FODA

9.5 Hum an factors

The most comprehensive study on human factors in DP operations was the Human Factors Pilot Project written by Captain J Hughes in 1994, and published by the DPVOA (now IMCA). Still relevant, some of the findings of this report will be reiterated here.

Analyses of DP-related incidents by IMCA over the period 1987 - 2008 indicated that human error still accounts for around 20% of incidents. That figure, although quite high, is an improvement on the approximately 50% recorded in the late 1980s.

A number of reasons can be proposed as accounting for this reduction. One of these reasons is the more systematic and regulated training undertaken by DPOs and others, administered by The Nautical Institute. Prior to this scheme becoming commonplace, training was usually an extremely piecemeal business, often only available to personnel taking charge of a new vessel. The establishment of the DP Operators' logbook enabled key personnel to record their experience.

In more recent years, equipment has become more reliable and user-friendly. Often, an incident is regarded as being primarily caused by operator error, but the design and layout of the eguipment was a contributing factor. Modern equipment operated by means of a Windows platform is much more intuitive and user-friendly to operate.

The wealth of experience in the operation of DP vessels has led to more relevant and comprehensive operations handbooks and manuals being available. Redundancy levels and provision is much improved, and the techniques of hazard-identification and risk- assessment have all contributed.

A study of human factors will focus on five key areas of particular significance:

Man/machine interface DP

Captain Hughes' report included a number of specific results of the study, some of which will be paraphrased here. For more comprehensive information on human factors, the reader is recommended to study the full document.

i. DP Consoles

An identified problem is physical and/or information overload. DPOs have to operate a large quantity of equipment surrounding the actual DP consoles. Another problem is the

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quantity of information on display, much of which is largely irrelevant.

ii. Work overload and under-stimulation

Overload and under-stimulation are features of a DPO's workload. There are many periods when the amount of work is excessive, and the DPO may well be expected to carry out duties additional to simply manning the DP console. This leads to an increase in stress levels with a commensurate increase in the probability of an operator-related incident. In other parts of this handbook, reference has been made to the need for the DPO to concentrate on the DP system and operation only, and not to engage in any other tasks; these being the duty of the other watch officer. The direct opposite problem is under- utilisation; long hours of enforced idleness at the DP console leading to concentration lapses.

iii. Temporary handover arrangements

Although watch handover arrangements are generally thorough and effective, occasionally a short-term handover causes problems. Relevant information is sometimes not passed over, and the incoming DPO may not be made aware of the status of the DP operation. This can happen, for example, when the Master takes over from the DPO, while the latter attends to another task.

iv. Distracting presence of non-DP personnel

In many vessels the DP control area is freely accessible to other personnel, resulting in distraction and noise. It is vitally important that the DP control area is an appropriate working environment, dedicated exclusively to the safe conduct of DP operations, free from all other distractions and influences.

v. Inadequate manuals and documentation

This is less of a problem nowadays than hitherto, but it occasionally happens that equipment and system manuals are either not available or insufficiently comprehensive or user-friendly.

vi. Risk taking

A variety of causal factors result in risks being taken, departing from accepted standards of operation. This is often the case with the management of position-references. While

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DPOs may assert that their standards of professionalism are high, the analysis of DP incidents shows risk-taking to be a significant causal factor.

vii. DP incident reporting

While IMCA maintains a database of reported incidents, it is evident that not all incidents are reported, and that some incident reporting is misleading or not fully accurate. The human factor here is that of avoiding blame or responsibility.

viii. DP operator training and competence

An inherent limitation in shore-based training is the lack of vessel-specific reality in DP simulator provision. Nevertheless, training is one of the most powerful tools in ensuring DPO competency and is directly linked with the human-factor element.

ix. Knowledge base - vessel specific

Cases are reported in which DPOs had insufficient knowledge of their vessels and their systems.

x. Geographical differences

Standards vary according to geographic location. There is considerable room for abuse of operational and safety procedures in certain parts of the world. The temptation to relax safety constraints must be countered by the implementation of acceptable company- specific standards, and the professionalism of the DPOs themselves.

xi. Fatigue

Principal causes of DPO fatigue are sleep-related, noise-related and operational stress. Sleep-related fatigue is greater where the DPO is working the night shift, and adequate rest is not obtained during the off-watch periods.The two-man watch system goes some way to addressing this problem.

xii. Irresponsible behaviour patterns

Not of major significance, but DPOs have been known to behave in a dangerous manner, violating rules and procedures.

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xiii. Employment conditions

There may be a correlation between conditions of employment, job security, and safety attitudes.

Morale is made up of a number of variables, all difficult to measure, and it is recognised that low morale means lower levels of safety.

xiv. Status of DP operators in the industry

It is evident that DPOs operate more positively where efforts have been made to integrate them into the management of the operation and in the planning of the project. Improved performance is directly related to job satisfaction and self-esteem.

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Guidance to Masters of DP vessels