Flujo de trabajo: Establecer líneas bases

Is truthful defamatory imputation against private individual and government employee a defense in libel? Proof of truth of defamatory imputation against private individual is a defense if it is published with good motives and for justifiable ends. Proof of the truth of defamatory imputation against government employees is a defense: (1) if it is published with good motives and for justifiable ends; or (2) if the act or omission imputed constitutes a crime;

or (3) if the imputation not constituting a crime is related to the discharge of his duties.

Truthfulness of imputation of a crime or a function-related defamatory act against a public

officer is a defense even though he does not prove that the imputation was published with good motives and for justifiable ends (Vasquez vs. CA, G.R. No. 118971, September 15, 1999).

MALICE - What are the different rules on presumption involving malice as an element of libel or oral defamation? 1. Disputable presumption of malice - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious. Presumed malice is also known as “malice in law.” However, the following circumstances negate the presumption of malice in a defamatory statement: (1) if there is a good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown; (2) if the defamatory statements is a qualified privilege communication such (a) A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and (b) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions (Article 354 of RPC). The enumeration under Article 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged (Borjal vs. CA, G.R. No. 126466 January 14, 1999). 2.

Conclusive presumption of lack of malice – If the defamatory statements are an absolute privilege communication, lack of malice is conclusively presumed. Thus, the person making defamatory imputation is not answerable for libel. Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith such as speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof (Philippine Journalists, Inc vs. Thoenen, G.R. No. 143372, December 13, 2005) or words uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings, provided the statements are pertinent or relevant to the case (Malit vs. People, G.R. No. L-58681, May 31, 1982).

FAIR COMMENT DOCTRINE - What is the doctrine of fair comment? Under this doctrine, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every defamatory and public imputation is deemed false, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the defamatory imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such defamatory imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts (Borjal vs. CA, G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999).

What is the difference between fair and true report, and fair comment as a privilege communications? (1) In fair and true report, the accused makes a report on the function-related acts performed by public officers without any comments or remarks. On the other hand, in fair comment, the accused is making a comment on the function-related acts performed by public officers. (2) In fair and true report, the prosecution must prove actual malice i.e., such as the report was made in bad faith. In fair comment, the prosecution must actual malice i.e., comment was made with knowledge that comment was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not (Sulivan vs. Newyork Times doctrine; Guingguing vs. the Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128959, September 30, 2005) Only false statements made with the high degree of awareness of their probable falsity demanded by New York Times may be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions (Flor vs. People, G.R. No. 139987, March 31, 2005).

(3) In fair and true report, the report involving defamatory statement must be true. In fair comment, the defamatory imputation in the commentary is not true but the accused has no knowledge that it is false and has not recklessly disregarded to know whether it is false or not.

Is error or misstatement in commentaries on function related acts of public officer actionable in a news articles for being libelous? Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language. There must be

some room for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy (Borjal vs. CA, G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999).

Brillante implicated Jejomar Binay, then the OIC Mayor of Makati, and Dr. Nemesio Prudente, then President of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines in a planned assassination of Syjuco as well as election-related terrorism. Is the doctrine of fair comment applicable in this libel case? The New York Times principle is not applicable since the utterances are unrelated to a public officer’s performance of his duties (Brillante vs. CA, G.R.

Nos. 118757 & 121571, October 19, 2004). Obviously, commission of murder and terrorism is not related to the performance of their duties as public officers.

Cristy Fermin imputed to Annabelle Rama Gutierrez an actress the crime of malversation and of vices or defects for being fugitives from the law and of being a wastrel. Is the doctrine of fair comment applicable in this libel case? No. It is unrelated to public figure’s work (Fermin vs. People, G.R. No. 157643, March 28, 2008). The defamatory imputation has nothing to do to with works of Annabelle as a as an actress.

