CHAPTER THREE: INSTITUTIONS: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Institutions keep society from falling apart, provided that there is something to keep institutions from falling apart.
— Elster (1989: 147)
Sovereignty is a social institution of supreme authority. Therefore, we should embed the study of sovereignty within the framework of social institutions and
institutional analysis. It is important to come back to the basics of institutions because some of the confusions over sovereignty result from disagreements on the meaning of institution itself.
The purpose of this chapter is to offer a clear definition of institution, an analytical framework for the study of institutions, including causes of institutional
change, as well as sources of institutional power. I will apply this framework to the study of sovereignty and intervention in the following chapter.
Definitions of Institution in Social Science
There are multiple definitions of social institutions in IR in particular and social science in general. There is no consensus on the meaning of institutions. While there is broad consensus that sovereignty is an institution (Keohane 2002), there is much less consensus on the meaning of institution. Thus, it is important to offer clear definition and
analytical framework of institution because various approaches of institutions lead to different perspectives on sovereignty.
From the rationalist perspective, the neorealist John Mearsheimer defines
institutions as “sets of rules that stipulate the ways in which states cooperate and compete with each other” (1994-5:8). The neoliberal intuitionalist Robert Keohane defines
institution as “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity and shape expectations” (1989:3).37 Both authors restrict institutions to regulative institutions, excluding constitutive ones from their definitions.
Keohane’s definition is the most common in IR although it suffers from some shortcomings. First, Keohane’s definition of institution is tautological for including the effects of institutions in the definition itself. In Keohane’s definition, compliance to institution is built into the definition of institution. But the behavioral outcome
(prescribed roles, shaped expectations and constrained activity) that ought to be explained by institutions should not be part of the definition of institution but a matter of empirical test (Simmons and Martin 2001: 194). By doing so, Keohane limits the concept of institutions only to successful institutions (i.e. institutions that successfully constrain activity and shape expectations). But only if we exclude the behavioral outcomes (shaped expectations and constrained activity) from the definition of institution, we can
differentiate between strong and weak institutions, discuss level of institutionalization as well as violation of institutions.
37 “To be institutionalized, the rules must be durable and must prescribe behavioral roles for
Second, Keohane also restricts institutions to “persistent” rules, which implies that institutional change is unusual matter and institutional persistence is normal fact. But both institutional persistence and institutional change are outcomes as highlighted by contemporary institutional economists. “Approaches positing institutional persistence as a matter of fact, and then thinking of institutional change as unusual events will not be satisfactory. Both phenomena have to be analyzed as part of the same dynamic
equilibrium framework” (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005: 463). Finally, Keohane also includes “to shape expectations” and “to prescribe
behavioral role” within the same definition, which is also redundant. “Behavioral role” is “behavioral expectation” so it is redundant to include “behavioral role” and
“expectations” within the same definition.
From the IR constructivist camp, O. R. Young defines social institutions as “recognized practices consisting of easily identifiable roles, couples with collections of rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles (Young 1986: 107; Keohane 1998:384). The prominent English School scholar, Hidemi Suganami defines institution as
a cluster of social rules, conventions, usages, and practices: it is not a mere
outwardly observable behavior–pattern but a set of conventional assumptions held prevalently among society-members to provide a framework for identifying what is the done thing and what is not in the appropriate circumstances. It connotes normativeness. It is to be distinguished from organizations such as NATO and UNO although these bodies come into existence through the working of institutions (1983: 2365).38
38 The primary concern of the institutionalist school (English School), according to Suganami is,
“to enquire what common assumptions are held about how things are to be done in international relations by those who speak and act in the name of states and how these assumptions affect the maintenance of order at the international level. In other words, the school is engaged in a search for the institutional basis of international order. Hence the label institutionalists” (1983: 2365).
