Th e Developmental State concept has not been without its critics, from within the theory in terms of imminent critiques (as discussed above) as well as from other theoretical traditions. One critique emerged from the World Bank, which (re)interpreted the East Asian Development experience and sug- gested that the state was involved in the industrialisation process simply to help facilitate freer markets (World Bank 1993 , 1997 ; see also Page 1994 : 199). Alternative criticisms have been more nuanced, focusing on either the narrowness of Developmental State theory’s understanding of development, for example, the repression of labour in terms of wages and welfare in order to maximise dynamic effi ciency (Caldentey 2008 : 50–51), or on the need to ‘bring class back in’ (Radice 2008 : 1168) to its analysis of the state.
Self-Selection Issues
As Developmental State literature emerged out of the context of an empiri- cal problem of explaining the East Asian development experience, the the- ory suff ers from the problem of ‘cherry-picking’. Th us, due to a method of ‘identifying developmental states and explaining them in terms of the policies adopted and the capacity to adopt them, case studies with the Developmental State literature have been self-selecting’ (Fine 2013 : 10).
Th e extent to which the concept of the Developmental State can be con- sidered a theory at all can therefore be questioned. However, this chapter rejects such a critique as it is itself grounded in the inductive approach
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(see Pirie 2013 : 167). Th e study of the political economy of development concerns transformations in the social system (Heymann et al. 2006 : 33). Tracking such processes and representing them in a precise way necessarily requires detailed analysis of events and policies before eff ective interpretation
through the application or development of theoretical frameworks. Th erefore, the role of theory is to facilitate holistic analysis and interpretation of oth- erwise apparently disconnected series of events. Furthermore, theory allows analysis to move beyond spatially and temporally specifi c events and thus facilitates comparative refl ections (in the context of the political economy of development) on patterns of production, consumption, and distribution. Such refl ections produce heuristic devices that enrich any attempts to charac- terise specifi c Developmental States or Regimes (Wylde 2012 : 9).
At the other end of the scale is the application of the Developmental State concept to any and all instances of state-driven development; the issue of con- ceptual stretching. Th e Developmental State must be more than simply an economic strategy based around economic growth. As Fine’s ( 1997 : 3) critique suggests, the Developmental State concept is in danger of being reduced to the statement that ‘[w]herever there is or has been development, there must have been a Developmental State’. Th is critique is overcome through a more rigor- ous understanding of the core theoretical tenets of Developmental State theory which moves beyond simple state–market dichotomies and embrace state– society concerns. Th e concept of embedded autonomy began this process, with the work of Pempel and others on the Developmental Regime taking it further. Embedded Autonomy Versus Relative Autonomy
Th e ontological theorisation of state–society relationships in classic Developmental State thought as outlined in the previous section can be brought into question. Developmental State theory, and indeed the Developmental Regime concept (at least as understood by Pempel) developed its understand- ing of society as a set of social groups with diff erent economic functions. Th erefore, the actions of Developmental States (indeed all states as we are now talking about general state theory) can be explained through the ‘organ- isational features’ of a given state. Organisational features can be defi ned as a set of organisations through which collectivities of offi cials may be able to formulate and implement distinctive strategies of policies (Evans et al. 1985 : 20–21). In terms of a Developmental State, this led to focus on bureaucratic strength and coherence; what matters is the relation between the state and other groups of collective individuals. Th is was achieved by interpreting the
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state as an independent agent that develops and institutionalises relationships with diff erent groups—for the Developmental State with business sectors and for the Developmental Regime a wider constellation of diff erent social groups dependent upon the specifi c case under consideration.
Such a view of the state has been critiqued by neo-Marxists (see, e.g., Chang
2013 ; Jessop 2008 ) as requiring politics to be viewed as analytically separate from economics—or the state as autonomous from classes. Such a view mis- represents or downplays the dependence of the state upon capital (or other class) relations (Chang 2013 : 91). Th at is not to say that the state should be seen as a mere refl ection of class interests—the ‘economic committee of the bourgeoisie’; rather, the state should be seen as a ‘social relation’ (Poulantzas
2000 [1978])—possessing ‘relative autonomy’ from diff erent class interests as it advocates the interests of capitalism rather than capitalists. Th is ‘embedded autonomy versus relative autonomy’ debate is centred on ‘bringing class back in’, or asking the question who is doing what to whom? (Radice 2008 : 1168), with the embedded autonomists seeing class more in terms of social groups that interact with the state, and relative autonomists focusing more on class relations and the complex manner in which these mutually (re)constitute the state, which can itself therefore be understood as a social relation. Such an understanding facilitates a fi rmer grip on the necessary ensemble of social relations of production and associated institutions that link society with the state that best facilitates latecomer industrialisation.