Paternalism draws its name from the analogy with the relation of father and child, where the father is acting on the child’s behalf and with the intent to benefit the child. However, political subjects do not appreciate being treated as children. This deprives them from their right to self-determination. Is this negative connotation of paternalism justifiable?
In defining paternalism, Joel Feinberg makes a quite instructive distinction to presumptively blamable and presumptively not blamable paternalism. In his book Harm to Self (1989), he distinguishes between:
“ 1. Presumptively blamable paternalism, which consists in treating adults as if they were children, or older children as if they were younger children, by forcing them to act or forbear in certain ways, either-
a. (benevolent paternalism) “for their own good”, whatever their wishes in the matter (this may or may not be blamable in the last analysis; that is the question at issue), or-
b. (nonbenevolent paternalism) for the good of other parties (e.g. teachers or factory managers), whatever their own wishes in the matter (This is generally thought to be blamable.)
2. Presumptively nonblamable paternalism, which consists of defending relatively helpless or vulnerable people from external dangers, including harm from other people when the protected parties have not voluntarily consented to the risk, and doing this in a manner
analogous in its motivation and vigilance to that in which parents protect their children”
(Feinberg 1989:5).
This second type of paternalism, the presumptively nonblamable, is not controversial and is not of my interest here since it does not deal with the actors that are not of normal physical or psychological capabilities, and hence per se cannot be taken to be equal contributors in social cooperation.81
Genuine paternalism is explicated by Finberg in the cases 1 a. and 1 b. Postulating non-paternalism means arguing against these two cases. Therefore, I am interested in why this type of paternalism is presumptively blamable; the circumstances in which paternalistic behavior originates; and what the structure of it is.
The structure of presumptively blamable benevolent paternalism can be summarized in the following way:
A is paternalistic towards the B if and only if:
1. A aims to bring about that which, with respect to some state(s) of affairs, concerns B´s good in the circumstances when B´s choice or opportunity to choose and make decisions is denied or diminished;
2. A´s belief that A´s behavior promotes B´s good is the main reason for A´s behavior;
3. A is reluctant to the B´s belief that an A´s behavior does not promote B´s good.
While the structure of the presumptively blamable non-benevolent paternalism says as much as:
A is paternalistic towards the B if and only if:
1.A aims to bring about that which, with respect to some state(s) of affairs, concerns B´s good in the circumstances when B´s choice or opportunity to choose and make decisions is denied or diminished;
2. A´s belief that this behavior promotes both A´s and B´s good is the main reason for A´s behavior;
3. A is reluctant to B´s belief that A´s behavior does not promote B´s good at all.
The first condition in both cases says that the B is unable act out of some reason that is not conditioned
81It would be begging the question if I would argue that the law ought to protect those not capable by their intrinsic characteristics to defend themselves. Interference in their freedom of action is necessary and can be justified on the grounds that are not paternalistic, i.e. on the grounds of preventing harm being done to them. Even Rawls, who is fundamentally against paternalism, allows for this second option. He even builds it implicitly into the set-up of the original position as prevention for the case that the power of reason is lost. Only in this case one is allowed to make decisions for others, and thus in the following manner: “We must choose for others as we have reason to believe they would choose for themselves if they were at the age of reason and deciding rationally. Trustees, guardians, and benefactors are to act in this way, but since they usually know the situation and interests of their wards and beneficiaries, they can often make accurate estimates as to what is or will be wanted.”(TJ: 209).
by its natural capacities but it is rather conditioned by circumstances. This further initiates A to act or to make a decision either completely on B´s behalf or to guide B in making a certain decision. The reason why A does that has been specified by the second condition. A either evaluates what would be the best for B, or A calculates what would be best for both of them, i.e. how to use B´s incompetence for the mutual advantage. Thereby, it is said that it may happen that B is not in accordance with A´s decisions but is “forced” to follow them.
In both cases B is constrained in his liberty to act or choose; A is choosing for him. Therefore, it is also B´s autonomy that is constrained. I define autonomy in the Rousseau-Kant-Rawls’ tradition as that character trait which says that we are to abide only by the laws that we have chosen ourselves. As Rawls puts it “…acting autonomously is acting from principles that we would consent to as free and equal rational beings and that we are to understand in this way. Also, these principles are objective.
They are the principles that we would want everyone (including ourselves) to follow were we to take up together the appropriate general point of view.” (TJ: 516) Consequently, we only approve institutions that provide for the individuals that are “self-authenticated sources of valid claims” (JF: 23). Neither of the presumptively blamable paternalisms seems to respect this.
