firma del demandante o representante Legal.

448. The Court notes that the applicant’s complaints relate both to the events that occurred on Poland’s territory and to the consequences of his transfer from Poland to other places of his undisclosed detention (see paragraphs 3 and 82-118 above and paragraphs 457, 515, 527, 535 and 546 below)

In that regard, the Court would wish to reiterate the relevant applicable principles.

1. As regards the State’s responsibility for an applicant’s treatment and detention by foreign officials on its territory

449. The Court reiterates that, in accordance with its settled case-law, the respondent State must be regarded as responsible under the Convention for acts performed by foreign officials on its territory with the acquiescence or connivance of its authorities (see Ilaşcu and Others, cited above, § 318; and El-Masri, cited above, § 206).

2. As regards the State’s responsibility for an applicant’s removal from its territory

450. According to the Court’s settled case-law, removal of an applicant from the territory of a respondent State may engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention if this action has as a direct consequence the exposure of an individual to a foreseeable violation of his Convention rights in the country of his destination (see, among many other examples, Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, §§ 90-91 and 113; Series A no. 161; Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, §§ 90-91, ECHR 2005-I with further references; Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201/06, § 125, ECHR 2008; Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom, no. 61498/08, § 149, ECHR 2010; Babar Ahmad and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 24027/07, 11949/08, 36742/08, 66911/09 and 67354/09, § 168, 10 April 2012; Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, no. 8139/09, §§ 233 and 285, ECHR 2012 (extracts) and El-Masri, cited above, §§ 212-214 and 239, with further references).

451. In that context, the Court has repeatedly held that the decision of a Contracting State to remove a person – and, a fortiori, the actual removal itself – may give rise to an issue under Article 3 where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person in question would, if removed, face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to that provision in the destination country (see Soering, cited above, § 91; and El-Masri, cited above, § 212).

Where it has been established that the sending State knew, or ought to have known at the relevant time that a person removed from its territory was subjected to “extraordinary rendition”, that is, “an extra-judicial transfer of persons from one jurisdiction or State to another, for the purposes of detention and interrogation outside the normal legal system, where there was a real risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”, the possibility of a breach of Article 3 is particularly strong and must be considered intrinsic in the transfer (see El-Masri, cited above, §§ 218- 221).

452. Furthermore, a Contracting State would be in violation of Article 5 of the Convention if it removed, or enabled the removal, of an applicant to a State where he or she was at real risk of a flagrant breach of that Article (see Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, cited above § 233; and El-Masri, cited above § 239).

Again, that risk is inherent where an applicant has been subjected to “extraordinary rendition”, which entails detention ...“outside the normal legal system” and which, “by its deliberate circumvention of due process, is anathema to the rule of law and the values protected by the Convention” (see El-Masri, ibid.).

453. Similar principles apply to cases where there are substantial grounds for believing that, if removed from a Contracting State, an applicant would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to a flagrant denial of justice (see Othman (Abu Qatada), cited above, §§ 261 and 285) or sentenced to the death penalty (see Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi, cited above, § 123 and Kaboulov v. Ukraine, no. 41015/04, § 99, 19 November 2009).

454. While the establishment of the sending State’s responsibility inevitably involves an assessment of conditions in the destination country against the standards set out in the Convention, there is no question of adjudicating on or establishing the responsibility of the destination country, whether under general international law, under the Convention or otherwise. In so far as any liability under the Convention is or may be incurred, it is liability incurred by the sending Contracting State by reason of its having taken action which has as a direct consequence the exposure of an individual to proscribed ill-treatment or other violations of the Convention (see Soering, cited above, §§ 91 and 113; Mamatkulov and Askarov, cited above, §§ 67 and 90; Othman (Abu Qatada), cited above, § 258; and El-Masri, cited above, §§ 212 and 239).

455. In determining whether substantial grounds have been shown for believing that a real risk of the Convention violations exists, the Court will assess the issue in the light of all the material placed before it or, if necessary, material it has obtained proprio motu. It must examine the foreseeable consequences of sending the applicant to the destination country, bearing in mind the general situation there and his personal circumstances.

The existence of the alleged risk must be assessed primarily with reference to those facts which were known or ought to have been known to the Contracting State at the time of the removal. However, where the transfer has already taken place at the date of the Court’s examination, the Court is not precluded from having regard to information which comes to light subsequently (see Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi, cited above, § 125 and El-Masri, cited above, §§ 213-214, with further references).

3. Conclusion

456. The Court will accordingly examine the complaints and the extent to which the events complained of are imputable to the Polish State in the light of the above principles of State responsibility under the Convention, as deriving from its case-law.

V. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION 457. The applicant’s complaints under Article 3 of the Convention involved both substantive and procedural aspects of this provision.

1) As regards his alleged ill-treatment and detention in Poland, he complained that the Polish authorities had knowingly and intentionally enabled the CIA to hold him in secret detention at the Stare Kiejkuty site for more than nine months. Poland had known about the CIA’s rendition programme on its territory and of the real and immediate risk of torture to which High-Value Detainees under this programme had been subjected. Poland had actively agreed to establish a secret detention site and to facilitate the CIA unhindered use of that site.

2) Furthermore, the applicant alleged that Poland, by enabling the CIA to transfer him from its territory to its other secret black sites, had exposed him to years of further torture and ill-treatment. The Polish authorities had known, or should have known, of the real risk that he would continue to be held in the same detention regime as that to which he had been subjected until that point.

3) He also complained under Article 3 taken separately and in conjunction with Article 13 of the Convention that the Polish authorities had been in breach of the procedural obligations under Article 3 and that he had been denied the right to a remedy under Article 13, since they had failed to conduct an effective investigation into his into his allegations of torture, ill-treatment and secret detention in a CIA-run detention facility in Stare Kiejkuty and of being unlawfully transferred to places where he had faced further torture and ill-treatment.

458. Article 3 of the Convention states:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

459. The Court will first examine the applicant’s complaint under the procedural aspect of Article 3 about the lack of an effective and thorough investigation into his allegations of ill-treatment when in CIA custody on Poland’s territory.