5. Políticas Y Controles De Seguridad
8.5. Focus gruop
Based on the findings of this report, it is evident that there is a need and space to develop better policies to deal with returnees. In their efforts, North African countries can take inspiration notably from the United Nations’ Counter-Terrorism Committee (UN CTC) ‘Madrid Guiding Principles’, which make very specific recom- mendations for coping with FTFs and returnees.19
In line with these principles, this report concludes that a more systematic and comprehensive approach is needed to deal with returning fighters and their families. Security measures are important to identify, monitor and prosecute returnees properly. However, policies based exclusively on security measures will inevitably fail.
The penitentiary approach to returnees should be reconsidered. Firstly, radicalisa- tion in prison is a major challenge in many countries, but it seems particularly acute in some of the countries studied in this report. Returnees will only add pressure to this existing challenge. It is therefore crucial to develop policies that respond effec- tively to the problem.
Second, jailing terrorists might be the end of the judicial cycle but it is only the begin- ning of the rehabilitation and reintegration process. Such programmes started recently in Morocco but are still absent in Egypt and Tunisia. Incarceration may effec- tively ‘freeze’ the problem stemming from returnees for several years, but it will not help in the longer term as terrorists will be released sooner or later. Some returnees are already exiting prisons in the Maghreb. An effective approach to returnees should therefore aim at lowering the chances of re-offending upon release by increasing the chances of a successful reinsertion.
This requires tailored programmes in prison but also more continuity between detention and post-detention measures and administrations. Extensive cooperation must be encouraged between security and social services – a process that is far from evident in Europe and does not seem to be envisaged yet in North Africa.
More broadly, it is accepted that there is a need to broaden the counter-terrorism spectrum, to invest more in community-based prevention programmes and in tackling the environment that is conducive to radicalisation. Indeed, as foreign fighters return into society, the risk of them re-engaging in jihadi activities is high if the primary causes of their radicalisation are not addressed. So far, however, it is not clear how much effort has been invested in such prevention programmes. The answer is clearly not enough.
19 Madrid Guiding Principles: A practical tool for Member States to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, UN Counter-Terrorism Committee, S/2015/939, December 2015; 2018 Addendum to the 2015 Madrid Guid- ing Principles, UN Counter-Terrorism Committee, S/2018/1177, December 2018.
Europe is willing to share its own expertise and offer support to North African countries, as emphasised by the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator in the foreword to this report. This cooperation can be articulated specifically around counter- terrorism issues. In this regard, more cooperation between judiciary and security services can be beneficial to both European and North African countries. Coopera- tion between Moroccan and European intelligence services has increased, for instance, as well as cooperation among prosecutors, notably in the context of the quartet between Moroccan, Belgian, French and Spanish prosecutors’ offices. Capacity-building programmes, such as the ones in Tunisia, should also be continued. Furthermore, European authorities can share their experience with the development of a comprehensive approach to violent extremism, ranging from a robust ‘preven- tion’ pillar to rehabilitation and reinsertion programmes for terrorist convicts. While European countries are still learning by doing, some lessons can already be drawn from the past six years of experiments. In return, Europeans could also learn from regional initiatives, notably from Morocco’s deradicalisation programmes in prison. Finally, at a broader level, Europeans should encourage and support initiatives that aim to tackle the North African environment that has proved conducive to radicalisa- tion. Supporting socio-economic development, education, rule of law, good govern- ance and, most importantly, inclusive policies or regional integration could all serve narrower counter-terrorism efforts.
In short, to conclude, there is still work ahead. The foreign fighters’ challenge will not go away with the fall of the Caliphate. In fact, it may even increase with the return or migration of a number of ‘Syrian veterans’. Historical precedents dictate tackling this issue seriously and proactively. It is, of course, primarily each country’s responsibility to deal with its own returnees. Since radicalisation and mobilisation dynamics are rooted locally and differ across countries, there cannot be a one-size-fits-all approach. However, in light of the scope of this challenge, and of its global dimen- sion, international cooperation is highly desirable. Every country would gain from an open discussion of this challenge and the sharing of good practices. If jihadis of the world can unite, so should we.
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