The task o f this section o f the current chapter is to provide an answer as to the
compatibility o f nationalism and democracy. From the outset I would like to stress what has already been signaled thus far - the relationship between nationalism and democracy is inherently ambiguous. This ambiguity is rooted in the fact that politics instigated by nationalism and democracy both claim to answer to ‘the will o f the people’. The
undesirable consequences o f nationalism have been amply demonstrated over the course o f this century159, nevertheless democracy is linked to a sovereign political unit and that to a modem state. The creation o f that state has most likely been preceded by a struggle for national self-determination in an attempt to secure rights for its national group. Each national struggle carries within itself two ideas: more rights and recognition o f a given territory and a distinctive group sharing certain ethnic and /or political characteristics. In each case the idea is simultaneously democratic and prone to an undemocratic practice, because the definition o f a territory, its group and its corresponding rights can and usually does generate a definition o f ‘the other’ who may then be excluded, politically or even physically from the unit that has thus acquired a new political status. Hence, the compatibility o f nationalism and democracy travels a very thin line, for every positive side there is a glimmer o f the negative side, which does not mean to say that the
relationship must fail, merely that it is a difficult one to manage. In the next few pages I shall focus on the positive elements o f national identity and national self-determination
159 For the opposite view, linking much o f the twentieth century genocide to ‘the dark side of
democracy’, see M.Mann ‘The Dark Side of Democracy: The Modem Tradition o f Ethnic and Political Cleansing’ New Left Review 235 May/June 1999 p.p. 18-45
whilst pointing out their potential negative characteristics and discuss the contradictory logic o f nation-building and state-building.
2.3.1. ‘The people’, their Identity and their Self-determination
It is argued here that three main pillars on which nationalism rests are national self- determination principle, its ontological key element - national identity and the interests of the national group. This section explores the close interrelationship among them (how international relations and in this context the European integration shape nationalism and its relation to democracy is the subject o f the Chapter 7). The idea o f national self- determination stands for the establishment o f the preferred form o f government, whether it is a component o f a multinational state, a federation or as an independent state160. Let us first explore the main arguments for national self-determination, that is for the boundaries o f political units (states or federal units) to coincide with national (cultural) boundaries.
The underlying assumption is that the nation is an important source o f personal identity161, which provides one with a place in the world and hence exercises a
considerable influence over one’s opportunities and choices in life. Obviously, one’s life is largely influenced by more immediate groupings and relationships than ‘the nation’, but national culture provides an important moral and practical resource in an individual’s existence. The main reason for favouring national self-determination derives from the above assumption that national cultures are worth protecting. Moreover, each
community feels that the distribution and management o f their resources and decisions about the future o f their community are best served by more autonomy.
Why it is a national state that is considered best equipped to protect a group’s culture and autonomy has to be sought in real or imagined national experiences. Historically there are many instances when a multinational state has tried to assimilate weaker groups by force (e.g. Magyarisation in the nineteenth century), or economically exploit a more successful national group (e.g. the Yugoslav federation versus Slovenia), or simply dominate the state’s policy by numerical preponderance (e.g. the Czechs in Czechoslovakia), so that empirically there is enough evidence to assume that the best
160 B.O’Leary as above p.69
protection against the erosion o f one’s culture and resources is to share decisions with like-minded people, thus keep it within one’s own state. That however does not stop a particular political or economic grouping from the exploitation o f its co-nationals, so strictly speaking national self-determination implies the correspondence o f the popular will and state borders162. Herein lies the connection between democracy and national self-determination. In principle only a democratic state would be able to ensure that the national self-determination truly reflects the will o f “the people” and therefore, in theory, national self-determination is linked to democratic consent and citizenship and the
development o f a modem state, itself the guarantor o f the nation.
In the context o f postcommunist transitions nationalism must be viewed, at least partially, as a positive force. The idea o f the nation provided the populations o f the ECE countries with an identity and self-esteem when both were rendered hollow by
communist regimes. Moreover, the greatest achievement o f nationalism is the right to national self-determination which in the East European context contributed to the
legitimacy and coherence o f the new-born states163 and helped their citizens to endure the initial hardship o f the transition. The problem however is that the idea o f the national self-determination, which can be interpreted as the right to democratic government, does not necessarily guarantee the existence o f a democratic regime.
One reason is the above mentioned fact that under democracy we understand liberal-democracy and that the logics o f liberalism and democracy, even if now merged, are quite different. Liberalism focuses on individual and human rights, democracy locates the power in the people; liberalism places limits on the power o f governments, even democratic ones, whilst democracy grants power to the people, whether the result is democratic or not. So, it would be stretching the concept o f national self-determination too far to claim that it requires or guarantees democracy.
It is clear that national self-determination has lost its good name due to the violence with which it is often pursued and because national self-determination once achieved does not guarantee a democratic regime in the name o f which the process legitimised itself in the first place. The problem is magnified in a multinational setting - a priority given to compatriots o f the dominant nationality, thus overriding obligations to
162 On Nationality p.89
S.R.Bollerup Ch.D.Christensen Nationalism in Eastern Europe London, Macmillan Press 1997