While constructivists’ definitions are more inclusive than the rationalist ones, they also have some shortcomings. Suganami’s definition, for example, is like a black box that includes a mix of stuff (rules, conventions, usages, practices, behavior pattern, and conventional assumptions) without addressing how they are related to each other.
Suganami does not address how the “cluster” is organized as a whole. In other words, he does not address the structure of the institution—the relationships among the different elements that compose institution.39 Constructivists also lack clear criteria of what constitute an institution. Even Hedley Bull “never gave a full definition of what
constitutes an institution, nor does he set out criteria for inclusion into or exclusion from this category” (Buzan 2006: 78). Some constructivists (e.g. Sikkink 1991) define
institution as “set of understandings”, which also suffers from the same pitfalls as Bull and Suganami.
The school of historical institutionalism defines institutions as “formal
organizations and informal rules and procedures that structure conduct.” Peter Hall, in particular, defines institution as “the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy” (Thellen and Steinmo 1992: 2).
John Campbell offers a broader definition of institutions as “sets of formal and informal rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, and systems of meanings that define the contexts within which people and organizations interact. They result in durable practices that are legitimated by widely held beliefs” (2004: 174). Notice that Campbell
39 This problem is common in IR in general, rationalists and constructivists alike. For criticism of
regards practices as a consequence of institution whereas Suganami and Young see practices as part of the definition of institution.
Even the disciplines of Philosophy and Economics lack consensus on the meaning of institution. The philosopher John Rawls defines institution as:
A public system of rules which defines offices and positions with their rights and duties, powers and immunities, and the like. These rules specify certain forms of action as permissible, others as forbidden; and they provide for certain penalties and defenses, and so on, when violations occur … An institution may be thought of in two ways: first as an abstract …system of rules; and second, as the
…[realized] actions specified by these rules (Rawls 1971:55).
What I find particularly useful in Rawls’s definition is the inclusion of social positions, which is excluded in IR definitions mentioned above. He also distinguishes between abstract rules and the practices.
The philosopher John Searle provides a different definition of institution as any collectively accepted system of rules (procedures, practices) that enable us to create institutional facts. These rules typically have the form of X counts as Y in C, where an object, person, or state of affairs X is assigned a special status, the Y status, such that the new status enables the person or object to perform functions that it could not perform solely in virtue of its physical structure but requires as a necessary condition the assignment of the status. The creation of an institutional fact is, thus, the collective assignment of a status function (Searle 2005: 21-22). Searle explicitly emphasizes the role of language in constructing institutions as he puts it, “instead of presupposing language and analyzing institutions, we have to analyze the role of language in the constitution of institution” (2005: 2). Both Rawls and Searle’s
definitions go beyond the regulative rules; they explicitly contain the constitutive dimensions of institutions.
In Economics, Olinor Ostrom defines institution as “prescriptions that human use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions” (2005:3). Acknowledging
the disagreements on the definition of institution in social science, Ostrom decided to focus on one component of institution, social rules. She defines rules as “shared
understandings by participants about enforced prescriptions concerning what actions (or outcomes) are required, prohibited, or permitted (2005: 18; italic original). “Well- understood and enforced rules operate so as to rule out some actions and rule in others” (Ibid.).
Ostrom also highlights the language character of institutions. “All rules are formulated in human language. As such, rules share problems of lack of clarity, misunderstandings, and change that typify any language-based phenomenon.”
The stability of rule-ordered actions is dependent upon the shared meaning assigned to words used to formulate a set of rules. If no shared meaning exists when a rule is formulated, confusion will exist about what actions are required, permitted, or forbidden. Regularities in action cannot result if those who must repeatedly interpret the meaning of a rule within action situation arrive at multiple interpretations…Even if shared meaning exists at the time of the acceptance of a rule, transformations in technology, in shared norms, and in circumstances more generally change the events to which rules apply (20).