In his series of articles of Erwin Tulfo, he targeted one Atty. "Ding" So of the Bureau of Customs as being involved in criminal activities, and was using his public position for personal gain. He went even further than that, and called Atty. So an embarrassment to his religion, saying "ikawnayataangpinakagago at magnanakawsamiyembronito." He accused Atty. So of stealing from the government with his alleged corrupt activities. And when Atty. So filed a libel suit against him, Tulfo wrote another article, challenging Atty. So, saying,

"Nagalititongtarantadongsi Atty. So dahilbinabantayankosiya at in-expose angkagaguhanniyasa [Bureau of Customs]." In his testimony, Tulfo admitted that he did not personally know Atty. So, and had neither met nor known him prior to the publication of the subject articles. He also admitted that he did not conduct a more in-depth research of his allegations before he published them, and relied only on his source at the Bureau of Customs. Is Tulfo liable for Libel? Yes. Journalists bear the burden of writing responsibly when practicing their profession, even when writing about public figures or matters of public interest. The report made by Tulfo cannot be considered as "fair" and "true" since he did not do research before making his allegations, and it has been shown that these allegations were baseless. The articles are not

"fair and true reports," but merely wild accusations. He had written and published the subject articles with reckless disregard of whether the same were false or not (Erwin Tulfo vs. People, G.R. No. 161032, September 16, 2008).

The article in Bander newspaper details the sexual activities of a certain “Miss S” and one “Philip Henson” who had a romantic liaison. The words used in the article convey that

“Miss S” is a sexual libertine with unusually wanton proclivities in the bedroom. Is the article defamatory and malicious? Is the writer liable for libel? Yes. In a society such as ours, where modesty is still highly prized among young ladies, the behavior attributed to “Miss S” by the article in question had besmirched both her character and reputation. Since on its face the article is defamatory, there is a presumption that the offender acted with malice. However, the writer cannot be held liable for libel. The libelous article, while referring to "Miss S," does not give a sufficient description or other indications which identify "Miss S." In short, the article fails to show that "Miss S" and complainant are one and the same person. Although the article is libelous, complainant could not have been the person defamed therein (Diaz v. People, G.R.

No. 159787, May 25, 2007).

INTERNET LIBEL - Under Article 355, a libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means. Is the internet used to post a malicious defamatory imputation through facebook within the contemplation of the phrase “any similar means” in Article 355? Yes. Writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition has a common characteristic, and that is, their permanent nature as a means of publication, and this explains the graver penalty for libel than that prescribed for oral defamation (People vs. Santiago, G.R. No. L-17663, May 30,

1962). Hence, the phrase “any similar means” should be understood in the lights of the said common characteristic of the means to commit libel. Since nature of internet as a means of publication is likewise permanent, it should be considered as a means to commit libel.

What is the venue for internet libel committed? As a general rule, the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense;

or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published (Article 360 of RPC).However, the place where libelous article was accessed by the offended party in the internet is not equivalent to the place where the libelous article is “printed and first published”.

To rule otherwise is to allow the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360, and that was the indiscriminate laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, to harass an accused. At any rate, Article 360 still allow offended party to file the civil or criminal complaint for internet libel in their respective places of residence (Bonifacio vs.

RTC, Makati, Branch 149, G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010).

Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyber libel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes “similar means”

for committing libel (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 20335, February 18. 2014).

VENUE - The rules on venue for libel in Article 360 of RPC are as follows: (1) Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published; (2) If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense. (3) If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. (4) If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense (Foz, Jr., vs. People, GR No. 167764, October 09, 2009, ).

Information alleged that the libelous writings were published in Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and that complainant (private individual) is a physician in Iloilo. Is the Information quashable for improper venue?

Answer: Yes. The allegations in the Information that "Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo" only showed that Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in considerable circulation but did not establish that the said publication was printed and first published in Iloilo City.

The Information failed to allege the residence of complainant. While the Information alleges that complainant is a physician in Iloilo City, such allegation did not clearly and positively indicate that he was actually residing in Iloilo City at the time of the commission of the offense. It is possible that complainant was actually residing in another place (Foz, Jr., vs.

People, GR No. 167764, October 09, 2009).