is not limited to the highest levels of government officials and since research by Betts et al. has concluded that “municipal authorities are key actors” in facilitating economic
empowerment of Syrian refugees and Jordanian citizens, the lack of securitization in this narrative is striking (Betts, Ali & Memişoğlu, n.d., p. 28).
Using the JC as a test case of the securitization hypothesis is especially interesting in terms of using securitization as a transversal political technology, or rather a way for politicians to mask certain failures by shifting attention to different concerns, such as refugees. On a national level, the government of Jordan has reason to shift public focus following a rise in threats to its political stability (Younes, 2018). Yet on an international level, the government gains the most by attempting to prove an increase in employment of Syrian refugees through the issuing of work permits, something that is more difficult when refugees are framed as security threats. Securitization inhibits economic integration and exactly economic integration of refugees is needed for the government to receive the most benefits.
All in all, this suggests that this hypothesis can be discarded in explaining the lack of progress of the JC in integrating Syrian refugees into the formal labor market and benefitting the host population. A risk in testing most securitization hypotheses is that once you look for it, it is easy to find examples suggesting securitization of an issue, whether it is justified or not. Nonetheless, the reasons for why state actors might use securitization of refugees as a political strategy is contradictory to their aims of increasing benefits derived from international agreements such as the JC. Moreover, it would not be justified to perceive Syrian refugees as the cause of security issues within Jordan when it is more so the case that Jordanian nationals pose security threats related to terrorism, radicalisation, and violent extremism.