The economist Douglass North offers a different definition, “institutions are the rules of the game in a society, or more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction…In consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic” (1990:3). Ostrom and North’s definitions
emphasize the regulative dimensions of institutions over the constitutive dimensions. Finally, March and Olsen define institution as
a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals and changing external circumstances. (2009)
Common Shortcomings in the Literature on Institutions
The short review of definitions of institutions clearly illustrates the absence of clear consensus on the meaning of institution. “A lot of work [still] must be done on determining exactly what goes under the title of an “institution” (Plott 1979:160; in Ostrom 1986: 3). Thus, it is important to clearly define institution before discussing the institution of sovereignty. Different definitions of institution above could lead to different approaches to the study the particular institution of sovereignty. For example, Searl’s definition of institution leads to a particular perspective on sovereignty, which is very different from our perspective on sovereignty if we adopt Mearshiemer or Keohane’s definitions of institution.
Besides the definitional problem, the literature on institutions does not provide much help to conduct research on institutional change. “While institutional analysis has earned prominent place in contemporary social science, the vast literature that has accumulated provides us with precious little guidance in making sense of processes of institutional change” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010:2).
The current literature tends to perceive institution as undivided whole, limiting the capacity to identify different dimensions of institutional change. But “institutions are multidimensional entities” (Campbell 2004:174). Unpacking the multi-dimensional aspect of institution is important for the study of institutional change. “If we want to better identify patterns of institutional change and avoid mistaking one pattern for another, then specifying important institutional dimensions and mapping them over an appropriate time frame is important” (Campbell 2004: 61). Some dimensions of the
institution might change while others remain constant. Also, different elements of the institution might change at different time pace (Campbell 2004: 31-39).
Regarding institution as a black box or undivided coherent whole also overlooks endogenous causes of institutional change. Endogenous causes of institutional change result from interaction between the different elements that compose institution (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 1-37). By not unpacking institutions, researchers restrict the causes of institutional change only to exogenous forces (outside the institution itself) (Ibid.)
The current literature on institutions also tends to regard institutions as discrete. There is tendency to study particular institutions as they operate in institutional vacuum, overlooking interactions between institutions as well as combined effects of institutions.
In the following section, I will offer a framework of institution that overcomes the above shortcomings in the literature. It includes the constitutive and regulative
dimensions of institution, allows us to unpack institution into its components, which is helpful for the study of institutional change, and it also allows us to study interactions between institutions and their combined effects.
Social Institution: A New Definition and Framework Social institution is a cluster of interconnected rules, roles, positions and practices. Rules, positions, roles, and practices are the four elements or dimensions of institution. They can also be seen as four levels of analysis of an institution.40
For the purpose of this dissertation, I define social institution as a set of connected (formal and informal) rules that define social positions, prescribe their behavioral roles,
and state how these roles are performed on the ground (i.e. practices). Of course this definition exclude some dimensions that included in the above definitions but in my view these four elements are still the most fundamental ones and they are particularly useful for the study of sovereignty and change in sovereignty.
Social institutions perform the following four functions: 1) Defining social positions;
2) Stating how participants enter or leave social positions;
3) Prescribing the behavioral roles of the social positions--which actions participants in these positions are required, permitted, or forbidden to take; 4) Specifying how the social roles are performed on the ground (practices).41 Roles are “behavioral norms and expectations associated with social position” (Donnelly 2011: 11). They specify the rights, duties as well as permitted, required, and forbidden behavior of the occupants of social positions. Institutional practices are the realized patterns of behavior that are prescribed by the roles of the institution. Realized practices embody, act out and possibly reify the inter-subjective content of the institution (rules, positions, and roles).
Realized practices are the highest level of institutionalization of an institution. Realized practices are the realized patterns of behavior that are prescribed by the institution. But not all institutions reach this high stage of institutionalization. It is an empirical question whether institutions reach the stage of realized practices.