In case 1a, A tries to do what is best for B. However, it is highly questionable how a third person can know what that best is, no matter how benevolent that person might be. Furthermore, as soon as the third person, in our case A, makes a decision or forces B into a decision of which he is not convinced, B´s autonomy has been disrupted. His freedom has also been disrupted, but this is something that has been in question from the very beginning, otherwise we would even get into “the business” of paternalism.
The way of justifying benevolent paternalism would be to declare it educative, in the sense that A´s goal is to teach B how to start making decisions on its own. However, it is questionable how much of B´s autonomy can be saved if A and A´s tradition perform its authority in educating B. This influence endangers B´s self-determination process. This means imposing a model of thinking on B, which A claims is best for B, instead of just letting B think for him/herself. It is a delicate version of autonomy encroachment.
Many philosophers, e.g. Gerald Dworkin, Joel Feinberg, have thus approved this kind of paternalism.
Dworkin argues that paternalistic restrictions are justifiable when they heighten a person’s ability to lead a rationally ordered life. Dworkin advocates moral paternalism, which says that the rationally ordered life does not necessary mean a better life in terms of welfare, but in terms of ethical values. The influence is justified if we are to make the influenced person a better person by it, even if he/she does
not recognize it. Feinberg’s position, on the other hand, is justification of criminal law. He argues that the state has a right to prevent self-harmful conduct even when it is non-voluntarily or when temporary intervention is necessary to establish whether it is voluntarily or not.82 Both Dworkin´s moral paternalism and Feinberg’s legal paternalism presuppose a unified moral or legal community, which shares in Dworkin´s case same moral values, and in Feinberg’s case the same conception of “harm”.
Thus, these paternalistic behaviors cannot be easily justified on a global level.
The case 1b is less controversial than 1a. This case does not even hide the fact that it does not primarily care for the good of B. It takes it into account only secondarily. In the forefront of assistance is the self-interest of A. Hence, it is clear that B´s freedom of action will be influenced; however, his autonomy, his way of thinking, and his possible wish for self-determination will not be touched. A in this second case does not go beyond fulfilling his own needs and influencing B´s actions in that direction.
What B really thinks is of no interest for A. The stability of the resulting state of affairs is fragile since as soon as B gains freedom it may rebel. This is why Realpolitik cannot lead to a stable and durable world order: it does not constrain autonomy, it constrains freedom of action in such a manner that autonomy cannot come to its expression, but it might as soon as there is an opportunity for it.
Thus, we can conclude with Rawls that political society, especially a global one, cannot generally be constituted on the principle of paternalism. Even if the general capacities, wishes and needs of men were known, each individual, still needs to find them for himself/herself and therefore political institutions need to support an individual’s autonomy and its free development. Paternalism in its genuine sense neglects freedom and autonomy of its subjects.
The question is if not paternalistically, then what is the way to assist those who in a particular moment in time lack a power to choose or make a decision. My answer is through solidarity. Solidarity means the relation of equal comrades. One comrade stands in for the other if the freedom of the other has, for some reason, been violated. Both are autonomous beings knowing fairly well what needs they have and what values they advocate. They help each other so that their autonomy may reach its full expression.
The true problem with paternalism is the third premise (see the above formal account of paternalism):
“A is reluctant to the B´s belief that an A´s behavior does not promote B´s good”. If, however, the assistance offered offers also expertise for the problem, in such a manner as for a solution to be a
82The example Feinberg gives is wearing the seatbelts in cars. The state forces everyone to wear seatbelts; not wearing them could cause harm, which is unintended by people who do not wear them. Thus, the state prevents people from involuntary self-harm.
mutual endeavor of A and B and in so convincing to both A and B (whatever option they might have held before) than one may say that the paternalism-objection has been rebutted.
This is, of course, a comprehensive endeavor and accrues a lot of discussion between the parties.
Public reason plays a role; even employment of the third parties is recommendable. A process of reflection needs to establish its equilibrium with all the participants. Since the process is complicated not all political issues can be dealt with in this way. Many state laws, like criminal law for example, need to be somewhat paternalistic and this is justifiable by the set of shared values in society. Hence, it is taken to be known what the others need. Globally this is not the case; therefore, global issues need to be settled through solidarity, i.e. through discussion between the parties and benefactors formal support for the content produced and approved by the beneficiary society.83