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DE LA FISCALÍA GENERAL DE LA NACIÓN

In document CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA (página 64-68)

TÍTULO VIII DE LA RAMA JUDICIAL

DE LA FISCALÍA GENERAL DE LA NACIÓN

Trade unions contribute positively to democracy on a political level if they manage to influence political parties and legislation in ways that gives legitimacy to the democratic institutions and ensures representation of workers. A negative role on the political level would be trade unions that either completely ignore or actively work to destroy democratic institutions.

The study of the political role of trade unions is of course connected to the other levels, but it deserves to be an analytically distinct factor. The political level is often seen as the most central dimension of union activity. It is also the dimension that concerned the consensus and conflict tradition elaborated on earlier in the chapter. But where the consensus and conflict tradition operationalized political impact as the degree of militancy and the stated

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demands of unions, I favor a somewhat broader approach. In order to fully assess the role unions play on the political level, we need to study how the unions relate to politics and how this affects the political institutions in the local context. Richard Hyman (2004) has made a useful distinction between three different ways unions can relate to the political level. The first is business unionism, meaning a strategy where unions seek to be only labor market actors, without any political goals. The second is class oriented unionism, where the trade unions see themselves as involved in anti-capitalist struggle, and workers must unite to change the system completely. The third strategy is social unionism, where the unions seek to work as actors for social integration, aiming for compromise, not unlike the strategy described in the consensus tradition. While these are seen as the most common ways of affecting party politics, it might not be the only ones imaginable. In Habermas’ ideal civil society, organizations function as intermediary for individuals and present a reasoned argument proposing changes in policy. These arguments are then taken up by democratically elected politicians who inscribe the policies suggested into law (Habermas 1992; Urbinati and Warren 2008). In this scenario, the workers need not establish their own parties, but rather make sure that their message is heard by the political parties that exist. Other political strategies might also be imagined. It is difficult to deem one political strategy conducive or destructive to democratization in itself. Again, the focus must be on the consequences in the given context.

A union`s wish and ability to influence the political institutions is important for democratization for mainly two reasons. First, it functions as an institutional mechanism ensuring the representation of workers, in line with Ringen`s definition of democracy. Second, it would give legitimacy to and strengthen democratic institutions. To be able to bring the voice of the workers to the political level is an important part of improving their control over decision making and thus improving the quality of democracy. An alternative role for trade unions to play here would be to ignore the political institutions altogether or actively seek to destroy them or replace them with non-democratic institutions. Truly revolutionary trade union movements for example, seeking the destruction of the political system cannot be seen as constructive democratizers. That does not mean that what they do is always harmful to society on all levels, but if the aim is to assess the consequences for

democratization, trade unions advocating and following a strategy that involves abolishment

of those very democratic institutions, have to be deemed destructive.

I have summarized the different dimensions of the new framework in table 3.2. In the analysis chapters (chapter 5-7), I provide an example of how this can be used to assess trade

35 unions’ role in democratization in a more in-depth way than existing perspectives. If we compare table 3.2 to table 3.1, we see that instead of just focusing on stated demands and degree of militancy, we have directed our focus at the broader role trade unions play in transition processes, including the political level, but also the individual and institutional level. This is not a narrow blueprint, claiming that trade unions have to follow a specific ideology, engage in a certain number of strikes, or seek specific alliances in order to be constructive to democracy. It opens up our way of thinking about trade unions in transition, rather than narrowing it. A wide variety of different strategies and union activities might be conducive or destructive to democracy according to this framework. It all depends on how their activity influences the given context.

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Table 3.2: Framework for Analyzing Trade Unions’ Role in Democratization

Individual level Institutional level Political level

Meaning Influence on individuals’

attitudes and actions

Influence on the industrial relations system

Influence on political institutions

Indicator(s)  Sense of agency

 Commitment to democracy  Democratization of industrial relations  Ability to implement demands  Influence on political parties and institutions Constructive role

 Increasing workers agency

 Contributing to establishing democratic consciousness  Actions leading to democratization of industrial relations  Ability to implement demands and potential to implement future demands

 Ability to forward demands to political parties

Destructive role

 Inability to make workers feel included/represented, increase a sense of exclusion from society

 Increasing sectarian cleavages, seeking sectarian or clientelistic solutions rather than collective action

 Actions that inhibits democratization of industrial relations

 Inability to implement any workers

demands/unwillingness (lack of internal democracy)

 Ignoring or seeking to destroy/delegitimize political institutions.  Unable to forward workers demand to political parties

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In document CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA (página 64-68)