Not all patterns of behavior are institutional practices. Patterns of behavior become institutional practices only when they embody rules, roles, and positions of the institution (inter-subjective knowledge). The pattern of behavior of balance of power in Kenneth Waltz theory (1979), for example, is not institutional practice. But the pattern of behavior of balance of power in Hedley Bull’s Anarchical Society is institutional practice (1977).
This definition includes constitutive and regulative dimensions of institution. It includes defining social positions (constitutive dimension) and prescribing behavioral roles (regulative dimension). This definition does not specify the origins of the
institutions. They might be human-designed projects (which are the focus of rationalist theories) or they can evolve out of historical patterns of behavior, routines, and for
granted assumptions (which is what Constructivists focus on). My definition of institution also allows the researcher to test empirically the impact of institution on the behavior and expectations of the actors instead of including institutional effects within the definition of the institution.
Unpacking the structure of the institution into rules, positions, roles and practices is also helpful for a more sophisticated research on inter-subjectivity of the institution. This definition allows us to explore the inter-subjectivity of the different elements of the institution (rules, position, roles, and practices). The level of inter-subjectivity may differ across the roles, rules, positions and practices of the institutions. For example, an
institution might enjoy absolute shared meaning at the level of rules and positions but experience different interpretations at the level of roles and practices. The formal rules of the institution might be shared inter-subjective fact but the roles and practices of the
institution might not. Also, different institutions offer different degrees of discretion at the level of interpretation of behavioral roles and the level of enactment of roles (practices).42
This definition is also helpful for studying institutional change. Accordingly, there are four dimensions of institutional change: rules, positions, roles, and practices. Not all elements of the institution change simultaneously. Changes in one dimension may or may not cause changes in the other. Rules can remain formally the same but the behavior expectations are interpreted and enacted in new ways. Also it might take time for changes in formal rules to be translated into changes in practices. And changes in roles do not necessarily cause changes in positions or formal rules. In contrast, IR rationalist and constructivist perspectives on institutions, which see institution as undivided whole, cannot account for this variation inside institutions.
This perspective on institutions also offers new insights on the relative power of agency and institution. Agency has more freedom for creativity and change at the levels of practices and roles. Institutional ambiguities at the level of role and practices “provide critical openings to creativity and agency” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 12). “The fact that rules are not just designed but also have to be applied and enforced, often by actors other than the designers, opens up space (as both an analytic and a practical matter) for change to occur in a rule’s implementation or enactment” (13).
42 Similarly, Donnelly (2013) unpacks the institution of human rights into principle,
interpretation, and implementation. He argues that human rights are universal (which in my view he means universal inter-subjective fact) only at the principle level but less so at the levels of interpretation and implementation.
Change in institution could occur “in the “gaps” or “soft spots” between the rule and its behavioral interpretation [roles] or the rule and its practices” (14). “There is simply a great deal of “play” in the interpreted meaning of particular rules or in the way the rules are instantiated in practice” (11). Therefore, “Institutional stability ultimately depends not only on the continuity of the rules themselves but also on the ways in which those rules are instantiated in practice” and also on the interpretations and enactments of roles (13).
The relations between the four dimensions of institution (rules, positions, roles, and practices) are mutual, interconnected and interdependent. They are all equally
important. Yet, we can still identify the structure of institution, for analytical purposes, as the following top-down relationship.
Figure 1: The structure of social institution.
This particular top-down structure is justified by the following relations between the elements of the institution. Patterns of behavior must embody inter-subjective
Rules
Positions
Roles
knowledge (rules, roles, and position) to be called practices. Otherwise it is just mechanical patterns of behavior. Also, practices are the performance of the roles. No practices without roles. Notice also that there are no roles without positions. Roles are behavioral expectations of social positions, so positions must exist before roles. Finally, there are no positions without rules that define these positions. But practices not only sustain but they also may change the above elements of the institution (roles, positions, and rules).
How do we see social institutions? The obvious indicators of institutions are the formal written ones but there are also the informal institutions. They can be seen