FOCALIZACIÓN (TARGETING) DE INVERSIONISTAS OBJETIVO

Fatimid Egypt emerged out of the wreckage of the Abbasid dynasty. Beginning around the year 900, the Abbasids, who had ruled the Muslim Near East for almost a century and a half, watched as their power declined and the various parts of the empire they controlled went their separate ways. Egypt was one of those parts. The Egyptians formed their own caliphate, separate from the one that already existed in Baghdad, supported by its own government and army. Since the caliph in Cairo traced the line of his authority back to Muhammad’s daughter, Fatima, his realm became known as Fatimid Egypt. Due to the fact that Fatima’s husband, Ali, was recognized by the Shiites as the sole legitimate heir to the Prophet, Fatimid Egypt became a Shiite stronghold that blatantly defied the Sunni caliph and the sultans allied with him.

For two centuries, Fatimid Egypt grew and prospered. But by the mid-12th century, all was not well along the banks of the Nile. Tensions similar to those between the sultan and caliph in Syria had grown between al-Adid, the caliph in Cairo, and a cunning politician named Shawar. Looking for nothing less than complete control over Egypt, Shawar demanded that al-Adid make him the vizier, or chief govern- ment official. Yet many men coveted such an important post. Shawar needed a strong patron to support his quest. Lacking the power necessary to force al-Adid to appoint him, Shawar solicited help from abroad in his struggle at home. Naturally he turned to Syria and Nur al-Din — who, for his part, wanted more influence over affairs in the eastern Mediter- ranean, and knew that the caliph would be in his debt if he succeeded in nudging Shiite Egypt back into the Sunni fold. After some thought, Nur al-Din agreed and promised Syrian troops to Shawar. The soldiers would serve under Shirkuh and his 26-year-old nephew, Saladin. Just as Shawar had hoped, the appearance of such a mighty expeditionary force 34 SALADIN

as that commanded by Shirkuh prompted the Fatimid caliph to appoint Shawar as vizier. Once in power, however, Shawar became nervous with so many armed Syrians in Egypt; he quickly made it clear that he wanted them to go home. Shirkuh and Saladin, however, were not so keen to leave without explicit orders to do so from Damascus, and stayed put.

Shawar feared the Syrians, and knew just how vulnerable Egypt was. He also realized what an attractive target Egypt presented to other parties, namely the Byzantines and Franks. The new vizier could not fight all these enemies, nor could he ally Egypt with both Christians and Muslims at the same time. Shawar’s dilemma forced him to consider which of his possible adversaries represented the greatest threat to his position and the independence of Egypt. Compelled to choose the lesser of these evils, Shawar sent word to Jerusalem that he wanted to talk to the Franks. In the end, the vizier feared Nur al-Din more than anyone else, so he invited the king of Jerusalem, Amalric, to form an alliance. Amalric might come and go, if the right price could be found, but Nur al-Din threatened Shawar’s very basis for control. Amalric, additionally, was no Shirkuh, and he most certainly had no second in command to match Saladin. Shawar figured that Amalric could be handled far more easily than the Syrians could.

Open warfare between the Fatimid-Frankish army and the Syrians now erupted. In their first engagement, Shirkuh and Saladin quickly put their opponents on the run, proving the superiority of Syrian arms and tactics. But instead of following up his rout of the enemy with a vigorous pursuit, Shirkuh fell back into Lower Egypt to protect his lines of supply and communication centered on the city of Alexandria. Once Shirkuh arrived, he gave the job of protecting the city over to Saladin. During the siege that followed, Saladin managed the defenses splendidly. Although the garrison

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A Fatimid illustration of two horsemen in combat. The Fatimid warriors, under the leadership of the vizier Shawar, aligned themselves with the Christian Franks and fought with the Syrians, with whom Saladin and his uncle Shirkuh fought.

suffered greatly from hunger and thirst and struggled to hold the Franks at bay, the city held out long enough for Nur al-Din to distract Amalric by attacking northern Palestine. Jerusalem’s king, fearing that his base of power might fall while he sat outside of Alexandria, had no choice but to ask Saladin for a truce. Victorious but weakened by the long siege, Saladin needed to return home to Syria for reinforce- ments, so he gladly accepted the Frankish offer. Saladin had won, but the experience left a lasting impression on him and gave the future sultan a lifelong aversion to siege warfare. Later, Saladin remarked that fighting and privation in Egypt changed him forever. “I suffered such hardships at Alexandria,” he once told a friend, “as I shall never forget.”

With the siege behind him, Saladin marched back to Damascus. No sooner had he settled in, however, then news arrived of a new Frankish invasion of Egypt. Shirkuh’s best chance to set matters straight in Egypt had come at last. “Yusef,” Shirkuh shouted at Saladin, “pack your things! We’re going!” Although he loathed the idea of going back, Saladin joined Shirkuh and returned once again. This time, the Franks pulled out before the Syrians even arrived, leaving Shawar without his Christian allies. Now came the moment for Shirkuh to break the scheming vizier once and for all. Soon after arriving, Saladin and some of his troops caught Shawar riding near the Great Pyramids and promptly killed him. The frightened caliph immediately elevated Shirkuh to Shawar’s office. Saladin’s uncle, for all intents and purposes, now ruled Egypt.

Shirkuh, however brave, had his faults. One was a tendency to overeat. As a matter of fact, Shirkuh loved to gorge himself at banquets. This habit proved fateful for Saladin. After one particularly huge meal, Shirkuh fell ill and suddenly died. Once again, Egypt was adrift. Who would become the vizier now? Saladin was the name on everyone’s lips. Bright and competent, Shirkuh’s nephew seemed to be

the logical choice. First, the Syrian emirs discussed the matter and decided that Saladin would make a fine leader. Next, the caliph in Cairo had to make up his mind. He knew very little about Saladin other than his exploits at Alexandria and his fine service to Shirkuh, so he turned to his advisers. They convinced the caliph that he could easily dominate the young man. “There is no one weaker,” they said, “than Yusef [Saladin].” In a singular act of underestimation, al-Adid chose to elevate Saladin into his uncle’s position. Saladin accepted and took the title Al-Malik al-Nasir, “the victorious king.”

Back in Damascus, Nur al-Din publicly congratulated Saladin, but privately he worried that Saladin might not remain an obedient vassal. As time passed, relations between the two men became strained. Saladin, sensing the tension, accelerated his consolidation of power in Egypt. He moved quickly to destroy the Fatimid army and undermine the caliph. Saladin had just begun to implement his scheme when suddenly fate intervened on Saladin’s behalf as it would so often in the future; in 1171, al-Adid died unexpectedly.

Free now to do as he pleased, Saladin reconstituted the Egyptian army around a Syrian core and made certain that the new force gave its loyalty to him exclusively rather than to Nur al-Din, as people had expected. Saladin then proceeded to strengthen his position by currying favor with the Abbasid caliph directly, making an end run around Nur al-Din. In a clear effort to win the caliph’s heart, Saladin officially rein- stated the Sunni faith in Egypt. Feeling intensely suspicious and very threatened, Nur al-Din prepared in the spring of 1174 to rein in his young protégé by force. He put together an army and readied an expedition designed to punish Sal- adin and put Egypt back under his control. But, once again, God appeared to shine on Saladin — Nur al-Din died before leaving Syria.

Saladin’s time had arrived. Nur al-Din had made the mistake of leaving his empire in the hands of a son too young 38 SALADIN

to rule in his own right. A struggle ensued to determine who would serve as regent for the boy. Saladin saw his chance and grabbed it. He threw together a small force of about 700 trusted men and set out for Damascus. Before he left, Saladin declared his loyalty to Nur al-Din’s son, but really he wanted power for himself. Marching unopposed to Damascus, Saladin occupied the city and claimed the regent’s title. Most of Nur al-Din’s cities rejected Saladin’s claim, but the caliph in Baghdad, feeling grateful for the return of Egypt, somewhat reluctantly recognized Saladin and proclaimed him to be the Sultan of Syria and Egypt. The son of Ayyub was now the master, even if in name only, of the Muslim Near East.

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